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DISMANTLING THE MASTER’S HOUSE: TOWARD A JUSTICEBASED THEORY OF COMMUNITY ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
Etienne C. Toussaint*
ABSTRACT
Since the end of the American Civil War, scholars have debated the efficacy of
various models of community economic development, or CED. Historically, this
debate has tracked one of two approaches: place-based models of CED, seeking to
stimulate community development through market-driven economic growth
programs, and people-based models of CED, focused on the removal of structural
barriers to social and economic mobility that prevent human flourishing. More
recently, scholars and policymakers have turned to a third model from the impact
investing community—the social impact bond, or SIB. The SIB model of CED
ostensibly finds a middle ground by leveraging funding from private impact
investors to finance social welfare programs within marginalized communities.
SIBs seemingly answer the call of local government law scholars of the New
Regionalists movement who advocate for governmental mechanisms that facilitate
regional cooperation, address equity concerns, and respect local government
autonomy. However, this Article argues that the SIB model of impact investing
will struggle to advance metropolitan equity due to its grounding in the politics of
neoliberalism.
After highlighting limitations of the SIB, this Article links contemporary
debates about CED theory to historical contestations within the black community
about economically-oriented racial uplift strategies. Placing historical figures, such
as W.E.B. Du Bois and Booker T. Washington, in conversation with more
contemporary theorists of political philosophy, this Article offers an alternative
conceptual framework of CED. Termed justice-based CED, this framing
distinguishes a typology of social change that places democracy at the epicenter of
the development debate and points toward the political principles of the solidarity
economy as guideposts for law reform. The justice-based approach rests upon three
core values: social solidarity, economic democracy, and solidarity economy. Taken
together, this perspective reflects a vision of political morality that embodies one of
America’s most foundational democratic values—human moral dignity.

*
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“It’s funny how money change a situation / Miscommunication
lead to complication / My emancipation don’t fit your equation / I
was on the humble you on every station.”—Lauryn Hill, Lost
1
Ones
“Democracy is flawed both economically and socially . . . justice for
Black people cannot be achieved without radical changes in the
2
structure of our society.”—Martin Luther King, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
I grew up in the birthplace of hip-hop. As a young boy, the
South Bronx felt like an oasis in New York City’s burgeoning metropolis; a concrete playground filled with infectious hip-hop music and inspiring graffiti art murals; a predominantly black and
Hispanic family of families brimming with cultural diversity; a textured mosaic of style colored by a broad spectrum of hardworking
immigrants chasing an ever-elusive American Dream. My summer
days were filled with the sounds of children laughing in the street

1.
2.

LAURYN HILL, Lost Ones, on THE MISEDUCATION OF LAURYN HILL (1998).
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., A Testament of Hope, in THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES (1969).
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as they danced barefoot under fire hydrant showers, while evenings
featured sports broadcasters narrating the New York Yankees’ latest
victory through my grandfather’s shortwave radio. We Bronxians
3
shared in the riches of a “cultural collective efficacy” that imbued
4
us with a sense of joy and pride in our uptown community.
However, the media routinely depicted the South Bronx with far
more hackneyed metaphors; nightly news reports displayed a lowincome urban neighborhood poisoned by a culture of negative attitudes, wayward values, and unlawful conduct that had resulted in
a debilitating, yet persistent, state of social dysfunction—failing
public education, unflagging unemployment, rampant drug use,
5
and widespread criminal activity. While I observed some of these
social challenges firsthand, the assumptions about the character
and conviction of Bronx residents, in my estimation, undermined
6
the positive social capital that I witnessed during my adolescence. I
would soon discover that what American philosopher Cornel West
refers to as a “sentimental nihilism” had not only infiltrated media
culture in the Bronx, but had also shaped the perspective of local
governments who sought to improve the lives of their urban resi7
dents. I would also learn that the same jaundiced narratives of
poverty, and the same stereotypical perspectives on urban culture
8
that plagued my childhood neighborhood of the Bronx, have
9
manifested in other low-income communities around the country.

3.
See Lisa Alexander, Hip-Hop and Housing: Revisiting Culture, Urban Space, Power, and
Law, 63 HASTINGS L. J. 803, 829–30 (2012) (“Cultural collective efficacy is a form of positive
bonding social capital generated through participation in cultural endeavors, which enables
some low-income, inner-city residents to mitigate the negative effects of living in a poor, racially segregated, and disinvested community.”).
4.
Historians of urban culture locate the birthplace of hip-hop, which comprises not
only the oral tradition called rapping, but also the hip-hop elements of breakdancing, graffiti art, DJing, and beatboxing, in New York City’s Bronx borough neighborhoods. See generally
Jeff Chang, CAN’T STOP WON’T STOP: A HISTORY OF THE HIP-HOP GENERATION 67–85 (2005).
5.
Hauntingly similar to present-day stories about low-income communities across
America, I still vividly recall the media narrative of Amadou Diallo, a young black man who
was shot forty-one times by police officers in front of his Bronx apartment building after his
pager was mistaken for a gun. See Michael Cooper, Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, and an Unarmed Man Is Killed, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/05/
nyregion/officers-in-bronx-fire-41-shots-and-an-unarmed-man-is-killed.html?pagewanted=all.
6.
See generally KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, FROM #BLACKLIVESMATTER TO BLACK
LIBERATION 218 (2016) (“Historically, the insistence that Black deprivation is rooted in
Black culture and in Black people has deflected attention away from the systemic roots of
racism, compelling African Americans to look inward instead of making demands on the
state and others.”).
7.
See CORNEL WEST, DEMOCRACY MATTERS: WINNING THE FIGHT AGAINST IMPERIALISM
36 (Reprint ed. 2005) (defining “sentimental nihilists” as those who are “willing to sidestep
or even bludgeon the truth or unpleasant and unpopular facts and stories, in order to provide an emotionally satisfying show.”).
8.
See infra section I. Within this Article, I take a Hegelian view toward the term ‘poverty’ as a state of material lack leading to a “socially frustrated personality.” E.g., C. J. Pereira
Di Salvo, Hegel’s Torment: Poverty and the Rationality of the Modern State, in HEGEL AND
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Today, countless twenty-first century black and brown communities across America are facing the same socio-economic challenges
10
that preoccupied many twentieth century development efforts.
Not only has income inequality risen in the past few decades, but
wages for low-income workers have remained relatively stagnant.
Further, our recent housing crisis (coupled with a resulting economic recession) has deepened the wealth gap between white and
11
non-white households. We are witnessing a dramatic rise in the
12
concentration of poverty across America. The number of Americans living in high-poverty neighborhoods has nearly doubled
since the year 2000, and black Americans and Latinos, in particular, are more than twice as likely to live in poverty as non-Latino
13
white Americans. With costly environmental and financial disasters tugging at the seams of social cohesion, many are now calling
into question conventional wisdom about prevailing economic and
14
political institutions. America’s democratic project, it seems, is
CAPITALISM 101, 110 ( Andrew Buchwalter ed., 2015) (“For Hegel, what is problematic is not
just that the impoverished individual is dependent on the arbitrary wills of the wealthy. Rather, poverty is problematic because those who are subject to that condition are rendered incapable of realizing their personality.”) (emphasis in original).
9.
See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE MAKING OF FERGUSON: PUBLIC POLICIES AT THE
ROOT OF ITS TROUBLES 2 (2014) (“Government policies turned black neighborhoods into
overcrowded slums and white families came to associate African Americans with slum conditions. White homeowners fled when African Americans moved nearby, fearing their new
neighbors would bring slum conditions with them.”).
10.
See, e.g., Scott Cummings, Thematic Overview: Community Development Law and Economic Justice—Why Law Matters, 26 J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUS. AND CMTY. DEV. L. 31 (2017) (“At
some level, distressingly, after all this time and work by so many committed and courageous
people, we still confront the intransigent problems of class division, racial discrimination
and segregation, and disregard for the plight of the most vulnerable members of our society.”).
11.
Trina Jones, Occupying America: Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., The American Dream, and
the Challenge of Socio-Economic Inequality, 57 VILLANOVA L. REV. 339, 348–49 (2012) (“From
2005 to 2009, black households lost just over half of their median net worth and Latino
households lost 66%, compared with white families, who lost 16% of their net worth.”);
Janelle Jones, The Racial Wealth Gap: How African Americans Have Been Short-Changed Out of the
Materials to Build Wealth, EPI.ORG (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.epi.org/blog/the-racialwealth-gap-how-african-americans-have-been-shortchanged-out-of-the-materials-to-buildwealth/ (“More than one in four black households have zero or negative net worth, compared to less than one in ten white families without wealth, which explains the large differences in the racial wealth gap . . . .”).
12.
Cf. TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 11 (“Over the last twenty-five years, the disparity in
household wealth has tripled; today, white median wealth (as opposed to income) is
$91,405, compared to $6,446 for African American households.”).
13.
MARJORIE KELLY & SARAH MCKINLEY, DEMOCRACY COLLABORATIVE, CITIES BUILDING
COMMUNITY WEALTH 10 (2015), https://democracycollaborative.org/sites/clone.
community-wealth.org/files/downloads/CitiesBuildingCommunityWealth-Web.pdf; see generally Angus Deaton, The U.S. Can No Longer Hide from Its Deep Poverty Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/opinion/poverty-united-states.html (noting that “there are 5.3 million Americans who are absolutely poor by global standards.”).
14.
See Peter Utting, Introduction to SOCIAL AND SOLIDARITY ECONOMY: BEYOND THE
FRINGE? 5–6 (2015) (“Recurring crises linked to finance, food and energy, as well as awareness of climate change, have fueled collective and solidaristic forms of coping, producing,
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failing marginalized, low-income families in record numbers, and
the promises of uplift evoked by the American Dream too oft have
remained simply that—lofty and sweet sounding dreams for our na15
tion’s poorest citizens.
My experiences in the Bronx have taught me that poverty manifests across a wide spectrum of social dimensions (e.g., legal, educational, political, psychological, etc.), beckoning a diversity of
community development strategies. Generally, community development describes a process whereby community members, alongside
civic leaders and government stakeholders, develop communityoriented strategies to address local economic, political, social, and
16
environmental problems. However, economists have historically
emphasized economic growth policies—from demand-side strategies, such as cutting taxes and interest rates, to supply-side interventions, such as deregulation and privatization—as market17
oriented solutions to ongoing social challenges. As a result, there
has been tension between proponents of community development
and economic development. Yet, legal scholars have long noted
the intersectionality of both approaches; arguing, for example, that
the social justice mission of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s
18
and 1960s — in many ways carried on by today’s movement for
19
black lives —is inextricably linked to the economic justice of mar20
ginalized communities.

and provisioning . . . and called into question conventional wisdom about growth and industrialization models.”).
15.
The continued salience of the “American Dream” represents what Frantz Fanon has
called the “colonization of the mind.” More than fifty years after its original publication,
Fanon’s text, Black Skin, White Masks, conveys themes about the public perceptions of
sources of individual wealth that endure today. See generally FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN,
WHITE MASKS (Grove Press 2008); see also RICH MORIN, RISING SHARE OF AMERICANS SEE
CONFLICT BETWEEN RICH AND POOR 3 (Pew Res. Ctr. 2012), http://assets.pewresearch.org/
wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/01/Rich_vs_poor-final_1-10-13.pdf (explaining that “a
46% plurality believes that most rich people ‘are wealthy mainly because they know the right
people or were born into wealthy families’ [while] . . . 43% say wealthy people became rich
‘mainly because of their own hard work, ambition or education.’”).
16.
David M. Chavis & Abraham Wandersman, Sense of Community in the Urban Environment: A Catalyst for Participation and Community Development, AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 55,
56 (1990).
17.
See generally Ronald F. Ferguson & William T. Dickens, Introduction to URBAN
PROBLEMS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (Ronald F. Ferguson & William T. Dickens eds.,
1999) (providing a survey of the history of urban development strategies in the twentieth
century aimed at improving the quality of life in low- to moderate-income neighborhoods).
18.
See CTR. FOR ECON. & SOC. JUSTICE, Defining Economic Justice and Social Justice (last
visited Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.cesj.org/learn/definitions/defining-economic-justice-andsocial-justice/ (defining social justice as the existence of institutions that “imposes on each
of us a personal responsibility to collaborate with others, at whatever level of the “Common
Good” in which we participate, to design and continually perfect our institutions as tools for
personal and social development.”).
19.
See Etienne C. Toussaint, Incarceration to Incorporation: Economic Empowerment for Returning Citizens Through Social Impact Bonds, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L.
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Accordingly, upon the heels of the Civil Rights Movement,
community economic development, or CED, emerged as a favored
approach by governments and lawmakers to resolve the social dimensions of intergenerational poverty through community21
oriented economic development efforts. Yet, there has been ongoing debate on the appropriate focus of CED laws and public policies designed to improve economic opportunities for vulnerable
22
citizens. CED has typically involved the creation of marketoriented, “place-based” government-sponsored programs that provide private investors with tax incentives to bring economic benefits (e.g., affordable housing and business enterprises) into low23
income communities. The place-based CED model embraces a
“localist” approach to governance that preserves the autonomy of
local governments to manage the financing and delivery of public

61, 62 n.3 (2016) (discussing the Black Lives Matter movement, which “seek[s] to affirm the
lives of Black men and women who, on a daily basis, experience the negative impacts of institutionalized white supremacy and structural racism in America.”).
20.
See Gary Chartier, Civil Rights and Economic Democracy, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 267, 267
(2000) (“At root, civil rights struggles have consistently touched on questions, not only social and cultural, but also economic, questions about the organization and distribution of
economic power and material goods.”); Laurie Hauber, Promoting Economic Justice Through
Transactional Community-Centered Lawyering, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 4 (2007) (“Economic justice requires striving to eliminate the imbalance of social and economic power in
urban areas by providing equal access to economic opportunities.”); Susan R. Jones, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Legacy: An Economic Justice Imperative, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 44
(2005) (“It is my position that economic justice must be advanced independently and as a
critical part of social justice, racial justice and human rights.”).
21.
See Patience A. Crowder, Inequality, Economic Development, and the New Regional Community, 43 SW. L. REV. 569, 573, 577 (2014) (“As a matter of public policy, economic development programs are government-sponsored programs aimed at improving the economic
vitality of a particular sector within a government’s jurisdiction.”); Audrey G. McFarlane,
Race, Space and Place: The Geography of Economic Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 304–05
(1999) (“[T]he prevailing view [is] that law should be limited to ensuring equal opportunity
rather than equality of outcome. . . . law is relegated to what is viewed as the unambiguously
neutral, impartial, and supportive position of quietly facilitating the urban development
process.”).
22.
While some have called for a community orientation, others have emphasized business development, and still others have focused on the intersectional nature of economic
development. For discussions of historic community-oriented lawyering efforts in the poverty law context, see generally, Susan D. Bennett, On Long-Haul Lawyering, 25 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 771, 784–85 (1998); Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67 (2000); Lucie E. White, Feminist Microenterprise: Vindicating the Rights of Women in the New Global Order?, 50 ME. L. REV. 327 (1998). For discussions
of historic lawyering efforts focused on stimulating microenterprise development, see generally SUSAN R. JONES, A LEGAL GUIDE TO MICROENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT: BATTLING POVERTY
THROUGH SELF-EMPLOYMENT: A RESOURCE MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND STAFF IN
MICROENTERPRISE PROGRAMS (Am. Bar Ass’n 1998); Susan R. Jones, Small Business and Community Economic Development: Transactional Lawyering for Social Change and Economic Justice, 4
CLINICAL L. REV. 195 (1997).
23.
The market-based strategy stands in contraposition to “community” economic development, which refers to “social, human, and physical . . . activities at the neighborhood
or community level,” empowering residents of marginalized neighborhoods to improve
their livelihoods and community. See McFarlane, supra note 21, at 296–97.
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24

welfare services. Conversely, instead of focusing on the geographic boundaries of place, some advocates have called for a “peoplebased” approach to CED, urging low-income families to “move to
opportunity” in wealthier neighborhoods through social mobility
25
programs. The people-based CED model embraces a “regionalist”
approach to governance, calling for the creation of regional government structures to tackle metropolitan inequality or, at best, as
26
many in the New Regionalist movement propose, regional modes
of informal cooperation or collaboration. Both the place-based
and people-based approaches have faced criticism for their inability to meet the needs of all low-income families, and for their em27
bedded racialized narratives about low-income neighborhoods.
Pay-for-success financing has emerged as a new CED model that
ostensibly finds a middle ground in the ongoing development debate by transcending the ‘people’ versus ‘place’ dichotomy. It
seemingly offers what scholars have called a “new governance” approach to CED that engages non-traditional stakeholders in the
28
public decision-making process. Bolstered by a growing commu29
nity of socially conscious “impact investors,” the pay-for-success
24.
See generally Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1124 (1996) (discussing the normative goals of local government law).
25.
See, e.g., Sara Aronchick Solow, Note, Racial Justice at Home: The Case for OpportunityHousing Vouchers, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 481, 483 (2010) (arguing that opportunity vouchers lead to better outcomes for the housing insecure by eliminating racially concentrated
ghettos because they decentralize low-income tenants based on race which avoids replication of the poor housing conditions common to traditional housing place-based projects);
Jens Ludwig, et al., Neighborhood Effects on the Long-Term Well-Being of Low-Income Adults From
All Five Sites of the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 337 SCIENCE 1505 (2012).
26.
See MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND
STABILITY, 12–13 (1997); DAVID RUSK, INSIDE/OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR
URBAN AMERICA 153–335 (1999); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self Interest, and the Tyranny of
the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2028 (2000)
(explaining the term “new regionalism” as “any attempt to develop regional governance
structures or interlocal cooperative arrangements that better distribute regional benefits
and burdens.”); Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity and the New
Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93, 100–19 (2003); David D. Troutt, Katrina’s Window: Localism,
Resegregation, and Equitable Regionalism, 55 BUFFALO L. REV. 1109, 1172 (2008) (describing
new regionalist strategies as a form of “equitable regionalism,” which “recognizes that issues
with distinct equity implications should be susceptible to regional cooperation because they
are typically the subject of localist opposition”).
27.
See generally infra section I.B.
28.
Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction,
28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1674 (2001) (defining new governance as “the wide array of
tools now being used to address public problems . . . the increased substitution of complex
networks of organizations for the rigid hierarchies of old to solve public problems . . . .”).
29.
While the term “impact investing” is relatively new, it builds upon America’s rich
tradition of corporate philanthropy, pioneered by altruistic corporate titans like Andrew
Carnegie, founder of the Carnegie Steel Corporation, and Henry Ford, founder of the Ford
Motor Company. Indeed, the Ford Foundation remains an influential player in the impact
investing community today. See Emily Chasan, Ford Foundation to Put $1 Billion of Endowment
in Impact Funds, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
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model—typified by the social impact bond, or SIB—facilitates social
30
infrastructure development that empowers marginalized individuals with resources to thrive in the communities where they live.
Under the SIB, impact investors assume the financial risks of social
welfare programs by taking a monetary loss if the program is unsuccessful, and only earn a return on their investment if government cost savings are achieved. Despite the SIB’s growing popularity, this Article argues that the SIB will struggle to advance
31
metropolitan equity because it is not a distinct theory of development, but merely a new instantiation of neoliberal rationality.
New Regionalists have long called for actionable frameworks to
guide mechanisms of regional cooperation and collaboration that
promote metropolitan equity while respecting local government
32
autonomy.
Responding to the call, this Article articulates an alternative
33
conceptual framework of CED. Termed justice-based CED, this
2017-04-05/ford-foundation-to-put-1-billion-of-endowment-in-impact-funds; see also Chelsea
McGrath, The Government’s Role in Unleashing Impact Investing’s Full Potential, 44 PEPP. L. REV.
799, 802 (2017) (“Impact investing refers to ‘investments made into companies, organizations, and funds with the intention to generate social and economic impact alongside a financial return.’”).
30.
Social infrastructure programs target challenges like prisoner recidivism or homelessness by making strategic investments into the health, housing, education, and employment of underserved populations. See GEORGIA LEVENSON KEOHANE, Innovative Finance in
Communities Across the United States, in CAPITAL AND THE COMMON GOOD: HOW INNOVATIVE
FINANCE IS TACKLING THE WORLD’S MOST URGENT PROBLEMS, 148, 156–57 (2016).
31.
See David Troutt, Inclusion Imagined: Fair Housing as Metropolitan Equity, 65 BUFFALO
L. REV. 5, 11 (2016) (defining metropolitan equity as “the idea that all parts of a region are
relevant to the distribution of opportunity in any part, and that remedies for expanding
mobility can and should be assessed on an equitable basis.”).
32.
See for example Troutt, supra note 26, at 1173 (noting “equitable regionalism is a
principle of local government law reform by which states enact legislation to compel interlocal cooperation where equity, and often efficiency, demand it. Its goal is a more even distribution of state resources across municipal populations, the transformation of marginal areas
into more integrated communities and the reduction of significant disparities in the provision of public and private services among localities”).
33.
The justice-based conceptual framework discussed herein builds upon the voluminous work of critical and progressive scholars who have called for “community-oriented”
economic development processes. See, e.g., Peter Pitegoff, Community Development Law, Economic Justice, and the Legal Academy, 26 J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUS. AND CMTY DEV. L. 31 (2017)
(“[N]ew approaches to local development and related lawyering, philosophies underlying
these new approaches, and dramatic changes in context challenge us to reimagine the
framework of community economic development.”); Roger A. Clay Jr. and Susan R. Jones, A
Brief History of Community Economic Development, 18 J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L.
257, 257 (2009) (“It has been described as a strategy that includes a wide range of economic
activities and programs for developing low-income communities such as affordable housing
and small business development.”); Michael R. Diamond , Community Economic Development: A
Reflection on Community, Power and the Law, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 151, 166 (2004)
(“Community economic development is more than the creation of jobs, the provision of
goods and services and the accumulation of individual wealth. . . . [It is a process whereby]
assets are marshaled, institutions built and power acquired and used.”); WILLIAM H. SIMON,
THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW
SOCIAL POLICY 3 (Duke Univ. Press 2002) (“[T]he core definition of CED embraces (1) ef-
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framing distinguishes a typology of social change premised on a
theoretical deconstruction of neoliberalism’s illusion of justice. By
shifting conceptions of liberty from notions of non-interference to
standards of non-dominance, the justice-based approach urges advocates, development practitioners, and lawmakers alike to reconsider the political philosophy that underlies predominant approaches to economic development. By prioritizing human moral
dignity as fundamental to notions of justice, establishing dignity as
coextensive with liberty, and elevating political equality as intrinsically valuable to liberty, justice-based CED places democracy at the
epicenter of the economic development debate.
Importantly, the justice-based framing recognizes that America’s
development challenges are not merely social or economic; they
are systemic to the very fabric of American political identity, a
hoary tapestry of ideological, institutional, and epistemological realities woven together by an unwillingness to transcend neoclassical
34
35
economic norms or combat neoliberal politics. Although emerging CED models like the SIB appear capable of overcoming the
troubles of neoliberalism by leveraging capitalism’s inherent profit
motive to advance social good, this Article argues that the SIB’s
underlying commitment to the dogma of market fundamental36
ism —a belief in unregulated economic activity to resolve societal
inequality—reveals the larger logic of neoliberalism’s entrenchment. Conversely, if governments reconsider the economic principles that lie beneath dominant approaches to CED, new strategies

forts to develop housing, job, or business opportunities for low-income people, (2) in which
a leading role is played by nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations (3) that are accountable to residentially defined communities.”); Cummings, supra note 10, at 35 (“CED law is
now less a body of activity or doctrine that can be empirically defined or normatively derived, and more a set of basic questions about the content and control of local struggles for
change, the role and responsibility of a democratic government to promote equality and
economic security for its people, and the potential of collaboration or conflict to achieve
deep and sustained structural reforms.”).
34.
See infra section II.D.
35.
The term “neoliberalism” defined the 20th century resurgence of 19th century laissez-faire economic liberalization. See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2
(2005) (explaining that under neoliberal orthodoxy, “[s]tate interventions in markets (once
created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot
possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signal (prices) and because
powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions (particularly in
democracies) for their own benefit.”); see also NOAM CHOMSKY, PROFITS OVER PEOPLE:
NEOLIBERALISM AND GLOBAL ORDER 20 (1999) (explaining that the basic tenets of neoliberalism are “liberalize trade and finance, let markets set price (‘get prices right’), end inflation
(‘macroeconomic stability’), privatize”).
36.
See West, supra note 7, at 4–5 (explaining that market fundamentalism renders
“money-driven, poll-obsessed elected officials deferential to corporate goals of profit, often
at the cost of the common good” while placing “a premium on the activities of buying and
selling, consuming and taking, promoting and advertising, and devalues community, compassionate charity, and improvements of the general quality of life.”).
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for development will emerge. The justice-based framing points toward the “social and solidarity” economy (SSE or the solidarity
37
economy) as an alternative approach to economic life that is participatory, inclusive, and, perhaps most important, grounded in a
38
concern for economic democracy. SSE need not replace America’s capitalist system. Rather, SSE serves as an epistemological challenge to the capitalist paradigm that shapes our development perspective, pushing policymakers to reconsider the philosophical
principles and fundamental moral values that drive economic
transformation, thereby targeting the sickness of poverty at the
root.
Part I of this Article begins with a brief review of the history of
CED in America, tracing a narrative from the early workings of localist strategies like Urban Renewal to more recent regionalist
strategies like Housing Choice Vouchers, and finally ending with
current blended innovations like the pay-for-success SIB model.
These CED models have been equally propelled by a neoclassical
political economy and a neoliberal political ideology that reveals
an historical unwillingness to incorporate non-market goods (e.g.,
social capital, culture, decision-making power) into mainstream
theories of economic growth. Part I concludes with a discussion of
the limitations of these CED models, revealing their role in the rise
of neoliberal rationality.
Next, Part II seeks to steer the ongoing CED debate into new waters by erecting justice as its central mast. Shifting from a historic
focus on people versus place, it begins by asking the reader to rethink the concept of justice, recognizing that diverse perspectives
on liberty drive varied opinions on the demands of justice on our
political economy, rendering the dominant framing as subjective.
Then, it frames political equality as a foundational component of
democracy, revealing how democratizing the ownership of wealth
furthers the social justice work of the civil rights movement. Part II
concludes by exploring the guiding tenets of the solidarity econo-

37.
See Utting, supra note 14, at 1 (SSE refers to “forms of economic activity that prioritize social and often environmental objectives, and involve producers, workers, consumers
and citizens acting collectively and in solidarity . . . [not only] enterprises such as cooperatives, mutual associations, grant-dependent and service-delivery non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and community and other forms of volunteering and giving, but also myriad
types of self-help groups organizing to produce goods and services, fair trade networks and
other forms of solidarity purchasing, consumer groups involved in collective provisioning,
associations of ‘informal economy’ workers, new forms of profit-making social enterprises
and social entrepreneurs, and NGOs that are having to shift from a dependence on donations and grants to sustaining themselves via income-generating activities.”); see infra section
III.C.
38.
See Chartier, supra note 20, at 267 (defining “economic democracy” as a combination of “egalitarian self-government” and “economic justice”) (emphasis omitted).
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my, which it argues can fuel CED initiatives seeking to transgress
the limitations of neoliberalism for poverty alleviation.
Finally, Part III articulates a new justice-based conceptual framing of CED to guide emerging development strategies toward
achieving the regional equity goals of the New Regionalist movement. This framing rests upon three foundational pillars—(1) social solidarity: fostering political equality among members of a
community to overcome the political construction and racial dimensions of state-sponsored privilege; (2) economic democracy: democratizing the ownership of wealth-generating property to promote long-term metropolitan equity; and (3) solidarity economy:
crafting empowerment-centered and community-owned institutions to addresses the structural dimensions of systemic poverty.
Taken together, justice-based CED provides guideposts to steer
emerging CED programs toward building a world without poverty
by promoting an inclusive, participatory, and empowerment-driven
economy. Even more, it reflects a vision of political morality that
embodies one of America’s most foundational democratic values—
human moral dignity.
I.

THE RISE OF NEOLIBERAL RATIONALITY

Diverse perspectives on the role of government in economic life,
narratives of the relationship between citizens and their community, and wide-ranging beliefs about the interplay between economic
growth and community development have shaped the history of
community economic development in America. These perspectives, narratives, and beliefs are informed by problematic assumptions about race and class that obscure or, at times, elide the transformative potential of CED. Take, for example, my hometown of
the South Bronx. Several factors converged to make the Bronx an
economically and racially marginalized community. First, like other urban areas across America, the Bronx experienced the “white
flight” of white middle-class residents to opportunity-rich suburbs.
Second, frustrated by new rent control policies, landlords abandoned housing developments across the city. Third, the massive
construction of interstate highways financed by federal subsidies
39
plunged a primarily working-class community into steady decay.
These factors, among other social forces, transformed the Bronx
during the twentieth century.

39.
See generally Omar Freilla, Burying Robert Moses’s Legacy in New York City, in HIGHWAY
ROBBERY: TRANSPORTATION RACISM & NEW ROUTES TO EQUITY 77–78 (2004).
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By the 1970s, the Bronx would be described as “burning,” a
community riddled with abandoned apartment buildings, persis40
tent crime, and rising homicide rates. Stunted economic development and limited educational opportunities characterized an
41
overwhelming number of neighborhoods across the borough.
Moreover, public health declined due to the devastating impact of
42
the crack cocaine epidemic. By the 1990s and early 2000s, the
Bronx witnessed both a pervasive gang culture and the persistence
43
of concentrated poverty. Stereotypical and racialized narratives of
the Bronx blame low-income residents for these dynamic changes.
However, conventional narratives of poverty obscure a complex
history replete with instances of state-sponsored racial segregation
and massive resistance to integration that together created a geog44
raphy of economic inequality. Worse still, this story is evident in
cities across America, the byproduct of a textured history of CED
experimentation that has undermined the collective voice and individual dignity of the poor. Today, CED policies in America reveal
an entrenchment of neoliberal values that undermine poverty alleviation.
A. Historical Origins
Throughout American history, political leaders, legal scholars,
and public policy advocates have been divided on the appropriate
focus of laws and public policies designed to address poverty in
marginalized communities. After the emancipation of enslaved Af45
ricans in 1865, creating a nation of nominally free citizens living
in racially segregated communities with unequal access to social
mobility, some political leaders began advocating for a welfare
state political system, whereby the government would take a proactive role in protecting the social and economic well-being of her

40.
See Winnie Hu, Fighting the Image of the ‘Burning’ Borough, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2013, at
A13.
41.
Cf. id.
42.
See Gene Mustain, When the Crack Scourge Swept New York City, DAILY NEWS (Aug. 14,
2017),
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/crack-scourge-swept-new-york-city-article1.813844.
43.
See generally Edwin J. Torres, Bronx Cheer: The New York Borough that Once Symbolized
Urban Decline Is Safer and More stable–But Most Bronxites’ Lives Are Still Precarious, THE AM.
PROSPECT (Oct. 12, 2015), http://prospect.org/article/how-bronx-came-back-didnt-bringeveryone-along.
44.
See Edward C. Burks, Bronx Rate of Poverty Is Highest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1972, at 37
(“Of every 100 Bronx families, 15 were living below the poverty level in 1970.”).
45.
U. S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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46

citizens. Alternatively, others argued for a more conservative, ‘libertarian’ approach to governance, whereby state power would be
47
minimized and individual rights would reign supreme. Proponents of the latter libertarian political order encouraged a ‘laissezfaire’ style of capitalism that relied upon the private market to correct economic failures and on individual action to address social
48
inequality.
This dichotomy manifests in the historic dialogue between
Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois during the early 1900s
regarding the best strategies to aid formerly enslaved Africans in
resisting Jim Crow racial subordination and attaining social and
49
economic equality. Booker T. Washington advocated an “economic nationalist” approach to social empowerment that prioritized economic self-sufficiency for black Americans through prop50
erty and business ownership. Washington believed that black
Americans needed to first establish a thriving black economic in51
frastructure to serve as the foundation for political demands.
Conversely, W.E.B. Du Bois rose to national prominence as a civil
rights leader in the movement for racial equality under the law, a
political movement that he believed would be quickened by the
52
leadership of the black intellectual elite, or the “Talented Tenth.”
For Du Bois, the self-help approach of Washington expressed an

46.
From the Civil War period until the end of Reconstruction in 1877, a group of
American politicians known as the Radical Republicans and led by John C. Fremont, Charles
Sumner, and Thaddeus Stevens—to name a few—pioneered efforts to establish civil rights
for formerly enslaved Africans or African descendants, including the 1866 Civil Rights Act,
the 1867 Anti-Peonage Act, the 1868 Eight Hour Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment. Such
political efforts seen by some as a justifiable form of state-sponsored “reparations” for the
nation’s widespread endorsement of chattel slavery for the 200 years prior. See generally
HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION: RACE, LABOR, AND POLITICS
IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865–1901 (2004).
47.
Libertarianism emphasizes individual autonomy and freedom of choice, while calling for the restriction or dissolution of social institutions. The political philosophy melded
with the white supremacist views of the Redeemers, as well as the conservative and probusiness southern wing of the Bourbon Democrats who staunchly opposed the public welfare programs of the Reconstruction era. Cf. JOHN C. RODRIGUE, RECONSTRUCTION IN THE
CANE FIELDS: FROM SLAVERY TO FREE LABOR IN LOUISIANA’S SUGAR PARISHES, 1862–1880, 168
(2001).
48.
See generally Harvey, supra note 35, at 7 (“The assumption that individual freedoms
are guaranteed by freedom of the market and of trade is a cardinal feature of neoliberal
thinking, and it has long dominated the US stance towards the rest of the world.”).
49.
See W.E.B. Du Bois, Of Mr. Booker T Washington and Others, in THE SOULS OF BLACK
FOLK 62–72 (David W. Blight & Robert Gooding-Williams, eds., Bedford/St. Martin’s Press,
1997) (1903); Lateef Mtima, African-American Economic Empowerment Strategies for the New Millennium—Revisiting the Washington-DuBois Dialectic, 42 HOW. L.J. 391, 394–99 (1999).
50.
Scott Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Towards a
Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 410–11 (2001).
51.
See id. at 410.
52.
See W. E. B. Du Bois, The Talented Tenth, in THE NEGRO PROBLEM (James Pott & Co.,
1903).
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attitude of “acquiescent submission”—a voluntary surrendering of
53
self-respect that diminished the dignity of black Americans. Instead, Du Bois urged a “militant, self-respecting self-assertion directed against racial prejudice and racial injustice,” a moral stance
54
later embraced by civil rights activist Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Washington and Du Bois differed on their ideological beliefs
about black socio-economic empowerment. Washington favored a
market-oriented approach (albeit, a segregated market where
black businesses faced the threat of racial terrorism) that deemphasized political engagement, and Du Bois advanced a political
strategy that prioritized the removal of systemic barriers to social
55
and economic mobility. Notwithstanding, both men agreed that
economic justice for black communities was a necessary compo56
nent of black liberation. Thus, they shared a fundamental belief
in the value of black business ownership and the power of collective community engagement in the democratic process. In their
view, CED demanded a liberated economic market where notions
of race and class did not constrain human flourishing. Indeed, Du
Bois proposed the organization of black-owned cooperatives during the later years of his life, drawing him closer to the ideology of
Washington, and connecting him, in some ways, to the emigration57
ist politics of leaders like Marcus Garvey.
Despite the thoughtful engagement of early public intellectuals
like Washington and Du Bois, economic development was largely
viewed by political leaders as a byproduct of economic growth policies. As a result, early economic development programs spearheaded by the federal government adopted a place-based, localist
approach to poverty alleviation that experimented with various

53.
Robert Gooding-Williams, The Du Bois-Washington Debate and the Idea of Dignity, in TO
SHAPE A NEW WORLD: ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 21
(Tommie Shelby & Brandon M. Terry eds., 2018) [hereinafter TO SHAPE A NEW WORLD].
54.
See id. This position also reflects a viewpoint espoused by early abolitionist Frederick
Douglass. See Williams L. Andrews, FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE AND MY FREEDOM
(University of Illinois Press, 1987) (1855) (“A man without force is without the essential
dignity of humanity. Human nature is so constituted that it cannot honor a helpless man,
although it can pity him; and even this it cannot do long, if the signs of power do not
arise.”).
55.
See John Albert Foster-Bey, Jr., “Don’t Want Nobody to Give Me Nothing”: An Assessment of Black Community Self-Help 8–9 (Apr. 19, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
Geo. U.) (on file with Geo. U.), https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/
bitstream/handle/10822/557677/FosterBey_georgetown_0076D_11846.pdf?sequence=
1&isAllowed=y.
56.
See HAROLD MCDOUGALL, BLACK BALTIMORE: A NEW THEORY OF COMMUNITY 12–14
(1993).
57.
Marcus Garvey advocated black independence from a primarily white-owned economic market through the establishment of Black-owned business cooperatives. Cummings,
supra note 50, at 411–12.
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economic growth strategies. As early as the 1920s and 1930s, the
federal government began sponsoring “slum” clearance programs
59
in cities across the country. By the 1940s and 1950s, these pro60
grams became known as “Urban Renewal,” directing public subsidies into the pockets of private developers to encourage the creation of affordable housing for low-income residents and business
61
development for blighted urban neighborhoods. These strategies
were supported by local governments because residential and
commercial infrastructure projects promised measurable risk profiles and quantifiable financial returns, creating safe investments
62
that, over time, could attract more capital from private investors.
The place-based CED model meshed with localist perspectives on
local government law that “normalize[d] and entrenche[d] citi-

58.
Economic development programs have historically focused on mobilizing human
and financial capital to attract business investment and development in targeted urban
communities. See Crowder, supra note 21, at 572–73. While legal scholars and historians of
urban development often locate the origins of economic development in the early 1900s,
and the origins of “community” economic development in the Civil Rights Movement of the
1950s-1970s, the development of government programs to address social inequality has earlier roots. In 1865, President Abraham Lincoln established the Freedman’s Bureau, an
agency of the United States Department of War to “direct such issues of provisions, clothing,
and fuel, as he may deem needful for the immediate and temporary shelter and supply of
destitute and suffering refugees and freedmen and their wives and children.” See An Act to
Establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865). Unfortunately, due to the rise of Ku Klux Klan terrorism and political opposition to public welfare assistance for formerly enslaved Africans, the agency was removed. See Veto of the FreedPARK
SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/anjo/learn/
men’s
Bureau
Bill,
NAT’L
historyculture/freedmens-bureau.htm (last updated Apr. 14, 2015) (noting the veto of President Andrew Johnson, who felt that the Freedmen’s Bureau was “‘class legislation’ for a
particular segment of society that: a. Would keep the ex-slaves from being self-sustaining,
and b. Had not been done for struggling whites (like he had been as an ex-apprentice).”)
59.
See, e.g., ROBERT B. FAIRBANKS, THE WAR ON SLUMS IN THE SOUTHWEST: PUBLIC
HOUSING AND SLUM CLEARANCE IN TEXAS, ARIZONA, AND NEW MEXICO, 1935–1965 (2014);
McFarlane supra note 21, at 317.
60.
See McFarlane, supra note 21, at 332 (“[U]rban renewal certainly allowed cities to
transform their economies in the light of the disappearance of manufacturing jobs, [but] a
great many of the newly created jobs benefitted primarily suburban commuters. . . . [Urban
Renewal] often eliminated poor and working class neighborhoods and replaced them with
high-rise, luxury structures for the more affluent while concentrating public housing sites
within black neighborhoods.”).
61.
Many contend that these policies did not wrestle with the most important drivers of
urban poverty. Indeed, many scholars now agree that low-income neighborhoods were the
product of racial isolation policies coupled with intentional government neglect. See Susan
Bennett, The Possibility of a Beloved Place: Residents and Placemaking in Public Housing Communities, 19 SAINT LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 259, 262 (2000), [hereinafter Beloved Place] (“By architectural and political design, public housing complexes began their history in racial and geographical isolation, an isolation intensified over the years by demographic shifts, labor and
housing market forces, and vicissitudes of federal housing policy. Atrocious management
and withdrawal of federal financial support for maintenance made of many complexes notorious hellholes that replicated the worst features of the early twentieth century slums that
they were built to replace.”).
62.
See generally Keohane, supra note 30, at 156–57.
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63

zens’ private, market-based, racial, and economic preferences.”
Such preferences often resulted in a “deficiency-oriented” perspective of low-income urban neighborhoods, reinforcing negative
opinions of urban culture and racial stereotypes stemming from an
64
ideology of white supremacy. In many cities across America, including my hometown of the Bronx, large sections of low-income
minority neighborhoods were demolished and replaced with parks,
office buildings, and highways that connected the newly improved
65
areas to low-poverty, predominantly white suburbs. As Sheryll
Cashin explains, this method of development resulted in a “tyran66
ny of the favored quarter” —the birth of suburban rings that
reaped the benefits of economic development while externalizing
67
the costs and burdens to inner city slums.
Our modern, multidimensional conception of community economic development largely emerged during the Civil Rights
Movement of the 1950s to 1970s. Building upon the legacy of
W.E.B. Du Bois, pioneering civil rights leaders like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. helped to launch a people-based, grassroots political
action movement to end racial oppression and attain economic
68
justice for black Americans. Notwithstanding Dr. King’s visible
commitment to political activism, the economic nationalism of
Booker T. Washington remained an important strategy of the civil
rights movement, principally because its leaders recognized that
dismantling Jim Crow laws would not immediately address the material needs of low-income black communities, much less yield a
69
sense of human moral dignity. Indeed, in 1968, shortly before his
assassination, Dr. King launched the Poor People’s Campaign as a
hallmark of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference’s economic justice strategy, demanding an economic “Bill of Rights”
that sought to integrate the ownership of wealth through progres63.
See Lisa T. Alexander, The Promise and Perils of “New Regionalist” Approaches to Sustainable Communities, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 639 (2011), [hereinafter New Regionalist Approaches].
64.
See Beloved Place, supra note 61, at 270–71 (arguing that the “[p]opular conception
that community cannot grow in public housing has been reinforced by best-selling ‘hero
stories’” that present decaying communities “without even the possibility of redemption.”).
65.
See McFarlane, supra note 21, at 318 (“This approach to revitalization entailed replacing low-income neighborhoods, which were often black, with highways, sterile housing
developments, and municipal office complexes, an approach which became known as “Negro removal.”).
66.
See Cashin, supra note 26, at 2003.
67.
See id. at 2003–04.
68.
See generally THOMAS F. JACKSON, FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: MARTIN
LUTHER KING JR. AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE (2006).
69.
See Progressive Politics, supra note 50, at 414; see also Tommie Shelby, Prisons of the Forgotten: Ghettos and Economic Justice, in TO SHAPE A NEW WORLD, supra note 53, at 189. (“King
argued that ghetto social problems are rooted in economic disadvantage, particularly in unemployment, low wages, and restriction to menial labor.”).
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70

sive political reform. King believed that the civil rights movement
was not only a call for the recognition of black American dignity
through equal civil rights, but also a demand for black liberation
71
through economic justice. Other prominent civil rights leaders,
such as el-Hajj Malik el-Shabazz (formerly Malcolm X), believed
the equal inclusion of black Americans into the social and economic fabric of American life was not only essential to their human
72
moral dignity, but was a matter of fundamental human rights.
As civil rights organizations began orienting their grassroots political activism toward economic justice for racially segregated and
socially oppressed low-income black communities, the federal government simultaneously began developing people-based policy
frameworks targeting the concentration of poverty in public housing developments. Inspired by President John F. Kennedy’s New
Frontier domestic programs, President Lyndon B. Johnson
launched the “Great Society” programs as part of his “War on Poverty” to eliminate poverty and racial injustice through an expan73
sion of the welfare state. President Johnson codified the Community Action Program (CAP) under the Economic Opportunity Act
of 1964 (EOA), which created the Office of Economic Opportunity
74
(OEO). The OEO coordinated various work experience and
study programs, including Job Corps and Volunteers in Service to
America, and various community action agencies, including Head
75
Start. However, CAP’s emphasis on creating community action
agencies (CAAs) that relied upon the “maximum feasible participation” of poor citizens threatened the existing power structure of

70.
See generally GERALD MCKNIGHT, THE LAST CRUSADE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE
FBI, AND THE POOR PEOPLE’S CAMPAIGN (1998); GORDON KEITH MANTLER, POWER TO THE
POOR: BLACK-BROWN COALITION AND THE FIGHT FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE, 1960–1974 (2013).
71.
See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 10 (Signet Classics 2000) (1964)
(“Equality meant dignity and dignity demanded a job that was secure and a paycheck that
lasted throughout the week.”).
72.
See MALCOLM X & ALEX HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 275 (Ballantine Books 1965) (“Respect as human beings! That’s what America’s black masses want. . . .
They want not to be walled up in slums, in the ghettoes, like animals. They want to live in an
open, free society where they can walk with their heads up, like men, and women!”).
73.
See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 42 (“Johnson’s Great Society programs included job
training, housing, food stamps, and other forms of assistance that inadvertently helped to
define Black inequality as primarily an economic question.”).
74.
The Community Action Program aimed to increase local control over CED initiatives and antipoverty programs. Community action agencies, administered in part by community residents, were delegated authority to implement programs in the areas of health,
job training, housing, social services, and economic development. See Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964) (repealed 1981).
75.
See generally Martha J. Bailey & Nicolas J. Duquette, How Johnson Fought the War on
Poverty: The Economics and Politics of Funding at the Office of Economic Opportunity, 74 J. OF ECON.
HIST. 351 (2014).
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76

local government leaders. Facing political pressure to preserve
the status quo, in 1966 President Johnson created the Model Cities
program, a government-led comprehensive anti-poverty framework
77
designed to address social inequities across urban communities.
In 1967, Congress passed the Quie Amendment to the EOA, which
stipulated that one-third of CAAs must comprise elected officials,
while another third must comprise private sector representatives,
reducing the representation of marginalized, low-income residents
78
to one-third. This modified management structure both silenced
79
the poor and stripped them of their “censorial power.” Also in
1967, Congress passed the Green Amendment to the EOA, which
enabled governments to begin withdrawing funding from existing
independent CAAs and prioritize city-controlled CAAs or public
80
agencies. Unsurprisingly, the Model Cities program encountered
challenges with funding and struggled to redefine Urban Renew81
al. CAAs were eventually replaced by community development
corporations (CDCs), non-profit entities committed to serving
82
marginalized communities. Since their creation, CDCs have been
instrumental in implementing community development programs
in neighborhoods across America. Yet, they remain relatively few
83
and far between. Notwithstanding efforts by the federal government to spur community development through Urban Renewal
and the Great Society programs, the federal government ultimately
faced criticism for instituting a largely anti-participatory, top-down
development process that failed to democratically engage low76.
Milton Kotler, The Politics of Community Development, 36 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3
(1971).
77.
See McFarlane, supra note 21, at 318–19 (explaining that the neighborhood-based
Model Cities programs were developed partially in response to the Civil Rights Act of 1965
and sought to coordinate the many governmental anti-poverty programs while giving community members a more active role in their design and implementation.).
78.
See Economic Opportunity Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222, § 211, 81
Stat. 693 (1967).
79.
As James Madison explained in a letter to James Monroe, “[T]he censorial power is
in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people.” Letter
from James Madison, Member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Virginia, to James
Monroe, U.S. Minister to France (Dec. 4, 1794), https://www.loc.gov/resource/
mjm.05_0799_0804/?sp=2&st=text.
80.
See Kotler, supra note 76, at 3.
81.
See McFarlane, supra note 21, at 319.
82.
The 1966 Special Impact Program amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964 established the allocation of federal funding to support CDCs. See Cummings, supra
note 50, at 415.
83.
See Alexander von Hoffman, The Past, Present, and Future of Community Development,
SHELTERFORCE (Jul. 17, 2013), https://shelterforce.org/2013/07/17/the_past_present_
and_future_of_community_development/ (“CDCs during the 1980s and 1990s sparked revivals in inner-city neighborhoods from coast to coast. In the Roxbury and Dorchester
neighborhoods of Boston, on the West Side of Chicago, in South Central Los Angeles, savvy
CDC directors helped fill in the unsightly and dangerous vacant lots and buildings on their
streets.”).
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income community members or provide equal access to economic
84
opportunities. After Richard Nixon became president in 1969, his
administration transferred many of the OEO’s programs to other
federal departments before eventually defunding the OEO’s CAP
85
division. In 1975, President Gerald Ford closed the OEO completely and replaced it with the Community Service Administration
86
(CSA).
The 1960s and 1970s also saw the rise of regionalism—the belief
that neighboring local governments should work together to com87
bat the regional dimensions of inequality and racial segregation.
Indeed, the U.S. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 mandated the
formation of metropolitan governing bodies to facilitate transpor88
tation planning for interstate highway construction. Further, the
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 encouraged the creation of elected regional councils of government and metropolitan
planning organizations to help address the regional dimensions of
89
poverty. However, the end of the civil rights era, coupled with
staunch resistance from many white citizens who championed their
local autonomy to exclude people of color from their neighborhoods, saw the federal government shift much of the responsibility
for administering redevelopment programs to the state and local

84.
Famed writer and public intellectual, James Baldwin, described the phenomenon of
Urban Renewal by stating,
A boy last week, he was sixteen, in San Francisco, told me on television — thank
God we got him to talk — maybe somebody thought to listen. He said, “I’ve got
no country. I’ve got no flag.” Now, he’s only 16 years old, and I couldn’t say, “you
do.” I don’t have any evidence to prove that he does. They were tearing down his
house, because San Francisco is engaging — as most Northern cities now are engaged — in something called urban renewal, which means moving the Negroes
out. It means Negro removal, that is what it means. The federal government is an
accomplice to this fact.
A Conversation with James Baldwin, Perspectives: Negro and the American Promise (WGBH television broadcast Jun. 10, 1963), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8Abhj17kYU. See also,
e.g., Scott Cummings, Between Markets and Politics: A Response to Porter’s Competitive Advantage
Thesis, 82 OR. L. REV. 901, 912 (2003) (“Urban Renewal became associated with clearing
away “slums” adjacent to downtown business areas, resulting in massive displacement and
resegregation in other urban neighborhoods. Public housing built for these displaced residents was frequently located by design in racially and economically segregated neighborhoods.”); Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses
of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 47 (2003).
85.
Robert Hornstein et al., The Politics of Equal Justice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L. 1089, 1094–95 (2002).
86.
See Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-866, 76 Stat. 1145 (1962).
87.
See Briffault, supra note 24, at 1133–41 (explaining how local government actions in
suburban localities can, in the aggregate, impose burdens on the central city).
88.
See Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-866, 76 Stat. 1145.
89.
See New Regionalist Approaches, supra note 63, at 642.
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levels. The idea of regional governance eventually began to lose
steam, and, during the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court began sanctioning exclusionary zoning powers in many suburban communi91
ties. In 1974, the Model Cities Program was terminated by President Gerald Ford and replaced by the Community Development
92
Block Grant (CDBG) Program. CDBG allocates discretionary
funding to states and municipalities through the Department of
Housing and Urban Development to facilitate community revitali93
zation programs. The emergence of the CDBG Program, followed
by the Urban Development Action Grants Program instituted un94
der President Jimmy Carter, reflected the shifting of decisionmaking authority down to the local level. By the 1980s, President
Ronald Reagan would dismantle many of the federal requirements
95
for regional review bodies altogether. Further, he would repeal
the EOA of 1964 and abolish the Community Service Administration, transitioning its funding to Community Service Block Grants
administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Despite political reluctance to embrace regional government, in
the rich tradition of W.E.B. Du Bois and earlier civil rights leaders,
social justice advocates and community organizers, such as Saul
96
Alinsky, continued to use grassroots political activism to advance a
97
broad-based and redistributive economic development agenda.
Building upon a history of community-based activism in the black
community, Alinsky sought to create “cross-racial alliances for economic justice” that shifted the development conversation beyond
98
the boundaries of local neighborhoods. In 1967, George Wiley
formed the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) to urge

90.
See Crowder, supra note 21, at 574 (explaining this shift was “based on the premise
that state and local government should have a better awareness of their local assets and economic development needs”); see generally MINDY THOMPSON FULLILOVE, ROOT SHOCK: HOW
TEARING UP CITY NEIGHBORHOODS HURTS AMERICA, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT, ONE
WORLD/BALLANTINE (2005); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY AND NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
91.
See Troutt, supra note 26, at 1147–48.
92.
See Community Development Block Grant Program — CDBG, HUD,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_planning/communitydevelopment/progra
ms (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
93.
See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 101,
88 Stat. 633, (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (2001)).
94.
See Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, § 119,
91, Stat. 1125 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (2001)).
95.
See Briffault, supra note 24, at 1148.
96.
Through the Industrial Areas Foundation, Saul Alinsky worked to “build local power, cultivate indigenous leadership, and mobilize the poor.” Cummings, supra note 50, at
417.
97.
See id. at 417–18.
98.
See id. at 418 & n.77.
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the federal government to reform the economic system and ex99
pand welfare benefits for millions of low-income Americans. Seeking a broader reform agenda, Wiley eventually left NWRO to form
the Movement for Economic Justice, a multiracial grassroots coalition of welfare recipients, the working poor, and the middle class,
100
all organized around various economic justice issues. Similarly, in
1970 Wade Rathke, formerly of NWRO, founded the Association of
Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) as a multiracial and multiclass organization dedicated toward a suite of economic justice issues affecting poor and working class popula101
tions.
Although the civil rights era exposed the broad impact of systemic racial discrimination and the regional dimensions of ine102
quality, as detailed in the 1968 Kerner Commission report, a
post-civil rights political framework of “colorblindness” provided
the theoretical foundation for conservative politicians to begin
103
rolling back the welfare state and its focus on economic justice.
Decades of racially-motivated disinvestment and under-resourcing
had contributed to the abysmal living conditions in many lowincome black communities. Yet, a politics of colorblindness
shrouded institutional racism and reduced the economic crisis of
the early 1970s as simply the natural consequence of moral decay,
104
urban criminality, and a toxic culture of poverty.

99.
See id. at 418. For example, through targeted advocacy, NWRO was able to defeat
President Richard Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan, which sought to replace Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC). See Clay & Jones, supra note 33, at 262.
100.
See Cummings, supra note 50, at 420.
101.
Some of these issues included “special needs welfare programs, tax reform, generic
drug pricing, ‘lifeline’ electric rates, and property taxes.” Id. at 420–21. By the 1970s,
ACORN entered local electoral politics to advocate a poor people’s agenda that included
issues such as the elimination of the state income tax for low-income individuals. See id. at
420.
102.
See KERNER COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL
DISORDERS (1967), http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf; see also
TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 52 (“The 1968 Kerner Commission report’s detailed descriptions of
racial discrimination by public and private institutions had established a basis upon which
African Americans could stake a claim to federal aid.”).
103.
See Ian F. Haney Lopez, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007) (tracing the evolution of colorblindness in America).
104.
See Oscar Lewis, Culture of Poverty, in ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY: PERSPECTIVES
FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 199 (Daniel P. Moynihan ed., 1969) (“The subculture [of the
poor] develops mechanisms that tend to perpetuate it, especially because of what happens
to the worldview, aspirations, and character of the children who grow up in it.”); TAYLOR,
supra note 6, at 53, 71 (quoting George Romney, President Richard Nixon’s first secretary of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, as stating, “Housing by itself cannot
solve the problems of people . . . who may be suffering from bad habits, lawlessness, laziness,
unemployment, inadequate education, low working skills, ill heath, poor motivation and a
negative self-image.”); WILLIAM DARITY JR., ET AL., WHAT WE GET WRONG ABOUT CLOSING
THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP (2018), https://insightcced.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/
Where-We-Went-Wrong-COMPLETE-REPORT-July-2018.pdf (“This belief was magnified by
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The emergence of a “neoconservative” political agenda during
the administration of President Ronald Reagan led to a transition
from the people-based, regional political activism advanced by
groups such as NWRO and ACORN toward predominately place106
based, localist, and neoliberal public welfare programs. Under
President Reagan’s fiscally conservative political program of supplyside “trickle-down” economics, the government strengthened its
107
market-based approach to economic development. Unfortunately, market-based programs like the Low Income Housing Tax Cred108
it (LIHTC), a mainstay in affordable housing development, have
shown limited evidence of reducing poverty in low-income neighborhoods. In fact, some studies suggest that the LIHTC has in109
creased poverty concentration and furthered racial segregation.
The neoliberal political project continued under the administration of President Bill Clinton. Its ‘free market’ political program of
economic liberalization—focused on reducing taxes for the
wealthy, increasing international trade, deregulating global financial and capital markets, privatizing public enterprises, reforming
110
the welfare system and cutting spending on entitlement pro-

Ronald Reagan’s use of the ‘welfare queen’ trope during his campaign, and, recently, via
internet financial gurus pushing images of black American spending money on Jordan
brand Nike shoes, rather than household needs.”).
105.
The term “neoconservative” was popularized during the 1960s and early 1970s by
those who rejected the countercultural politics of the New Left, such as President Lyndon B.
Johnson’s Great Society programs, and the pacifist approach to foreign policy, such as the
Vietnam War protests. Cf. Jonah Goldberg, The Neoconservative Invention, NAT’L REV.
(May 20, 2003), https://www.nationalreview.com/2003/05/neoconservative-inventionjonah-goldberg/.
106.
See Cummings, supra note 50, at 421–22.
107.
See id. at 423–24.
108.
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the federal government created the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program (“LIHTC”), which provides tax credits to encourage private developers to build affordable rental housing for low-income Americans. Since its creation, the federal program has helped to finance housing for more than 2.4 million
affordable rental-housing units. See 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2012); see also David Philip Cohen, Improving the Supply of Affordable Housing: The Role of The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 6 J.L. &
POL’Y 537 (1998).
109.
See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2514 (2015) (prompted by a lawsuit claiming that the Texas Department of Housing
and Community Affairs was funding LIHTC developments in predominantly minority, highpoverty neighborhoods). But see Ingrid G. Ellen et. al., Poverty Concentration and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit: Effects of Siting and Tenant Composition, 34 J. HOUS. ECON. 49, 58
(2016) (noting that there is little evidence that LIHTC concentrates poverty, and some evidence that LIHTC reduces poverty rates).
110.
Under the Clinton Administration, reform meant a bill that abolished the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and replaced it with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). TANF imposes mandatory work requirements and strict
term limits on welfare recipients. See Cummings, supra note 50, at 425–26.
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111

grams —aimed to create market conditions for businesses to help
resolve the issues facing low-income communities through private
112
investments. Initiatives such as the HOPE VI program and the
Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Cities Demonstration pro113
gram sought to expand business activity in distressed, low-income
communities by offering tax benefits to employers in pre-defined
zones. In 1994, the Clinton administration instituted the Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund under the
United States Department of the Treasury. The CDFI Fund has
promoted commercial real estate development and small business
development in many low-income communities since its inception.
114
Yet, the wealth gap has persisted. In the year 2000, President
115
Clinton created the New Market Tax Credit Program to incentivize the private sector to invest in businesses located in low-income
communities and help revitalize economic activity. Despite these
praiseworthy efforts to catalyze community development by leveraging private sector capital, scholars argue that these programs
have largely failed to improve social and economic conditions for
116
low-income black communities across America.
Both the administrations of President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama continued the steady march of neoliberalism
with market-based initiatives like the Choice Neighborhoods pro-

111.
See Sheldon Danzinger, Welfare Reform Policy from Nixon to Clinton: What Role for Social
Science?, in SOCIAL SCIENCE AND POLICY-MAKING: A SEARCH FOR RELEVANCE IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 137, 147-150 (David Lee Featherman ed., 2001).
112.
Under the HOPE VI program (enacted under the Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No.
75–412, § 24, 50 Stat. 888, 899, amended by Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of
1998, 42 USC § 1437v) and later the Choice Neighborhoods grant program, the federal
government provided public subsidies to private developers to redevelop struggling public
housing developments into new high-quality mixed-income developments. See Choice Neighborhoods, HUD, https://www.hud.gov/cn.
113.
In 1993, Congress created the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Cities Demonstration Program, which was designed to create jobs and stimulate business investments in
economically distressed urban communities through a combination of grant and tax credits.
See McFarlane, supra note 21, at 296–97. The zones were designed to be areas of democratic
governance and participatory community decision-making. See id.
114.
See Clay & Jones, supra note 33, at 264.
115.
Established as part of the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, the New
Markets Tax Credit Program sought to incentivize commercial and mixed-use real estate
investments in distressed, low-income communities through a federal tax credit. Administered by the US Treasury Department’s Community Development Financial Institution
Fund and allocated by local Community Development Entities (CDEs) across America, the
NMTC awarded $1 billion in allocation to CDEs during the first year of the program, enabling investors to reduce their federal tax liability by $390 million (39% of the amount invested into CDEs) over a seven-year period. Cf. Janet Thompson Jackson, Can Free Enterprise
Cure Urban Ills? Lost Opportunities for Business Development in Urban, Low-Income Communities
Through the New Markets Tax Credit Program, 37 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 659, 662–63, 693–94
(2007).
116.
See id. at 700–04 (arguing that NMTC would be more effective if benefits were allocated to businesses owned by community members).
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gram (the next generation of the HOPE VI public housing pro117
gram). In 2010, the Obama administration took noteworthy steps
to revive the legacy of regional development through the Sustaina118
ble Communities Regional Planning Grant Program. However, as
Lisa Alexander reveals, the program may struggle to achieve equi119
table development due to flaws in its design. More recently, President Donald Trump’s tax reforms mark not only the continued
entrenchment of neoliberal politics at the expense of the welfare
state, but also signal a return to the ‘trickle-down’ economic strategy that defined the Reagan era. Such a move could threaten re120
gional approaches to CED once again. Indeed, in the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act of 2017, the Trump administration established the
Opportunity Zones incentive, a bipartisan effort to spur long-term
private sector investments in low-income communities nation121
wide. Although labeled by political leaders as a promising solution to the increased poverty concentration and hypergentrifica122
tion that has overwhelmed many cities since the early 2000s,
history forewarns that the neoliberal and market-oriented Oppor123
tunity Zones program merely promises more of the same.
It would be hasty to conclude that the various market-based
economic development programs described above have not benefited marginalized communities throughout America’s history.
Building affordable housing and encouraging the creation of sustainable businesses are both key elements of bringing goods, ser124
vices, and jobs to low-income communities. Further, it would be
117.
CARL GRODACH & RENIA
IN A CHANGING WORLD (2016).

EHRENFEUCHT, URBAN REVITALIZATION: REMAKING CITIES

118.
See Alexander, supra note 63, at 631.
119.
See id. at 660–73.
120.
See Peter S. Goodman & Patricia Cohen, It Started as a Tax Cut, Now It Could Change
American Life, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/
business/republican-tax-cut.html (noting President Trump’s recent tax legislation “could
constrain the ability of states and local governments to levy their own taxes, pressuring them
to limit spending on health care, education, public transportation and social services.”).
121.
See Investing in Opportunity Act, 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018).
122.
See, e.g., Laura Bliss, The New York That Belonged to the City, CITYLAB (Aug. 17, 2017),
https://www.citylab.com/life/2017/08/vanishing-new-york-gentrification/537126/ (“Where
immigrants, minorities, radicals, queers, runaways, and everyday workers once built an island of tolerance, grit, and creative verve . . . tourists, college bros, and the superrich now
occupy a bland-ified fortress of consumption.”); Tanvi Misra, From Gentrification to Decline:
How Neighborhoods Really Change, CITYLAB (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.citylab.com/
equity/2019/04/gentrified-cities-neighborhood-change-displacement-poverty-data/586840/
?fbclid=IwAR3BX1_DN3rZZkc47ZnHl3bzKWiS9ha0L6cqYcdVQ0t1zlxKS_yrfU4cAJM (“But
across U.S. metros, gentrification may not be the dominant type of urban change. Instead,
it’s the concentration of poverty—particularly in the suburbs—that’s the type of transformation most Americans have been experiencing.”).
123.
Timothy Weaver, The Problem with Opportunity Zones, CITYLAB (May 16, 2018),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/05/the-problem-with-opportunity-zones/560510/.
124.
The diversity of opinion on the costs and benefits of various economic development
programs reflect a larger conversation about the role of the private market in addressing
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rash to suggest that each of the presidential administrations discussed above have equally advanced a neoliberal political agenda
with the intent of benefiting the wealthy at the expense of the
125
poor. Certainly, politics plays an ongoing role in the nature and
shape of America’s political economy, and most would concede
that our highest elected officials lead with the best of intentions.
Instead, this Article argues that the market fundamentalism guiding the varied place-based and people-based CED models through
American history—commonly linking poverty alleviation to the
economic benefit of private investors—has not only undermined
126
the public welfare role of the government, but has facilitated a
hegemonic shift toward a neoliberal rationality in community development.
B. Progressive Critiques
There have been various critiques of place-based and peoplebased models of CED. Scholars from the law and economics
movement have argued that localist, place-based lawmaking is economically inefficient, generating high transaction costs and producing negative “spillover effects” to unsubsidized stakeholders in
127
neighboring localities. These scholars maintain that place-based
CED policies have historically failed to empower residents of marginalized communities and conclude that their social benefits do

poverty in America. Michael Porter, in a 1995 Harvard Business Review article entitled, “The
Competitive Advantage of the Inner City,” urged a move away from social welfare programs
toward a development agenda that created opportunities for the private market to bring
needed goods, services, and jobs to low-income neighborhoods. This market-based approach called for minimizing the influence of government oversight and overbearing community demands. Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, 73 HARV. BUS.
J. 55 (1995). However, as Scott Cummings argues, while Porter’s competitive advantage thesis may help grow urban economies, “Porter’s approach suffers from two weaknesses: the
failure to connect his market-based model to the political realities of urban development
and the lack of attention paid to distributive consequences.” See Cummings, supra note 84, at
902.
125.
Indeed, there have been important nuances in political strategy, dynamic narratives
of policy negotiation, praiseworthy efforts toward bipartisan proposals, and even instances of
progressive legislation passed by each of the previous political administrations, a discussion
beyond the scope of this Article, but one that merits noting nonetheless.
126.
See Etienne C. Toussaint, The New Gospel of Wealth: On Social Impact Bonds and the Privatization of Public Good, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 153, 219 (2018); see also Crowder, supra note 21, at
574 (“[W]hat used to be a largely public function still has its roots in the public sphere but is
now influence by a private profit motive. . . . upending the original intent of economic development.”).
127.
See Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 983, 996-1002 (2012) (arguing that mixed-income housing projects, while superior
to the traditional public housing model, are inferior to the provision of portable housing
vouchers to needy tenants).
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128

not outweigh their economic costs. These assertions become
readily visible when one considers the common attributes of place129
based CED programs.
Under the place-based model of CED, the conception of place is
limited, focused less on the latent social infrastructure of marginalized communities and more on the untapped investment potential
of built infrastructure for corporate stakeholders. Guided by a probusiness approach to economic development, the notion of ownership is also limited, focused primarily on generating assets to be
owned by the financial elite, with little attention devoted toward
carving out opportunities for community ownership, or honoring
existing non-market ties to community. As a result, the return on
capital investment from place-based CED programs have often
flowed out of marginalized communities rather than into the pockets of community residents. This limited, neoliberal approach to
CED is exacerbated by a limited focus on inclusion. Since many of
the institutional development organizations, social service providers, and investment banks (often publicly traded firms) are owned
by a small segment of society, community members and community-based organizations play a limited role in the development process.
By not reserving a ‘seat at the table’ for community members
due to a limited commitment to collaboration, place-based CED
projects suffer from limited transparency and inadequate democratic engagement. Decision-making is traditionally led by government and private stakeholders. As a result, place-based programs often limit attention to job creation and housing
development. Moreover, they often fail to wrestle with entrenched
barriers to social and economic empowerment grounded in historic racial segregation policies, state-sponsored racial injustice, and
an unrelenting political commitment to global capitalism. This has
birthed CED programs and political institutions designed to benefit the wealthy through marginal improvements in the lives of the
poor, and with little change to the status quo of wealth inequality
130
in America.
Scholars have also criticized place-based CED models on social
grounds, contending that they perpetuate the segregation of low-

128.
See id. at 985, 1010.
129.
See generally KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13, at 1.
130.
See Cummings, supra note 84, at 913 (“The issue identified by scholars has been that
oftentimes subsidies are used to attract development that not only does little for low-income
communities, but has dubious overall effects on city-wide prosperity.”); see also McFarlane,
supra note 21, at 333 (“Poor inner-city neighborhoods have not benefitted from the economic development going on around them because economic development promotes capital accumulation and mobility that intentionally bypasses poor neighborhoods.”).
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income communities of color from predominantly white, low131
poverty and “opportunity-rich” suburban neighborhoods. Sociologist William Julius Wilson was instrumental in advancing this view
in the late 1980s, arguing that the structural challenges facing distressed, predominantly black urban communities had resulted in a
132
“culture of urban dysfunction,” perpetuating the cycle of poverty.
According to Wilson, urban revitalization strategies must focus on
dismantling dysfunctional urban neighborhoods and helping lowincome residents move to communities with greater opportuni133
ties. The research of sociologists Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A.
Denton in the 1990s, captured in the acclaimed book American
Apartheid, also proffered social critiques of place-based lawmaking,
noting the persistence of racial segregation facilitated by placebased CED programs, and instead calling for race-conscious development policies that both prioritized integration and invested into
134
the lives of marginalized individuals. These criticisms of the
place-based CED model led to a series of lawsuits against housing
agencies across the country for their failure to affirmatively further
135
fair housing, as mandated by the Fair Housing Act, through their
administration of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)
136
program.
Seeking to address the racial integration challenges of placebased lawmaking, development practitioners began advocating a
137
“people-based” CED strategy. Advocates of people-based CED
programs recognize the numerous political and cultural challenges
associated with locating affordable housing in low-poverty, pre138
dominantly white neighborhoods (e.g., racism). Consequently,
these advocates suggest providing low-income residents with the
tools and resources necessary to move directly into opportunityrich suburbs themselves in an effort to bypass local politics. Predi131.
See, e.g, Cashin, supra note 26, at 1991–93.
132.
See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 60–62 (Reprint ed. 1990); see also Beloved Place, supra note
61, at 271 (“Coverage in mass print, visual, and other media a pushed the negative archetypal symbols of public housing—the high rises, the garbage, the gangs—into prominence.”).
133.
Id. at 157–59.
134.
See generally Massey & Denton, supra note 90.
135.
Fair Housing Act of 1968, 90 P.L. 284, 82 Stat. 73.
136.
See Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, § 119,
91, Stat. 1125 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5318 (2001)). A more robust discussion of the social critique of place-based economic development programs, including the
successes and failures of the LIHTC program, is beyond the scope of this Article. However,
the Author intends to explore this line of inquiry in future scholarship.
137.
See generally Randall Crane and Michael Manville, People or Place? Revisiting the Who
Versus the Where of Urban Development, LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y (Jul. 2008)
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/7620/1403_719_LLA080702.pdf
?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
138.
See id. at 3–4.
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cated on the success of the Gautreaux Assisted Housing Program
and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s
federal mobility program called “Moving to Opportunity for Fair
139
Housing,” qualified applicants are provided with housing vouchers that enable them to afford a “better” life in a better-resourced,
but more expensive, neighborhood. Ironically, in recent years,
shifting urban demographics and changing investment patterns
140
have altered the traditional urban-suburban divide. Many formerly blighted urban neighborhoods are changing dramatically, while
141
many formerly low-poverty suburbs are on the decline. As a result, housing mobility programs seeking to move low-income residents to “opportunity” may become, in some cases, a vehicle for
urban centers to drive away low-income residents and pave the way
for luxury housing for wealthier families and young profession142
als.
These critiques fail to recognize the hegemonic nature of neoliberalism as a political rationality—a “discursive logic that legitimates exercises of power” by structuring the very language of poli143
cy debates and defining the limits of government. Neoliberalism
not only influences the role government plays in supporting the
market and using law as a tool to promote “rational” economic behavior, it shapes common sense assumptions about the capacity of
144
government to enact a substantive vision of collective well-being.
More than merely ubiquitous, some argue that neoliberalism has
become an invisible form of power inseparable from the rule of
145
law.

139.
See generally Greg J. Duncan & Anita Zuberi, Mobility Lessons from Gautreaux and Moving to Opportunity, 1 N.W. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 110 (2006). For the consent decree that outlined
the parameters of the Gautreaux demonstration, see Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp.
665, 672–82 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
140.
See Alexander, supra note 3, at 815, 820–21 (“Aware of trends that will make innercities more valuable sites in the future, global private equity funds, real estate investment
trusts, and other large international developers are increasingly being attracted to previously
disinvested inner-city areas before they substantially gentrify.”); see generally SHERYLL CASHIN,
THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN
DREAM (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
141.
See Bethany Y. Li, Now Is the Time!: Challenging Resegregation and Displacement in the Age
of Hypergentrification, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1189 (2016).
142.
See Alexander, supra note 3, at 820–21 (discussing the long-term gentrifying and
displacing effect of projects that fail to include safeguards for existing low-income residents.).
143.
Corinne Blalock, Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Legal Theory, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
71, 84 n.74 (2014).
144.
Id. at 85.
145.
Id. at 85–86. But see Owen M. Fiss, The Autonomy of Law, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 517, 519
(2001) (“[L]aw is an autonomous institution that serves a rich panoply of values, a good
number of which, such as political freedom, individual conscience, and substantive equality,
are unrelated to the efficient operation of the market or to economic growth. Law may be a
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This Article contends that place-based and people-based CED
models have failed to meaningfully consider the distributive justice
implications of neoliberal development strategies. By focusing on
the expansion of investment opportunities for private stakeholders
in distressed neighborhoods, place-based strategies have perpetuated wealth inequality while undermining the economic empowerment of the poor. Similarly, while people-based strategies appear
preferable because they empower individuals with the resources
necessary for self-care, they undermine the inherent social capital
of distressed, low-income neighborhoods. Advocates of peoplebased CED programs implicitly perpetuate a racialized, yet unconscious bias that concludes—when it comes to low-income minority
neighborhoods—there is nothing of value worth sticking around
for. Though well-meaning, by encouraging low-income residents to
“move to opportunity” in low-poverty suburbs, these advocates discount the existing social and cultural capital of black low-income
neighborhoods where non-market economic assets typically go unaccounted in the development process. Further, people-based programs simultaneously privilege the supposed inherent value of opportunity-rich
and
predominantly
white
low-poverty
neighborhoods, discounting the threat of racism and social isolation for marginalized citizens of color. Much like the media images
that painted a monochromatic portrait of my hometown of the
Bronx, these policies reinforce the cancerous assumptions of racial
146
inequality that remain malignant in the body of America.
C. Neoliberal Entrenchment
Noting the limitations of localism in addressing metropolitan
147
equity, yet observing the history of unsuccessful attempts to cre148
ate and enforce regional forms of consolidated government,

precondition to the market, but once law emerges, it takes on a life of its own as an autonomous sphere of human activity.”).
146.
See Beloved Place, supra note 61, at 273–74 (“Some assumptions are supported by data: that people who live in public housing are very poor; and that in some communities they
are disproportionately minorities. Other assumptions – that residents in public housing do
not work, that most of them receive income from public assistance, and that they consist
overwhelmingly of female-headed households with many children – are not.”).
147.
See Matthew J. Parlow, Equitable Fiscal Regionalism, 85 TEMPLE L. REV. 49, 60 (2012)
(noting “the localist system has helped create a great wealth and resource disparity between
the central city and many of its suburbs. This is due, in part, to the ability of affluent suburbs
to capture wealth and regional benefits by imposing externalities onto the central city and
other parts of the metropolitan region.”); see also Cashin, supra note 26, at 1988.
148.
See generally Christopher Johnson Acuff, Beyond the City-Country Divide: Race, Referenda, and Representation in Consolidated Governments (Aug. 2017) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Tennessee, Knoxville), https://trace.tennessee.edu/
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scholars in the fields of local government law, housing law, and
community development law have turned to “new regionalism” as a
149
pathway forward. Lisa Alexander explains, “[n]ew regionalists
support the creation of limited-purpose metropolitan governments, interlocal cooperative agreements, or other more informal
150
and voluntary regional collaborations.” These regional collaborations are voluntary, and in many ways, represent what scholars have
151
called “new governance” or “democratic experimentalism.” The
new governance movement emphasizes “a shift away from the monopoly of traditional politico-legal institutions, and implies either
the involvement of actors other than classically governmental actors, or indeed the absence of any traditional framework of gov152
ernment.” This retreat from formal regulation encourages the
participation of non-traditional stakeholders in the public decision153
making process. From a normative standpoint, new governance
theory strives to respond to the demands of progressive scholars
who call for social problems to be resolved in a participatory, fair,
154
and economically just way. Still, scholars have raised concerns
about the ability of new governance approaches to both socially
and economically empower marginalized stakeholders while ad155
dressing the root causes of poverty.
These concerns manifest in an emerging CED model that perhaps stems from the new governance movement itself—the pay for
success model. As the private market has taken an increasingly
greater interest in public welfare service delivery, a community of
156
socially conscious “impact invest[ors]” has started to invest in an
innovation called the social impact bond, or SIB. The SIB seemingcgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=5877&context
=utk_graddiss (providing a quantitative exploration of city-county consolidation campaigns
on minority representation, revealing race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status as critical
factors in voting patterns).
149.
See Cashin, supra note 26, at 227–28.
150.
See New Regionalist Approaches, supra note 63, at 643.
151.
See, e.g., Introduction to NEW GOVERNANCE, LAW AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, IN LAW
AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 2 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds.,
2006); Michael Wilkinson, Three Conceptions of Law: Towards a Jurisprudence of Democratic Experimentalism, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 673; Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin’s
New Governance Experiment, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 645, 649; Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
DE BÚRCA & SCOTT, supra note 151, at 2.
152.
153.
See, e.g., Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: Lessons from
Chicago’s Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 117, 127 (2009).
154.
See New Regionalist Approaches, supra note 63, at 634.
155.
See, e.g., Wendy A. Bach, Governance, Accountability, and the New Poverty Agenda, 2010
WIS. L. REV. 239, 241.
156.
See McGrath, supra note 29, at 803 (“Impact investing refers to ‘investments made
into companies, organizations, and funds with the intention to generate social and economic impact alongside a financial return.’”) (quoting What You Need to Know About Impact Investing, GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, https://thegiin.org/impact-investing).
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ly finds a middle ground in the ongoing CED debate by targeting
social infrastructure programs that empower low-income families
with tools to better their lives in the places where they live. Emerg157
ing in the U.S. in 2012, the SIB establishes mission-driven part158
nerships between the public, philanthropic, and private sectors.
Private investors commit strategic investments toward social welfare
programs with pre-determined timelines and pre-established per159
formance benchmarks. An intermediary organization coordinates the operation of the SIB and plays a central role in selecting
160
social service providers who facilitate SIB programs. At the completion of a SIB program, if the social service providers have successfully met pre-established performance benchmarks after being
assessed by an independent evaluator, the government stakeholder
repays the impact investors their original investment, along with a
161
return on their investment based upon social outcomes. If the
SIB program is deemed unsuccessful, the impact investors are not
162
repaid.
By aligning private sector capital with underfunded social welfare programs, SIBs offer the prospect of both financial and social
returns for private investors, while helping to address important
social challenges. Reminiscent of the themes of the new governance movement, the SIB replaces classical governmental regulation
with collaborative processes that imbue non-traditional stakeholders with decision-making power. Both scholars and practitioners
163
have taken note of the SIB’s promise. Despite debate over the
164
benefits and drawbacks of the model, the social finance tool is

157.
For a more robust discussion of the SIB, see generally Toussaint, supra note 126.
158.
See EMILY GUSTAFSSON-WRIGHT ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE POTENTIAL AND
LIMITATIONS OF IMPACT BONDS: LESSONS FROM THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF EXPERIENCE
WORLDWIDE, 1–2 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/
Impact-Bondsweb.pdf.
159.
See McGrath, supra note 29, at 810–11.
160.
See MCKINSEY & CO., FROM POTENTIAL TO ACTION: BRINGING SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS
TO THE U.S. 15–16 (2012), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/social-sector/ourinsights/from-potential-to-action-bringing-social-impact-bonds-to-the-us (follow “From potential action: Bringing social impact bonds to the US” hyperlink).
161.
See id. at 9, 14.
162.
Id. at 15.
163.
See generally V. KASTURI RANGAN ET AL., HARV. BUS. SCH., THE PROMISE OF IMPACT
INVESTING
(2011),
http://www.filantropia.org.co/archivo/attachments/article/198/
Impact%20Investing.pdf.
164.
See, e.g., Toussaint, supra note 126, at 162 (discussing some of the benefits of the SIB
model, including: “(A) the expansion of investment capital for social innovation; (B) the
transfer of investment risk from the public sector to the private sector; and (C) the prioritization of evidence-based preventative social welfare programs,” and also some of the associated challenges, including: “(A) the transaction complexity of SIB deals . . . (B) the execution risks that arise during the implementation of complex SIB deals . . . and (C) the
political risk associated with SIBs”); Deborah Burand, Globalizing Social Finance: How Social
Impact Bonds and Social Impact Performance Guarantees Can Scale Development, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. &
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increasingly being used by governments across the globe to address
an array of social issues, including prisoner recidivism, early childhood development, homelessness, and services for disadvantaged
165
and at-risk youth.
Perhaps most significantly, the SIB model provides a platform
for governments to finance preventative, forward-looking social
welfare programs that reduce public expenditures in the long
166
run. Despite evidence that preventative programs yield long-term
167
social impacts, governments often lack the public resources or
168
political will to invest in the future, especially for hot-button political issues like criminal justice or poverty alleviation that are
tinged with stereotype-laden questions of race and class. As a result, the emergence of a CED model that facilitates preventative,
forward-looking social welfare programs via democratic experimentalism seems a step in the right direction.
Nevertheless, while the SIB model seems to integrate some of
the best features of localist and regionalist approaches to CED, key
challenges have plagued its development and may hinder its
169
broader adoption by communities across America. As Lisa Alexander reveals, new governance methods often struggle to disentangle the power dilemmas that emerge when traditionally marginalized groups are placed in collaboration with “more
170
economically and socially empowered groups.” In particular, Alexander highlights three common power dilemmas: (1) the probBUS. 447 (2013); Susan R. Jones, Is Social Innovation Financing Through Social Impact Bonds the
Last Hope for Community Economic Development Programs During the Trump Administration?, 26 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING 351, 357 (2017).
165.
See JENNIFER GIOVANNITTI & JOSHUA OGBURN, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
RICHMOND, GROWING THE PIPELINE OF PAY-FOR-SUCCESS PROJECTS (2018),
https://payforsuccess.org/sites/default/files/resource-files/Community%20Practice
%20Paper_2.2018.pdf (highlighting “20 PFS projects in the United States (100 across the
globe) that are considered launched, meaning the feasibility and structuring processes are
complete, and investors have agreed to the formal structure and terms.”).
166.
Government spending is often targeted toward “crisis-driven services” that stand to
yield results within one fiscal year. See Rebecca Leventhal, Effecting Progress: Using Social Impact Bonds to Finance Social Services, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 511, 523 (2013); see also Toussaint,
supra note 19, at 78 (“Government-sponsored social service programs are historically remedial in nature, targeting social problems as they arise or after they have materialized in
communities.”).
167.
For example, vaccinations have long been proven a far more cost-effective public
health intervention than treating diseases after an outbreak or pandemic. See Keohane, supra
note 30, at 162; see also Benjamin R. Cox, Financing Homelessness Prevention Programs with Social
Impact Bonds, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 959, 968 (2012) (“The SIB structure redirects money from safety-net programs to more effective early-intervention programs.”).
168.
See also Utting, supra note 14, at 6 (“Ongoing constraints associated with market
forces, neoliberal ideology and conditionality have restricted social spending by governments, thereby opening up the space for non-state actors to engage in social service provisioning and proximity services.”) (quotations omitted).
169.
See Toussaint, supra note 126, at 187.
170.
See New Regionalist Approaches, supra note 63, at 644–45.
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lem of demographic representation, where the representatives of
marginalized groups, despite sharing similar demographic characteristics, harbor competing allegiances that amount to a false representation; (2) the problem of representative opportunism, where
well-meaning, demographically or ideologically aligned representatives act opportunistically to achieve their own private interests at
the expense of the broader marginalized group; and (3) the problem of representative acquiescence, where representatives articulate their needs, often unconsciously, in language and terms that
reflect dominant narratives and cultural beliefs, ultimately benefit171
ing the more dominant groups in the collaboration. These power
dilemmas reveal that even when marginalized groups gain a proverbial seat at the table, other forces may operate to weaken their
representation, or silence their voices altogether, resulting in solutions that do not benefit their long-term interests or address the
deep roots of their oppression.
In the well-trodden tradition of American development, the SIB
is built upon a market-based model that fails to resolve these power
dilemmas, often demoting community members and community172
based organizations to footnotes, statistical charts, and graphs.
Although non-profit organizations may claim to represent the interests of marginalized groups, they remain vulnerable to private
interests tied to future funding and can be swayed by toxic narra173
tives that overshadow the populations they serve. Although shortterm metrics may be achieved to guarantee future funding, meaningful democratic engagement may be overlooked and long-term
economic justice undermined. The insistence on a serviceoriented, donor-donee development model may perpetuate a
sense of dependency among program participants that “defines a
status of subserviency and evokes fear, resentment and resignation
174
on the part of the donee.” These flaws in the design of the SIB
not only represent a waning of the primary role of government in
175
the advancement of public good but, more generally, are symptomatic of neoliberalism’s invisible dominance. Further, they point

171.
Id.
172.
See Toussaint, supra note 126, at 208; see also McFarlane, supra note 21, at 301 (“The
development discourse, therefore, embodies a top-down, ethnocentric, and technocratic
approach, which treat[s] people and cultures as abstract concepts, statistical figures to be
moved up and down in the charts of progress.”) (quotations omitted).
173.
See Edgar Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317, 1327
(1964) (“The continuous need for new sources of funds and for renewal of existing grants
can result in actual service activities remaining sharply curtailed for an extended period
while field staff gather data and write up project and research proposals.”); see also Toussaint, supra note 126, at 156–57.
174.
Cahn, supra note 172, at 1322.
175.
See Toussaint, supra note 126, at 154.
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toward the need for a ‘reconstructed’ CED model that can over176
come the deficiencies of our capitalist economic system.
II. DECONSTRUCTING NEOLIBERALISM’S ILLUSION OF JUSTICE
Amidst the political tension, civic distrust, and ongoing social
177
inequities that characterizes the Trump era, scholars are increasingly demanding justice for the oppressed within our political
economy. The perspectives on the root of the problems are varied,
and the proposed solutions are diverse. However, discussions within the legal academy that probe the theoretical implications of jus178
tice upon the rule of law remain inconclusive.
Many political philosophers understand the term justice to be an
179
ideal of democracy; an ethical obligation imposed upon citizens
of a democratic government because it promotes the flourishing of
human beings and the actualization of human moral dignity,
180
thereby facilitating the best approximation of democracy itself.
However, there has long been debate on the mode of democracy
that best actualizes justice. From a political standpoint, the historic
debate between those in support of classical liberalism and those in
favor of the socialist welfare state has resulted in the ongoing reform of America’s liberal democracy. Yet, due to the dominant order of capitalism, and both the accumulation of wealth and the
monopolization of capital amassed by a bourgeois class, liberal
democracy in America has historically triggered a conflict of moral
181
values—equality versus liberty. Growing social and economic inequality reveals the limits of liberalism’s theoretical ground, suggest176.
See id. at 220–21.
177.
See generally James Goldgeier, How to Understand the Trump Era: The Deep Roots of Populism, Racism, and Unchecked Presidential Power, Foreign Affairs, Oct. 31, 2018 (conveying some
of the challenges of the Trump Administration).
178.
While several scholars have explored the meaning of justice in relation to legal theory, a dominant legal theory of justice has yet to emerge in the legal academy. Compare
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978), with Richard Posner, The Ethical and
Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 487 (1980),
and ROBIN WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF PROFESSIONALISM
(2014), and Troutt, supra note 31 (proposing a novel legal theory of structural inequality
that taps into the multidimensional interplay of space, race, economic segregation, and institutions).
179.
For a more robust analysis of the philosophical study of justice, see generally
GUTTORM FLØISTAD, PHILOSOPHY OF JUSTICE (2014).
180.
See D. R. Bhandari, Plato’s Concept of Justice: An Analysis, J.N.V.U. (last visited Nov. 18,
2019), https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Anci/AnciBhan.htm.
181.
Equality brings with it a “moral” character, “something men aim at or by reference
to which they guide their conduct.” JOHN REES, EQUALITY 11 (1971). Meanwhile, liberty’s
meaning is ambiguous and complicated. See Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 Phil. Q. 127, 130 (1987) (“The debate over the proper conception of liberty has
been bitter and sometimes deadly.”).
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ing—notwithstanding democratic constraints and the loose framework of a welfare state—compromise is needed to deter growing
social unrest and conflict between members of the proletariat and
182
the ruling class.
In his famous work, A Theory of Justice, American moral and political philosopher John Rawls attempted to reconcile the tension between equality and liberty by articulating a conception of “justice as
183
fairness.” A full critique of Rawls’ conception of justice as an ideological framework to reconcile the competing values of equality
184
and liberty is beyond the scope of this Article. Further, this Article does not engage larger philosophical debates about the mean185
ing of equality and liberty. Instead, this section limits discussion to
three points of contention with Rawls’ theory of justice that reveal
an illusion of justice perpetuated by the hegemony of neoliberal
rationality in America.
A. Revisiting Justice—An Incoherency Critique
For Rawls, justice requires “fairness” because inequality “cannot
possibly be justified by an appeal to the notions of merit or de186
sert.” To identify the fair social arrangement, Rawls conceives of
a theoretical “original position” whereby each person is assumed to
be rational, self-interested, and guided by a personal conception of
187
his or her own “good.” Rawls presupposes “mutual indifference”
in the original position, or a “veil of ignorance” that represents, in
his view, a state of equality of opportunity because human decision188
making is not influenced by knowledge of personal information.
Further, this original position exists in a society marred by conflicts

182.
See Young-Soon Bae, Balancing Equality and Liberty in Rawls’ Theory of Justice 3 (Aug.
2002) (unpublished Master’s Thesis, University of Tennessee) (on file with the University of
Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE network).
183.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 111 (1971) [hereinafter A Theory of Justice].
184.
But see, e.g., Gerald Doppelt, Rawls’ System of Justice: A Critique from the Left, 15 NOÛS
259 (1981); David Gauthier, Justice and National Endowment: Toward a Critique of Rawls’ Ideological Framework, in DEVELOPMENT AND MAIN OUTLINES OF RAWLS’S THEORY OF JUSTICE 205–28
(Henry S. Richardson ed., 1999); Alan H. Goldman, Response to Rawls from the Political Right,
in JOHN RAWLS’ THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 435–62 (H. Gene Blocker & Elizabeth H. Smith
eds., 1980).
185.
But see, e.g., JOHN CHARVET, A CRITIQUE OF FREEDOM AND EQUALITY (1981); ERIK
VON KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN, LIBERTY OR EQUALITY: THE CHALLENGE OF OUR TIME (2012).
186.
See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 183, at 7.
187.
See Bae, supra note 182, at 13.
188.
In the original position, individuals “have no information about their place in society (class position, social status), their natural assets (intelligence, strength), their own conception of the good (plans, values), their particular psychological attributes (attitudes toward risk, optimism), or about the particular aspects of their own society (its political or
economic system, history and so on).” Bae, supra note 182, at 14.
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of interest and limited resources, necessitating the soothing balm
189
of justice. In such situations, “the parties would therefore find it
rational to opt for a system of equal distribution of all social primary goods except where the inequalities lead to the maximization of
190
the long-term expectation of the worst off group in society.”
This conclusion reveals the core principles of Rawls’ theory of
191
192
justice: (1) the liberty principle and (2) the equality principle,
often referred to as the “difference principle.” Under the liberty
principle, the basic liberties—relating to private matters, and criti193
cal to each person’s ability to freely pursue chosen ends —can only be restricted for the sake of a greater system of basic liberties for
194
society at large. Under the difference principle—based on a presumption that it is impossible to distribute social and economic
goods equally, and the notion that some inequality may be necessary to advance the collective good—society only seeks to minimize
195
inequality. So long as opportunity is available to all who are “able
and willing to strive for them, [the equality principle] will lead to a
196
just distribution.” In response to concerns about differences in
natural endowment, Rawls concludes that such contingencies are
197
“morally arbitrary” and cannot be avoided nor merited. Thus, the
difference principle serves as a guide to redistribute the benefits of
morally arbitrary endowments. When such benefits are redistributed under a veil of ignorance, they will maximize benefits for the
198
least well-off and benefit the larger community.

189.
See Bae, supra note 182, at 15.
190.
VINIT HAKSAR, EQUALITY, LIBERTY AND PERFECTIONISM 164 (1979).
191.
See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 271 (1993) [hereinafter POLITICAL
LIBERALISM] (“Each person has an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic
liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all. [ ] Social and economic inequalities are permissible provided that they are i) to the greatest expected benefit of the
least advantaged; and ii) attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of
fair equality of opportunity.”).
192.
See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 183, at 302 (“Social and economic inequalities
are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,
consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”).
193.
According to Rawls, the basic liberties include political liberty, liberty of conscience
and freedom of thought, freedom of person, the right to personal property and the freedom from unlawful arrest and seizure of that property. See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note
183, at 53.
194.
See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 183, at 203, 229.
195.
See Bae, supra note 182, at 23.
196.
See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 183, at 66.
197.
Id. at 311–12.
198.
See Bae, supra note 182, at 29; see also A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 183, at 176
(asserting that the principles “not only . . . protect [individuals’] basic rights but . . . insure . . . against the worst eventualities.”).
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Rawls further argues that the liberty principle should take prec199
edent over the equality principle. He reasons, “[t]he basis for
self-esteem in a just society is not one’s income share but the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and liberties.”
Rawls contends that while liberty is a value embedded within a
government’s constitutional process because “it is more urgent to
200
settle the essentials dealing with the basic freedoms,” economic
matters are to be resolved at the legislative stage, presumably because they take more time to resolve. However, these conclusions
prove incoherent when confronted by modern poverty.
History reveals that “those who control the means of production
201
have an inordinate influence in the [constitutional process],”
challenging the presumption that a powerful ruling class will uphold the difference principle through legislation. Such conclusions
confound Rawls’ theory and reveal the limits of his balancing approach to matters of economic inequality, principally because the
self-interested decision-making of the ruling class can be justified
by the priority ordering of liberty before equality. The privileging
of liberty assumes that equality is only possible within the social
and political constraints imposed by a sovereign authority that preserves freedom. Evoking a Hobbesian conception of human nature
as fundamentally evil and self-interested, Rawls suggests that we
need law and order before we can work toward equality. But this
ordering lacks any objective foundation, and the hierarchy could
be inverted. Equality could just as easily presuppose liberty if we
believe that humans are capable—evoking a Lockean belief in the
fundamental goodness of human nature—of living harmoniously
and respecting the dignity of their neighbor.
In truth, liberty and equality are mutually independent, incapable of being objectively ranked and calling into question Rawls’ assertion that “either a private-property economy or a socialist re202
gime can satisfy this conception of justice.”
Further, the
incoherency of Rawls’ ordering reveals his assumption of capital203
ism as the dominant economic paradigm. Within a capitalist regime, unless the ruling class voluntarily transfers economic benefits to the working class, it is difficult to eradicate economic

199.
See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 183, at 61 (stating, “departure from institutions
of equal liberty required by the first principle cannot be justified by, or compensated for, [ ]
greater social and economic advantage.”).
200.
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 191, at 230.
201.
Barry Clark & Herbert Gintis, Rawlsian Justice and Economic Systems, 7 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 302, 312 (1978).
202.
A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 183, at 309.
203.
See Bae, supra note 182, at 40.
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inequality, especially when one’s liberty to pursue economic activi204
ty takes precedent over social and economic inequality.
B. Rethinking Equality—A Universality Critique
Even if Rawls’ privileging of liberty over equality is not incoherent, it is difficult to claim as universally valid. At best, his ordering
should be viewed as historically contingent, a phenomenon subject
to change and conditioned on the willingness of communities to
reconstruct the moral values and political principles that govern
human interaction. John Rawls’ conception of justice presupposes
a political order where law is necessary to constrain human nature,
but participation in democracy is not necessary for one to achieve
justice. Indeed, Rawls argued that the value of democracy, or polit205
ical participation, was purely instrumental; it merely provided a
mechanism for individuals to secure collective liberty—the right to
freedom of thought, expression, and association. As a result, Rawls
believed that political participation should not be imposed upon
206
all but instead should be taken up by the interested few. However, this view is not widespread. Other political philosophers
throughout history, such as Jürgen Habermas, have argued that
political participation is intrinsically valuable, a necessary compo207
nent to human flourishing.
th
In the early 19 century, the Swiss-French political activist Benjamin Constant articulated these divergent views as the battle between the liberties of the ancients and the liberties of the
208
moderns. According to Constant, the “ancients” prioritized political rights because they viewed them as necessary to human flourishing, whereas the “moderns”—who were influenced by the industrial revolution and capitalism’s promise of social mobility based
204.
Id. at 41.
205.
See generally James W. Nickel, Rethinking Rawls’s Theory of Liberty and Rights, 69 CHI.KENT L. REV. 763 (1994) (explaining that Rawls viewed liberties as instrumentalities to preserve other liberties, and alternatively, to preserve the structures and processes of the whole
governmental structure).
206.
Chantal Mouffe, Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community, in COMMUNITY AT
LOOSE ENDS 70, 71–75 (Theory Collective Miami ed., 1991).
207.
Jürgen Habermas, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 270 (Mass. Inst. Of Tech. ed., William Rehg trans., 1996)
(“Governmental authority derives from the power produced communicatively in the civic
practice of self-determination, and it finds its legitimation in the fact that it protects this
practice by institutionalizing public liberty.”).
208.
See generally BENJAMIN CONSTANT, THE LIBERTY OF ANCIENTS COMPARED WITH THAT
OF MODERNS (1819), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/constant-the-liberty-of-ancientscompared-with-that-of-moderns-1819 (articulating a distinction between two competing
conceptions of liberty, referred to as the liberties of the ancients and the liberties of the
moderns).
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upon entrepreneurial effort—prioritized private property rights
and the individual right to freedom of thought, expression, associ209
ation, and contract. Moderns believed that the interference of
the state was not a necessary piece to the puzzle of experiencing
the “good” life. Political theorist Isaiah Berlin later renamed the
liberties of the ancients as “positive liberties”—a positive right to
participate in government—and the liberties of the moderns as
“negative liberties”—the right to be free from interference as one
210
pursues human flourishing.
Professor Danielle Allen contends that John Rawls’ privileging of
liberty over equality reveals a prioritization of the negative liberties,
211
or private autonomy, over the positive liberties, or public autonomy.
In other words, Rawls believed that living the just life did not require one to participate in government if government ensured the
basic liberties necessary for actualizing self-esteem. It is here that
Professor Allen departs from the Rawlsian notion of justice, recognizing its conditionality. John Rawls’ theory was premised on the
existence of a ‘neutral’ state whereby public decision-making mirrors the cultural interests and general conception of good of all
212
members of a polity. However, under conditions of diversity
where citizens enjoy a wide range of cultural interests and conceptions of the good, it may be difficult for public decision-making to
not impose upon the liberty of disempowered community mem213
bers. The legacy of Jim Crow in America highlights how some
can interpret the law as promoting liberty, while it actually facilitates and creates inequality for an oppressed population. The notion that liberty presupposes equality is contingent on whose liberty is being upheld. As a result, the preservation of negative
liberties—freedom from interference with one’s thoughts, expres-

209.
See generally BENJAMIN CONSTANT, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS APPLICABLE TO ALL
GOVERNMENTS (Etienne
Hoffman
ed.,
Dennis
O’
Keeffe
trans.,
1815),
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/constant-principles-of-politics-applicable-to-allgovernments.
210.
See ISAIAH BERLIN AND THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM: ‘TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY’ 50
YEARS LATER, 73–114 (Bruce Baum & Robert Nichols eds., 2013); see also Rawls Rules: Three
Post-War Liberals Strove to Establish the Meaning of Freedom, ECONOMIST: SCHOOLS BRIEF (Aug.
30, 2018), https://www.economist.com/schools-brief/2018/08/30/three-post-war-liberalsstrove-to-establish-the-meaning-of-freedom.
211.
Danielle Allen, Political Equality and Empowering Economies—Toward a New Political Economy (Jan. 9, 2018), in Political Equality as Justice (unpublished manuscript),
http://henryfarrell.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Allen_equality.pdf.
212.
Id.
213.
Edward C. Lyons, Reason’s Freedom and the Dialectic of Ordered Liberty, 55 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 157, 189 (2007) (quoting ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE
PUBIC SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE 16–17 (1997))
(“A liberal state exists in good part to accommodate a variety of people irrespective of their
special preference for one kind of life over another; it thus allows coercion only where necessary to preserve civic order and not simply on the basis of majority preference.”).
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sions, and associations—may require that the positive liberties, or
the exercise of public autonomy through political participation, be
214
viewed as necessary to human flourishing. In short, under certain
conditions, governments may need to prioritize equality to facilitate liberty and achieve justice.
Recognizing diverse orientations of the individual and notions of
“self-perfection” along the spectrum of sociopolitical life also sup215
ports the universality critique. Whereas some political theorists,
such as John Rawls, view the notion of perfectionism as establishing
the liberty of the individual, and the arrangement of political institutions as maximizing general human achievement toward “a fixed
216
teleological principle,” others attach individual moral agency to
the process of self-perfection, with citizens “calling each other to
217
the better angels of their natures.” Those in the latter camp,
evoking what American philosopher Stanley Cavell described as an
218
Emersonian sensibility, view perfectionism not as “some fixed hierarchy of ends,” but instead as “an individual ethical injunction to
strive to be better . . . striving towards a higher ‘unattained yet at219
tainable self.’” The notion of a steady, yet sinuous, quest to improve not only the self, but society at large, calls for a recognition
of democracy as more than a collection of static, formalistic, and
neutral institutions and processes; democracy must be seen as a
process of self-transformation, with citizens remaining vigilant to
the ever-present need to reinvent the self and identify new path220
ways for effective democratic citizenship. Framing democracy as a
movement toward an amorphous conception of “better” attaches
to it a moral agency and ethical subjectivity that explains the need
for equal political participation, notwithstanding the importance
of liberty. Justice is contingent on our willingness to question the
subjective priority ordering of our democratic values.
214.
Id. at 160 n.10 (quoting Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1037
(2006) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))) (“The
most influential judicial opinion ever written about the meaning of substantive due process
proclaimed that ‘the liberty guarantee by the Due Process Clause . . . includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.’”).
215.
Perfectionism is a branch of moral and political philosophy that advances ethical
theories of human well-being and the human good, often in terms of the development of
human nature. See generally THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM (1993).
216.
See TO SHAPE A NEW WORLD, supra note 53, at 40.
217.
See id. at 39 (discussing Professor Chris Lebron’s notion of “moral-agency perfectionism,” which describes a flourishing democracy as an ongoing process of community and
self-development).
218.
STANLEY CAVELL, EMERSON’S TRANSCENDENTAL ETUDES, 141–83 (David Justin
Hodge ed., 2003).
219.
See TO SHAPE A NEW WORLD, supra note 53, at 40.
220.
See id. at 41 (“Democracies need their citizens to remain dissatisfied with things as
they stand, and to remain open to the possibility that justice will require reconstructing both
society and the self.”).
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Consequently, justice then not only requires equality in the
rights that protect private autonomy, but also demands political
equality—an equal right to participate in public decision-making.
Democracy furthers justice by insisting upon the steady pursuit of
political equality to not only protect liberty but facilitate our collec221
But, is American democracy democratic
tive self-perfection.
enough? In other words, does American democracy enable the invention of new pathways for democratic citizenship? Does the
American citizen’s vote enable her to enjoy political equality? Or,
does true political equality in America require a rethinking of
equality itself, a rethinking of its relation to the many social and
economic questions that lie at the heart of poverty’s puzzle? As
Paul C. Taylor suggests, “[j]ustice requires more than integrating
an America that remains otherwise unchanged, or making segregation more humane, or seizing power by any means . . . more than
fighting simply against racial oppression . . . our inadequacy must
222
itself be subject to critique and continually revised.”
C. Reframing Liberty—An Indeterminacy Critique
Even if we presume that the ordering of liberty over equality is
coherent, and further presume that such an ordering is universally
valid, the nature of political economy that facilitates such an ordering is indeterminate. To begin, consider the dominant conception
of the term equality. Rethinking equality is difficult, hindered by a
constrained ‘social imaginary’ that Antonio Gramsci referred to as
223
cultural and ideological hegemony. According to Gramsci, certain ideas that are favorable to the ruling class are so deeply ingrained in social and economic processes that it becomes almost
224
impossible for most people to conceive of alternate ideas. Discussions of poverty often focus on social or economic equality, while
some progressive and critical scholars emphasize the additional
importance of intersectional categories like racial equality or gen-

221.
Danielle Allen, Opinion, Why the Dispossessed Riot, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-last-straw-riot/2015/04/30/6e7168aa-edcf11e4-8abc-d6aa3bad79dd_story.html (explaining that freedom from domination requires
more than merely the protection of basic liberties, but also an equal share of control over
the legal institutions that shape daily life).
222.
See TO SHAPE A NEW WORLD, supra note 53, at 47.
223.
See generally, e.g., Michael G. Hanchard, Racial Consciousness and Afro-Diasporic Experiences: Antonio Gramsci Reconsidered, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY, March 1991, at 83 (1991); T.
J. Jackson Lears, The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities, 90 AM. HIST. REV.
567 (1985) (describing the notion of social and cultural hegemony).
224.
See Lears, supra note 223.
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225

der equality. Professor Danielle Allen argues that human moral
equality—individual freedom as recognition of universal human
worth (i.e., equal dignity)—is foundational to a democratic state
226
and coextensive with liberty. One cannot experience liberty if
227
one does not also experience equal dignity. Equal dignity, however, is undermined by the existence of laws, cultural practices,
228
and societal norms that embed hidden biases and stereotypes.
Thus, beyond attaining freedom from interference (private autonomy vis-à-vis civil rights), if liberty is coextensive with dignity, then
liberty also demands a society where citizens enjoy an equal share
in the ownership and creation of the laws, policies, and procedures
229
that govern their daily lives. Danielle Allen refers to this aspect of
230
political equality as the “co-ownership of political institutions.”
This duality—liberty and dignity—manifests in two key goals of
the civil rights movement—desegregation and integration. Desegregation, a critical first step in securing liberty for black Americans,
can be described as upholding and preserving the negative liberties—freedom from the interference of racially-driven legal and
societal prohibitions that infringe upon the private autonomy of
black citizens. However, as Professor Allen explains, human moral
equality also requires that we uphold and preserve the positive liberties of all citizens—the freedom to participate in shaping sociopolitical life to avoid domination by the biases or stereotypical as231
sumptions of those in power. This second requirement was the
crucial work of integration, the second phase of the civil rights

225.
E.g., JAMES R. KLUEGEL & ELIOT R. SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT INEQUALITY: AMERICANS’
VIEWS OF WHAT IS AND WHAT OUGHT TO BE (1986) (describing the findings of a national
survey of beliefs about social and economic inequality in America).
226.
See Spencer Lee Lenfield, The Egalitarian, HARV. MAG., May–June 2016, at 42–43,
https://harvardmagazine.com/2016/05/the-egalitarian.
227.
As King argued in WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE, “The dignity of the individual will
flourish when the decisions concerning his life are in his own hands, when he has the assurance that his income is stable and certain, and when he knows that he has the means to seek
self-improvement.” MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR
COMMUNITY? 173 (1968).
228.
Non-legal norms and practices also contribute barriers to the realization of moral
equality. Cf. Edgar S. Cahn & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 Yale
L.J. 1317, 1333 (1964) (“For law is made not merely through statutes and legislative programs, but also through modes of official behavior.”).
229.
Melvin L. Rogers, Race, Domination, and Republicanism, in DIFFERENCE WITHOUT
DOMINATION: PURSUING JUSTICE IN DIVERSE DEMOCRACIES (Danielle Allen & Rohini
Somanathan eds., forthcoming June 2020) (“[T]he security of freedom depends on (a) a
republic imposing constitutional constraints that guard against arbitrary power and (b) institutional spaces that allow citizens contestatory power to ensure the proper functioning of
a constitutional order.”).
230.
Danielle Allen, Political Equality and Empowering Economies—Toward a New Political Economy 9 (Jan. 9, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author),
http://henryfarrell.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Allen_equality.pdf.
231.
Id. at 5.
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movement that Dr. King embarked upon in his Poor People’s
232
Campaign before his untimely assassination. As King himself
states, integration “unchains the spirit and the mind and provides
233
for the highest degree of life-quality freedom.” In other words,
King viewed integration as a necessary step toward affirming the
full dignity of black Americans by enabling them not merely to
234
vote, but also to become “co-creators in the kingdom of culture.”
The challenge, as King described it, is that while desegregation
can be achieved by the requirements of legal reform, the law cannot easily mandate integration. In his essay, “The Ethical Demands
of Integration,” King remarked,
The ultimate solution to the race problem lies in the willingness of men to obey the unenforceable. Desegregation
will break down the legal barriers and bring men together
physically, but something must touch the hearts and souls
of men so that they will come together spiritually because it
235
is natural and right.
Thus, human moral equality demands a radical reconstruction of
our notion of liberty and, ultimately, our understanding of justice
itself. Government must not merely enforce standards of noninterference through civil rights and a rejection of toxic ideologies,
such as white supremacy; it must also embrace notions of non236
dominance through integration. Such integration can only be
achieved through appeals to “an unenforceable moral law . . .
237
awakened in the souls of all.”
It is here where scholars have oversimplified King’s clarion call
for integration. By integration, King meant something more than
merely compelling citizens of different races to live in the same
geographic space or attend the same public schools. True integra232.
The first phase of the civil rights movement (1955-1965) focused on ending racial
terrorism by white supremacists and abolishing discriminatory Jim Crow ordinances to secure the freedom of association and political participation of black Americans. The second
phase emphasized substantive equality by advocating for an end to poverty and economic
exploitation of marginalized communities. See TO SHAPE A NEW WORLD, supra note 53, at
187.
233.
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., The Ethical Demands of Integration, in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 121 (James M. Washington ed., 2003).
234.
See Danielle Allen, Integration, Freedom, and the Affirmation of Life, in TO SHAPE A NEW
WORLD, supra note 53, at 148.
235.
KING, supra note 233, at 124.
236.
Frank Lovett, Domination and Distributive Justice, 71 J. POL. 817, 820 (2009) (“The
political and social institutions or practices of any society are just to the extent that, in expectation, they will tend to minimize the sum total domination, counting the domination of
each person equally.”).
237.
See Danielle Allen, Integration, Freedom, and the Affirmation of Life, in TO SHAPE A NEW
WORLD, supra note 53, at 149.
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tion means engaging all community members in the work of creating and owning the political institutions that shape and govern
their daily lives. By moving beyond a narrow focus on residency toward a broader engagement with the political institutions that govern daily life, as David Troutt explains, integration becomes the
process of “connecting housing-related resources to residency
without limitation by race, color, religion, sex, familial status, na238
tional origin or disability.” This, of course, begs the question—
what constitutes a political institution and what housing-related resources matter? Beyond America’s three branches of government,
what additional political forces drive public decision-making and
dictate whether law and order promotes dignity, thereby ensuring
liberty and achieving justice?
Conventional notions of government comprise elected public
officials who craft laws and policies that operate within a political
economy—the systems of production, distribution, circulation, and
consumption of goods and services that define how people seek
material well-being. However, the rise of neoliberalism in America’s political economy reveals an abiding truth—large and powerful corporate institutions also yield a powerful influence on our po239
litical system. Further, the ownership of productive economic
property that generates wealth enables one to wield political influ240
ence on our economic system. Consequently, the ownership of
wealth in America should also be viewed as a kind of a political institution. Yet, the ownership of wealth remains highly segregated in
241
America, enjoyed by a few, and left out of reach for many. The
economic segregation of the haves and the have-nots must not only
be understood as a form of “social leprosy,” but also as a denial of
242
dignity itself.
Thus, political equality requires not only civil rights protecting
one’s freedom from interference, but even more, it calls for public
autonomy—freedom from domination through a democratization
238.
David D. Troutt, Inclusion Imagined: Fair Housing as Metropolitan Equity, 65 BUFF. L.
REV. 5, 90 (2017).
239.
See generally JOHN MIKLER, THE POLITICAL POWER OF GLOBAL CORPORATIONS (2018)
(describing global corporations as political actors that leverage economic power to influence political decision-making).
240.
Id.
241.
Kari Paul, America’s 1% Hasn’t Controlled This Much Wealth Since Before the Great Depression, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 5, 2018, 10:03 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
wealth-inequality-in-the-us-is-almost-as-bad-as-it-was-right-before-the-great-depression-2018-0719 (“The incomes of the top 1% grew faster than the bottom 99% in 43 states between 2009
and 2015.”); REBECCA TIPPETT ET AL., CTR. FOR GLOBAL POLICY SOLUTIONS, BEYOND BROKE:
WHY CLOSING THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP IS A PRIORITY FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC SECURITY
(2014), http://globalpolicysolutions.org/report/beyond-broke/ (“When it comes to the
racial gap in liquid wealth, African Americans and Latinos are nearly penniless.”).
242.
KING, supra note 233, at 121.
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of the ownership of productive economic property. These two elements are critical to promoting human moral dignity for all citizens. This line of reasoning demonstrates the indeterminacy of the
dominant neoliberal order. How then do we shift from a predominate focus on standards of non-interference via desegregation policies to embracing the demands of non-domination via meaningful
integration across all aspects of sociopolitical life? The next section
discusses the solidarity economy, or SSE, which scholars have described as an alternative approach to economic life that can democratize the ownership of wealth and promote economic jus244
tice. SSE challenges the hegemony of neoliberalism by proposing
a new vision of political and economic life.
D. Reconstructing Theory—A Justice-Based Approach
Although prevailing market-based CED models boast an ability
to catalyze social impact by tapping into private sector financing,
their adherence to the politics of neoliberalism undermines alternative approaches to economic development that may better advance justice. This Article argues that the adoption of a justicebased framing of CED will inspire a shift away from the principles
of global capitalism toward the communitarian values of the social
and solidarity economy, or SSE, thereby promoting participatory
245
and inclusive community economic empowerment.
Economic development policy in America has largely been driven by theories of economic growth grounded in neoclassical eco246
nomics. America’s economic institutions of production, consumption, and distribution play a central role in determining

243.
KING, supra note 227, at 105.
244.
See, e.g., ERIC DACHEUX & DANIEL GOUJON, THE SOLIDARITY ECONOMY: AN
ALTERNATIVE
DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGY?
(2012),
http://www.im-pactes.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/SE-alternative-development-strategy.pdf.
245.
Cf. ANUP DASH, UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH INST. FOR SOC. DEV., TOWARD AN
EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR SOCIAL AND SOLIDARITY ECONOMY 2 (2014),
http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/(httpPublications)/2DE9BF410E3B
8F94C1257CA600310304?OpenDocument (noting that scholars emphasize “these very
communitarian and cooperative qualities as the distinct identity of these alternative associative and participatory economic forms, which converge toward a central purpose, endowed
with a unique economic rationality that places human beings and communities above material things, work and capital.”).
246.
Historians generally consider British economist Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) as the
father of neoclassical economics. In PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890), he developed “the
ceteris paribus technique of economic analysis, formulated the general law of demand, discovered the concept of consumers’ surplus, refined marginal analysis, and devised a formula
for measuring the price elasticity of demand.” Francisco E. Guerra-Pujol, Cornel West, Meet
Richard Posner: Towards a Critical-Neoclassical Synthesis, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 39, 41
(2006).

382

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 53:2

whether individuals can, or cannot, meet their material human
247
needs. The neoclassical economic paradigm that drives mainstream economic theory traces its origins to Adam Smith and his
248
seminal work, Wealth of Nations. Premised on theories of human
behavior that have been argued to be both primitive and largely
249
inaccurate, the neoclassical theory of economics describes “a
formulation of the economy based on models derived from exchange markets in which the forces of supply and demand operate
to achieve a state of equilibrium deemed to be the optimal alloca250
tion of society’s resources.” Based on this framework, neoclassical
economics embraces “efficiency” as the economy’s normative value, reinforced by a Protestant “waste not want not” ethic, and “ra251
tionality” as the basis of human motivation. Alongside claiming
great predictive power through its preference for empiricism, neoclassical economics describes a market that “seeks to promote efficiency and wealth maximization, tends to ignore distributional ef252
fects, favors market solutions, and has a strong individualist bias.”

247.
Traditional “neoclassical” economics focuses on how our society’s systems of production, distribution, circulation, and consumption of goods and services define the ways in
which people organize themselves and seek their material well-being. Under this formulation of economic life, the extent to which one can navigate existing economic institutions
and earn income to meet basic human needs ultimately determines his or her ability to devote time and energy to the spiritual, intellectual, cultural, and social activities that are necessary to fully realize human dignity and individual sovereignty. This Article argues for a
broader conception of economic life, one that defines economies “as all of the diverse ways
that human communities meet their needs and create livelihoods together.” DASH, supra
note 245, at 11. This, in turn, opens the door for economic frameworks that are embedded
in social and cultural processes, focused on social capital, cooperation, and collective action.
See id. at 11–14.
248.
Adam Smith famously situated the study of economics within the framework of
moral philosophy, claiming in The Wealth of Nations that human economic choices are motivated by self-interest. Economists such as David Kreps have argued that the morality of neoclassical economics has evolved in recent decades, transitioning “from the assumption of
utility maximization to wealth maximization, and [from] self-interest . . . into explicit
greed.” DASH, supra note 245, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result,
“[e]conomics has changed from being a theory of our material subsistence to becoming a
theory of human nature, with scarcity no longer rooted in material life, but rather in the
human mind as a function of infinite human desires driven by greed.” id. at 5.
249.
Generally, the orthodox, “neoclassical” economic system can be described as “[t]he
intellectual and ideological home of the capitalist economic system . . . the belief in the universality of rational choice theory; the efficient market hypothesis; the instrumentally rational, utility-maximizing, ‘separative self’ (England 1993) underlying the concept of the
‘homo economicus’; the assumption of a ‘separate sphere’ of economic activity, and that markets and hierarchies are alternative modes of coordination.” Dash, supra note 245, at 3–4;
Charles R.P. Pouncy, The Rational Rouge: Neoclassical Economic Ideology in the Regulation of the
Financial Professional, 26 VT. L. REV. 263, 273 (2002).
250.
Charles R.P. Pouncy, Introduction, Latcrit X: Critical Approaches to Economic In/Justice,
17 BERKELEY LA RAZA J. i (2006).
251.
Id.; see also Guerra-Pujol, supra note 246, at 44 (“In the words of Richard Posner, for
example, ‘economics is the science of rational choice in a world—our world—in which resources are limited in relation to human wants.’”).
252.
Guerra-Pujol, supra note 246, at 41.
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Critical legal studies scholars have long been suspicious of the
rational choice theory of neoclassical economics, arguing that our
marketplace should instead adopt a more “egalitarian, communi253
tarian, and progressive” conception of economic life. Further,
scholars note that wealth maximization and economic efficiency
are often incompatible with the anti-subordination and community-building principles of critical theory. Notwithstanding, neoliberalism as a political rationality has shaped the role of law in development—“the creation of stable and well-protected property
rights, enforcement of private contracts, and limitation of the arbitrary exercise of government power—enabling a particular ideal of
254
entrepreneurial liberty, not visions of society.” Scholars trace the
origins of neoliberal philosophy to the early work of Friedrich
Hayek, who described the economic market as “spontaneous orders,” or cosmos; a complex system beyond the capacity of human
255
knowledge. According to Hayek, law should remain subordinate
to the economic market because government can “never be aware
of all the costs of achieving particular results by such interfer256
ence.” However, this framing strips government of its substantive
role in building a collective vision of society. Further, it renders law
merely “a condition for the preservation (and optimization)” of
257
the market. Accordingly, law derives legitimacy from creating the
conditions for individual liberty, but it is not primarily concerned
with notions of social solidarity.
SSE represents an opportunity to explore the range of alternative economic frameworks promoted by critical scholars that address some of the shortcomings of neoclassical economics and neoliberal ideology. Specifically, SSE integrates elements of both the
“social” economy and the “solidarity” economy. The social econo258
my—a variant of embedded liberalism —offers an alternative perspective to the prevailing, crisis-ridden capitalist economic regime,
focusing instead on empowering people-centered organizations
and leveraging progressive societal norms that counteract the con-

253.
Id. at 44.
254.
Blalock, supra note 143, at 84.
255.
Id. at 85–86 (quoting 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 38 (1981)).
256.
Id. at 86 (quoting HAYEK, supra note 255, at 57).
257.
Id. (citing HAYEK, supra note 255, at 47–48).
258.
See HARVEY, supra note 35, at 11 (“The term ‘embedded liberalism’ has been used to
signal “how market processes and entrepreneurial and corporate activities were surrounded
by a web of social and political constraints and a regulatory environment . . . State-led planning and in some instances state ownership of key sectors (coal, steel, automobiles) were not
uncommon (for example in Britain, France, and Italy).”).
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259

ventional economic paradigm. The “solidarity economy” emphasizes redistributive justice, participatory democracy, and alterna260
tives to capitalism and a debt-based monetary system. Taken together, the combined social and solidarity economy offers a proprogressive approach to CED that serves as a counter-hegemonic
advance against the structures of neoliberalism and the tenets of
261
global capitalism.
It is unlikely that present-day America will forego capitalism full
stop for a new economic theory like SSE. Nevertheless, SSE incorporates principles that can help shift current CED models away
from the dogma of market fundamentalism. The SSE theory focuses on reasserting the primacy of social control over private profit;
emphasizing ethical behavior in economic activity; and rethinking
economic life through the lens of democratic self-management
262
and active citizenship. In other words, instead of individualism,
SSE promotes communitarianism; instead of profit, SSE promotes
equity; instead of privacy, SSE promotes democratic participation.
When these principles of SSE are woven into an economic development process, several strategies emerge that prove helpful in developing criteria for a justice-based conceptual framework of
CED—(1) leveraging the existing cultural collective efficacy of
marginalized neighborhoods by seeking to develop under-utilized
community-based assets for the benefit of residents; (2) promoting
local, broad-based ownership of newly developed assets to keep
money circulating within the hands of people living in marginalized communities; (3) encouraging the usage of local, communityowned organizations and community-based financial institutions in
the provision of social welfare services; (4) bringing community
stakeholders to the decision-making table to foster transparency
and engender accountability; and (5) prioritizing social welfare
263
programs that consider the impact of institutional racism, system-

259.
See Utting, supra note 14, at 2; cf. DASH, supra note 245, at 6 (explaining that new
evolutionary biology supports the contention that humans are by nature not selfish and isolated individuals, but rather inclined toward cooperative relationships).
260.
See Utting, supra note 14, at 2.
261.
The social and solidarity economy (SSE) traces its roots to historic debates on sociopolitical and economic problems facing Europe during the industrial revolution in the
eighteenth century. The philosophy manifested as different economic theories—
cooperatives, self-management, mutualism, social economy, etc.—that served as alternatives
to the hegemonic capitalist regime that had come to define modern economic life. It was
further developed as a philosophical formulation by the utopian socialists and early champions of cooperative philosophy, including Robert Owen, Henri de Saint Simon, Charles
Fourier, and Pierre-Joeseph Proudhom. See DASH, supra note 245, at 7. For more information on SSE, see generally Utting, supra note 14.
262.
See Utting, supra note 14, at 2.
263.
See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 8 (“Black revolutionary Stokely Carmichael and social
scientist Charles Hamilton coined the phrase ‘institutional racism’ in their book Black Pow-

WINTER 2019]

Dismantling the Master’s House

385

ic economic inequality, and sustained racial segregation. These
strategies stand in direct contraposition to the traditional drivers of
264
place-based CED policy.
265
As an economic framework, SSE is not without its critics. But,
if SSE can help advance political equality by democratizing the political institution called wealth, and if political equality is a necessary component of justice, then how might embracing SSE’s core
principles change the way we think about CED policy in America?
By seeking to de-commodify economic activity, SSE offers a different perspective on economic life that can shift society toward a social conception of democracy that fosters justice. The current prevailing ideology of corporate capitalism has inspired an alphabet
soup of market-based CED programs—the LIHTC, NMTC, HCV,
and SIB, to name a few. By embracing the principles of SSE, and by
integrating its strategies into a coherent justice-based conceptual
framework of CED, emerging development programs like the SIB,
or the newer Opportunity Zones program, can shift from profitdriven incentives toward a more democratic motivation for social
welfare provision. Perhaps this approach would yield the ‘new governance’ America so desperately needs.
Importantly, this approach to CED does not perpetuate an outdated, unspoken, and implicit bias that assumes the deficiency and
266
inherent inferiority of low-income, minority “ghettos.” It does not
privilege our country’s legacy of white supremacy by implicitly suggesting that the lofty American Dream exists for people of color
generally, and black Americans specifically, only when such citizens
abandon a toxic “ghetto” culture that has stymied progress since

er. . . . Institutional racism, or structural racism, can be defined as the policies, programs,
and practices of public and private institutions that result in greater rates of poverty, dispossession, criminalization, illness, and ultimately mortality of African Americans.”).
264.
See supra Section I.B.
265.
See Utting, supra note 14, at 4 (“Neoclassical economic or rational choice theory, for
example, has emphasized problems of free riders or shirking; organizational theory points
to issues of institutional isomorphism as organizations and managers from different (private,
public, collective) fields assume similar characteristics; radical political economy cautions
about the capacity of powerful actors not only to repress but also to co-opt ‘alternatives’;
neo-structuralist analysis critiques so-called neo-populist tendencies within the SSE movement that depict homogeneity and harmony (as opposed to differentiation and conflict)
among SSE actors . . . .”).
266.
Cf. McFarlane, supra note 21, at 303 (“Considered underdeveloped rather than undeveloped, inner-city ghettos are described in terms of obsolescence and dysfunction, culturally perverted and not in keeping with Western, middle-class norms.”); id. at 339; Alexander, supra note 3, at 807 (“This deficiency-oriented construction of the inner-city . . . reflects
an overly simplistic understanding of the actual dynamics occurring in some low-income
predominantly minority, inner-city neighborhoods. It also ignores the positive social capital
that exists . . . .”); see generally WILSON, supra note 132.
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267

emancipation. Rather, it emphasizes a communitarian ethic, and
envisions new ontological formations of community itself, both at
268
the expense of the presumed rationality, utility maximizing, and
269
atomistic self-interest of the “homo economicus” that undergirds
our current neoclassical capitalist economy. Low-income, underserved black and brown communities are not asked to “move to
opportunity” in predominantly white, low-poverty neighborhoods.
Nor are they asked to single-handedly solve their own poverty with
resources garnered from altruistic social welfare programs as the
270
beneficiaries of a new, Carnegie-inspired “gospel of wealth.”
Instead, the justice-based framing of CED articulated below incorporates key principles from the SSE movement that celebrate
the richness of American diversity and foster economic justice.
This refashioning of economic life will require a shift away from
neoliberalism toward a more social conception of democracy that
271
challenges the plutocratic impulse in modern American life. Alt267.
Blaming marginalized communities of color for their poverty is not new. In 1965,
sociologist Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then serving as Assistant Secretary of Labor under President Lyndon B. Johnson, published The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, known as
the “Moynihan Report.” In his influential report, Moynihan argued that the rise of single
parent black households was not the product of a failing labor market, nor the result of decades of state-sponsored racial injustice, but the product of a toxic “ghetto” culture that
served as a “tangle of pathology.” Specifically, Moynihan argued, “at the center of the tangle
of pathology is the weakness of the family structure. Once or twice removed, it will be found
to be the principal source of most of the aberrant, inadequate, or antisocial behavior that
did not establish, but now serves to perpetuate [sic] the cycle of poverty and deprivation.”
See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR
NATIONAL
ACTION
(1965),
https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/webidmoynihan.
268.
See HARVEY, supra note 35, at 68 (“All agents acting in the market are generally presumed to have access to the same information. There are presumed to be no asymmetries of
power or of information that interfere with the capacity of individuals to make rational economic decisions in their own interests.”).
269.
DASH, supra note 245, at 5 (explaining, “[t]he starting point for economic analysis
in neoclassical economics is the individual, the homo economicus—anthropocentric, instrumentally (hyper)rational, atomistic and self-interested, utility maximizing, autonomous,
economic actors. Emphasis on self-interest and maximization as prime movers of human
action governed by the principle of competition strip the homo economicus—the ontologically
cold and rational, calculative, instrumentally driven, atomistic man with a ‘separate self’—off
[sic] any morality and substantive rationality, and create a thin theory of human action.”).
270.
See Toussaint, supra note 126, at 155 (“Carnegie called for the wealthy to live ‘unostentatious’ lives, and become ‘trustees’ for the poor, by giving away the majority of their
wealth after providing ‘moderately for the legitimate wants’ of those dependent upon
them.”).
271.
The term “socialism” has become taboo. However, a “social democracy” is an ideological stance that strikes a balance between market capitalism and the welfare state. While
capitalism facilitates a reliable means to generate wealth, its inability to efficiently distribute
wealth among its citizens necessarily leads to economic inequality and eventually poverty. To
engender more egalitarian outcomes, and to promote democracy, a social democracy asserts
that it is necessary for the state to both regulate the economy and provide social services to
marginalized populations within the society. Historically, the notion of a social democracy
was associated with Keynesian economics, state interventionism and the welfare state. More
recently it has been characterized by a commitment to addressing inequality and systemic
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hough this uphill journey toward economic justice may seem far
too difficult given the weight of partisanship in today’s political
landscape, this Article argues that such a democratic awakening is
necessary, not only to challenge the intransigence of market fundamentalism in American society, but perhaps more importantly,
to embrace the underlying moral commitments of American de272
mocracy. Fortunately, the notion of sacrificing private profit for
the sake of collective benefit is not entirely foreign to America’s
market economy, as demonstrated by the rise of corporate social
responsibility, social entrepreneurship, and social impact investing.
By uprooting the market moralities prevalent in traditional articulations of CED, and instead planting a firm commitment to the social responsibilities of economic justice, this Article argues that a
justice-based conceptual framework of CED can sprout progressive
projects and grow community-based institutions that target the
273
root causes and structural determinants of inequality in America.
III. TOWARD A JUSTICE-BASED THEORY OF
COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The pay-for-success model of impact investing, operationalized
through social finance tools like the SIB, appears to be a promising
approach to poverty alleviation. Indeed, it has already proven successful in helping to address educational disparities in Utah, for
example, through an early childhood education SIB financed by
274
Goldman Sachs. Further, at least 100 new SIB programs are underway worldwide. Nevertheless, the pay-for-success model reflects

oppression. See ANDREW HEYWOOD, POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES: AN INTRODUCTION 128 (5th ed.,
2012); Jonas Hinnfors, Social Democracy, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE 2423 (Bertrand Badie, et al. eds., 2011); Richard Hoefer et al., Social Welfare Policy
and Politics, in CONNECTING SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY TO FIELDS OF PRACTICE 29 (Ira C. Colby
et al. eds., 2013).
272.
As Cornel West argues, a democracy is more than a system of elected leaders and
political institutions, regulated by well-articulated check and balances. A democracy embodies timeless values and ethical beliefs, defined by “an enlightened and motivated democratic
citizenry . . . that can so effectively push for democratic change . . . through democratic individuality, democratic community, and democratic society.” WEST, supra note 7, at 203.
273.
See Toussaint, supra note 19, at 81 (posing the following question to scholars and
advocates of the emerging SIB model: “[a]t the conclusion of social service programs, are
communities left more political engaged and prepared to challenge the institutional structures that perpetuate cyclical poverty?”).
274.
See Nathaniel Popper, For Goldman, Success in Social Impact Bond that Aids Schoolchildren, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/
business/for-goldman-success-in-social-impact-bond-that-aids-schoolchildren.html
(“For
people studying social impact investing, the results in Utah are exciting — even more so given the children’s success. Among the 110 students who had been expected to need special
education had they not attended preschool, only one actually required it this year.”).

388

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 53:2

the rise of neoliberal rationality in CED policymaking. It deemphasizes the role of community stakeholders under an assumption that
economic growth will nurture long-term community development.
History has called into question that assumption, as market-based
CED programs have largely failed to address the growing wealth
275
disparities within American society.
Scholars have made strides in combatting the pro-business and
neoliberal trend in CED. Many now advocate for neighborhoodlevel, comprehensive strategies that “empower geographically discrete localities by channeling resources into communities to build
affordable housing, foster community-controlled business enterprises, and provide important supplemental services, such as job
276
training and child care.” Nevertheless, limited community involvement in economic development decision-making must not
become the endpoint of CED advocacy, but instead should serve as
a launching pad toward a broader reconstructive movement for
277
economic justice. Consequently, while existing CED models may
incorporate some level of community engagement—often by
choosing to fund community-based social service providers—more
work remains to move beyond the power dilemmas of new govern278
ance approaches described by Lisa Alexander.
Justice-based CED offers a new, perhaps simpler, framing of development—what if lawmakers and development practitioners prioritized justice? This section explores that very question, mapping
the contours of a new conceptual framing of CED that points toward the democratic principles of the solidarity economy. As described below, justice-based CED is built upon three foundational
pillars—(1) social solidarity; (2) economic democracy; and (3) solidarity economy—forging a path for America to transgress its stubborn systems of domination. Taken together, the conceptual
framework evokes what scholars have called “the blending of people
279
and place strategies,” while incorporating a unique emphasis on
economic justice. The Author hopes that it will inspire a shift away
275.
See generally DARITY JR., ET AL., supra note 104.
276.
See Scott L. Cummings & Gregory Volz, Toward a New Theory of Community Economic
Development, 37 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 158, 158 (2003) [hereinafter Toward a New Theory].
277.
See id. at 158 (“We must also measure success by the degree to which we are able to
translate this community participation into structural reforms that actually distribute significant resources to low-income communities.”).
278.
See Angela Glover Blackwell, Promoting Equitable Development, 34 INDIANA L. REV. 4,
1273, 1278 (2001) (“Equitable development includes policies and practices to promote and
manage regional economic growth in a way that maximizes benefits for residents of lowincome communities of color throughout metropolitan regions.”).
279.
See id. at 1279 (emphasis in original) (“People strategies are investments in human
capital, such as workforce development and safety net programs. Place strategies revolve
around bolstering or safeguarding the physical infrastructure, the types of activities implicated by transportation or environmental policy.”); see also supra Section II.C.
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from the stalled localism versus regionalism debate altogether, and
instead refocus attention on the demands of justice.
A. Social Solidarity
The first pillar of justice-based CED, social solidarity, calls for development efforts to foster political equality for all people within
and beyond the dynamic boundaries of modern communities, with
280
the ultimate goal of conferring power. This goal can be achieved
through two related strategies: (1) participatory democracy that disrupts systems of class privilege and racial hierarchy embedded in
law; and (2) equitable development initiatives that transcend local autonomy concerns and embrace the regional dimensions of inequality. These two strategies work hand in hand. Creating participatory
democratic spaces that build local power, such as broad-based multiracial coalitions that extend beyond the neighborhood level and
engage existing political institutions, promote equity in public decision-making by giving citizens tools to hold civic leaders accountable. In turn, equitable development demands comprehensive
strategies that transcend the boundaries of neighborhoods and
consider the economic, political, social, and environmental dimen281
sions of community development. Yet, a comprehensive regional
approach to participatory democracy must first wrestle with historical narratives of state-sponsored segregation and racial oppression
that perpetuate inequality and weaken citizen power.
Racialized narratives of poverty, perpetuated by neoliberal ide282
ology, operate to convince skeptics that poor people are poor
because of their own moral failings. However, a progressive CED
strategy grounded in economic justice demands a deeper examina283
tion of politically and socially fragmented communities. The first

280.
Scholars have already noted the need to integrate economic empowerment strategies into CED through a regional, broad-based political reform agenda. See, e.g., Anthony V.
Alfieri, Rebellious Pedagogy and Practice, 23 CLINICAL L. REV. 5, 8 (2016) (discussing the legacy
of “rebellious lawyering” as “a transferable form of clinical pedagogy and practice, [sic] and
as a legal-political method of community- and social-movement-building.”); Toward a New
Theory, supra note 276, at 159 (noting, “CED has treated low-income communities as isolated markets amenable to exclusively local remedial economic action. Yet . . . the roots of racial and economic segregation in urban areas have a peculiar political, as well as economic,
history.”); see generally, David J. Barron, The Community Economic Development Movement: A Metropolitan Perspective, 56 STAN. L. REV. 701 (2003).
281.
See Troutt, supra note 26, at 1171–74.
282.
Cf. Blalock, supra note 143, at 88 (“With this neoliberal conception of the subject
comes the assumption that the subject alone bears responsibility for the consequences of
her actions.”).
283.
See Cummings, supra note 84, at 905 (“A CED program that focuses narrowly on
structuring economic incentives and facilitating economic investment loses sight of the
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pillar of justice-based CED encourages new ontological formations
of community that transcend traditional geographic boundaries
shaped by race and class. CED initiatives have historically treated
low-income communities as isolated, problem markets troubled by
a culture of poverty that can be fixed with neighborhood-level,
284
place-based initiatives. Even where communities have imple285
mented social mobility programs, they have often failed to address the political construction of historic racial and economic segregation. In other words, the boundaries of community that dictate
notions of accountability are illusory vestiges of white supremacy
that both separate and ‘other’ black and brown Americans. This
stems, in part, from an ideology of American exceptionalism—the
notion that America operates under a post-racial, meritocratic social order where the American Dream is attainable for anyone who
286
simply works hard enough. Individuals who embrace this ideology
believe that poverty can be overcome by greater self-determination
in poverty-stricken neighborhoods through targeted social welfare
287
programs, or through good old-fashioned “tough love.”
Calls for self-determination as a solution to poverty make sense
considering the historic election of Barack Hussein Obama, the
first African American president of the United States. After decades of sluggish racial progress and the continued expansion of
the racial wealth gap, the election of President Obama signaled for
many the dawn of a new day in American politics, the birth of a socalled “post-racial” society, and the affirmation of what has become
a persistent call for “colorblindness” and “race neutrality” in the
288
law. However, just eight years later, the recalcitrant legacy of
deeply embedded political structure of inter-jurisdictional relations that constrains inner
city economic growth.”).
284.
See supra Section I.A.
285.
See id.
286.
Yet, for many, the American Dream may soon be out of reach. See DEDRICK ASANTEMUHAMMAD ET AL., PROSPERITY NOW, THE ROAD TO ZERO WEALTH: HOW THE RACIAL
WEALTH DIVIDE IS HOLLOWING OUT AMERICA’S MIDDLE CLASS, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY
STUDIES 5 (2017) (“If the racial wealth divide is left unaddressed and is not exacerbated further over the next eight years, median Black household wealth is on a path to hit zero by
2053—about 10 years after it is projected that racial minorities will comprise the majority of
the nation’s population. Median Latino household wealth is projected to hit zero twenty
years later, or by 2073. In sharp contrast, median White household wealth would climb to
$137,000 by 2053 and $147,000 by 2073.”).
287.
See Steve Holland, Obama Has Tough-Love Message for African-Americans, REUTERS
(July 16, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-obama/obama-has-tough-love-messagefor-african-americans-idUSTRE56G06K20090717 (noting that at the 100th anniversary celebration of the NAACP, President Barack Obama “urged blacks to take greater responsibility
for themselves and move away from reliance on government programs.”). But see DARITY JR.
ET AL., supra note 104 at 8 (“[S]tudying hard and working hard clearly is not enough for
black families to make up for their marginalized financial position.”).
288.
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, On Class-Not-Race, in A NATION OF WIDENING
OPPORTUNITIES? THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT 50, 105 (Ellen D. Katz & Samuel R. Bagenstos
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white supremacy has resurfaced under the election of real estate
mogul and entertainment celebrity Donald John Trump, ushering
a new political order of pseudo-populism built upon a familiar
290
platform of “law and order” and racial retrenchment. With the
291
support of an overwhelming majority of white voters, Trump’s
election led to the elevation of white-nationalist champion Steve
292
Bannon to the White House advisor seat and the appointment of
Jefferson Sessions to the highest position of federal law enforce293
ment. Although both Bannon and Sessions spent limited time in
office, the Trump administration reveals the bitter truth about
American post-racialism; the “problem of the color line,” as de294
scribed by W.E.B. Du Bois, remains a salient force in American
life. The antiquated political perspectives of a few continue to belie

eds., 2015) (discussing the arguments of “class-not-race” advocates and highlighting key
problems in the struggle to address issues of social and economic justice).
289.
See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 210 (explaining that white supremacy was historically “a
political strategy intended to manipulate racial fears as a means of maintaining class rule for
the landed elite of the cotton-rich Black Belt,” and existed “to marginalize Black influence
in social, political, and economic spheres while also obscuring major differences in experience in the social, political, and economic spheres among white people. Like slavery, this
was necessary to maximize productivity and profitability, while dulling the otherwise sharp
antagonisms between the richest and poorest white men.”).
290.
See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race to the Bottom: How the Post-Racial Revolution
Became a Whitewash, THE BAFFLER (June 2017), https://thebaffler.com/salvos/race-tobottom-crenshaw (“Not only did Trump’s successful white-backlash candidacy for the Oval
Office revive Nixonian tropes of Black lawlessness and depravity—complete with gruesome
caricatures of life in Black-majority inner city neighborhoods and calls for a return to whiteauthoritarian “law and order”—but it also relied on an overt platform of racist retrenchment
that prior Republican presidents had voiced only in code.”).
291.
Cf. Alec Tyson & Shiva Maniam, Behind Trump’s Victory: Divisions by Race, Gender, Education, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/11/09/behind-trumps-victory-divisions-by-race-gender-education/
(“Trump’s
margin among whites without a college degree is the largest among any candidate in exit
polls since 1980. Two-thirds (67%) of non-college whites backed Trump, compared with just
28% who supported Clinton, resulting in a 39-point advantage for Trump among this
group.”).
292.
See Julian Borger & Spencer Ackerman, Steve Bannon’s Role in Inner Circle of Trump
(Jan. 31,
2017),
Team
Raises
Fears of
Security
Crisis, THE GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/30/steve-bannon-nsc-politics-nationalsecurity (“Placing Bannon on the NSC, with his lack of national security experience, was a
‘radical’ step, Rothkopf said, as the former Breitbart media chairman had shown himself to
hold ‘racist, misogynist and Islamophobic’ views.”). Steve Bannon was eventually removed
from his position, but he has vowed to continue supporting President Trump’s agenda of
trying to erode Barack Obama’s political legacy. See Oliver Darcy, Steve Bannon Returns to
Breitbart After Ouster from White House, CNN: BUSINESS (Aug. 18, 2017),
https://money.cnn.com/2017/08/18/media/steve-bannon-returns-breitbart/index.html.
293.
Trump Cabinet: Senate Confirms Jeff Sessions as Attorney General, BBC (Feb. 9, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38915273 (“The confirmation follows a series
of divisive hearings during which Democrats attacked Mr. Sessions’ record on civil rights.
Democrat Elizabeth Warren was silenced after recalling historic allegations of racism against
Mr. Sessions.”).
294.
W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK; ESSAYS AND SKETCHES (New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1968) (1903) (the term “color line” gained popularity after Du Bois used
it to describe the problem of racial discrimination in America).
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the lived experiences of the many. Justice demands a vision of social solidarity that disentangles the threads of racism woven into
the fabric of American democracy.
The quest for social solidarity begs the question—are there hidden societal constraints that hinder human moral dignity and perpetuate racial domination? The answer depends on how one defines racial justice. Discussions of racial justice in America have
traditionally sought to define racial domination and racial subordination as “discrimination,” an irrational distortion of reason that
can be remedied through the enforcement of neutral, unbiased
295
legal principles by a benign, colorblind state. Emerging in the
1980s and 90s, scholars of the critical race theory (CRT) movement
proposed new conceptions of racial power, grounding their analysis in the perennial tensions between prevailing “integrationist” civil rights strategies and the unorthodox views of more radical, “na296
tionalist” factions of the black community. CRT scholars, such as
the late Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, Cheryl Harris, Kimberlé
Crenshaw, Charles R. Lawrence III, Patricia Williams, Mari Matsuda, Devon Carbado, and others, waged an epistemic critique of the
dominant framings of racial power, asserting that demands of “race
neutrality” in laws and public policies served to not only shelter
white expectations of de facto race-based privilege, but also legitimized substantive inequality and rationalized the “property” rights
297
of white privilege. In effect, the race-neutral and colorblind
295.
See, e.g., Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking
Back to Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1260–62 (2011).
296.
See id. at 1274–75; Cummings, supra note 50, at 405, 410–13 (discussing the classic
dialogue between Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois over the best strategy to
achieve racial justice and economic empowerment for emancipated slaves). A similar tension between the normative and political strategies of civil rights lawyers was visible in the
struggle for school desegregation. See generally Derrick Bell, “Serving Two Masters”: Integration
Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976) (exploring whether “the political, organizational, and even philosophical complexities of school
desegregation litigation justify a higher standard of professional responsibility on the part of
civil rights lawyers to their clients”).
297.
See Charles R. Lawrence III, Passing and Trespassing in the Academy: On Whiteness as
Property and Racial Performance as Political Speech, 31 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 8, 9–
10 (2015); see also, generally, Devon W. Carbado & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Theory Meets Social
Science, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149, 156–57 (2014) (describing the impact of critical race
theory’s critique of formalism and neutrality in law); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1711 (1993) (arguing that “distortions in affirmative action doctrine
can only be addressed by confronting and exposing the property interest in whiteness and
by acknowledging the distributive justification and function of affirmative action as central
to that task”); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 139, 150–52 (1989) (describing the failure of legal doctrine to adequately convey Black
women’s experiences as Black women); Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical
Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. CIV. RTS.–CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 301, 303–
07 (1987) (offering “criticism of certain trends in critical legal studies scholarship that some
minority scholars of color find troubling, including the CLS critique of rights and disdain
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“post-racial project” of American political leadership has not
freed America from the manacles of racism; it has instead reinforced and normalized racialized distribution of power, wealth,
and opportunity, rendering us shackled to a false belief in the lofty
American Dream and mired in a global capitalist society ruled by
299
plutocratic elites. Post-racialism blinds us to the intimate connection between the phenomenon known as the American ghetto and
our belief in an American Dream. In other words, we racialize
space because of unspoken insecurities and deeply-held fears triggered by the desire for self-perfection, or simply a need for some300
thing to ‘move on up’ from.
History reveals a panoply of covert (and overt) systems of class
privilege and racial hierarchy that have been baked into laws and
public policies, making it immensely difficult for low-income
301
communities to climb out of poverty. Local government policies,
often supported by federal programs, have both created the urbansuburban divide and have perpetuated false narratives about low302
income communities. The work to dehistoricize race in American culture and craft a colorblind society continues today; the early
for incremental, piecemeal reform”); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. CIV. RTS.–CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 323, 333 (1987) (discussing
how “combining deep criticism of law with an aspirational vision of law is part of the experience of people of color”); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. CIV. RTS.–CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 401, 403–06 (1987) (discussing
the CLS movement’s rejection of rights-based theory and its application for the black struggle for civil rights).
298.
See Lawrence, supra note 297, at 9–10.
299.
See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimization in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) (arguing the formal
equality, which declares that only laws that classify by race on their face will be treated as
suspect, actually legitimizes and reinforces the institutional and structural vestiges of white
privilege and supremacy in society).
300.
See McFarlane, supra note 21, at 340 (“The ghetto is a place that makes the places
outside of it (whether affluent central-city neighborhoods, the suburbs, or exurbs) a desirable refuge and a safe haven. Racialized space also provides a stark point of reference that
can make onlookers more content with where they are in their lives. Black racialized space is
also space people usually leave as soon as they are able: moving up means moving out.”)
(footnotes omitted).
301.
See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 217 (“If federal programs were not, even to this day,
reinforcing racial isolation by disproportionately directing low-income African Americans
who receive housing assistance into the segregated neighborhoods that government had
previously established, we might see many more inclusive communities. Undoing the effects
of de jure segregation will be incomparably difficult. To make a start, we will first have to
contemplate what we have collectively done and, on behalf of our government, accept responsibility.”); see McFarlane, supra note 21, at 334 (“Bank redlining and Federal Housing
Administration policies perpetuated and skewed this outmigration for many years by devaluing neighborhoods that were racially mixed and by refusing to insure or make available
mortgages for neighborhoods occupied by blacks.”).
302.
Cashin, supra note 26, at 2026 (explaining that localism tends to “institutionalize
societal attitudes that, in turn, reinforce existing disparities of power, wealth and social access.”).
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twenty-first century has already witnessed assaults on affirmative ac303
tion and voting rights, to name a few. New laws and public policies designed to remedy economic inequality, educational disparities, or social challenges like criminal activity and drug abuse, concontinue to ignore the institutional, structural, and ideological
manifestations of racial hierarchy that continue in America to304
day. Even calls for our nation’s first black president to be “postracial,” followed by President Barack Obama’s sustained posture of
racial avoidance (as evidenced in many of his presidential speech305
es), reveals the continued presence of race-consciousness in the
American polity. Many hardworking and ambitious Americans who
live in low-income communities still find themselves “stuck in
306
place” because of their race. And, if human moral equality, or
freedom from domination, is a key attribute of a just society, then
CED in America has failed at promoting justice.
Social solidarity requires a dismantling of the vestiges of statesponsored white privilege that impede human moral dignity. Unfortunately, scholars have noted a declining prioritization of race
when engaging issues of poverty, with many practitioners seeking
307
to instead refocus attention on issues of class. Notwithstanding,
the ideology of racial hierarchy has led to continued rationalizations of the income gap, the wealth gap, the achievement gap, the

303.
Cf. Ari Berman, The Trump Administration Is Planning an Unprecedented Attack on Voting Rights, THE NATION (June 30, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-trumpadministration-is-planning-an-unprecedented-attack-on-voting-rights/.
304.
See generally Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM
AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (3 ed., 2009) (arguing that the
post-racial project has led to an increase in racial disparities in the quality of education); Ian
F. Haney-Lopez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023 (2010) (arguing that racial disparities in the American criminal justice system reflect the impact of our country’s unwillingness to resolve institutional
racism, evident in our shift from civil rights and social welfare policies to stereotype-driven
crime control tactics); Peter Halewood, Laying Down the Law: Post-Racialism and the DeRacination Project, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1047 (2009) (arguing that colorblindness and the postracial project has contributed to increased economic inequality).
305.
See Crenshaw, supra note 290, at 13.
306.
PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF
PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY (2013) (describing how political decision-making and
government policies have marginalized black neighborhoods, perpetuating segregation and
poverty that belie the promise of the civil rights movement.).
307.
See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS
AND CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS (3d ed. 2012) (classifying various categories of oppression experienced by black Americans that are rooted in class struggles). The erasure of
“race” from public discourse transcends dialogue within the economic development community and manifests in other academic domains as well. For example, as award-winning
novelist Toni Morrison explains regarding the field of literature, “[s]ilence and evasion have
historically ruled literary discourse. Evasion has fostered another, substitute language in
which the issues are encoded, foreclosing open debate . . . the system is aggravated by the
tremors that breaks into discourse on race.” See TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK:
WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION 9 (1993).

WINTER 2019]

Dismantling the Master’s House

395

incarceration gap, the police brutality gap, and a panoply of other
gaps we find ourselves stuck between, as the failings of an inferior
“ghetto” American culture. These rationalizations of outcome with
cultural inputs suggest, implicitly, that the poor are to blame for
their lot in life. Yet, evidence suggests it is “racial differences in initial endowments of and access to financial resources that sustain
308
and fuel the racial wealth gap.”
Wrestling with the sticky issue of race becomes even more pertinent for CED initiatives targeting criminal justice reform, such as
309
the first SIBs launched in the United States. Professor and civil
rights advocate Michelle Alexander highlights the implications of
race within the broader context of mass incarceration in America
by noting,
What is completely missing in the rare public debates today
about the plight of African Americans is that a huge percentage of them are not free to move up at all. It is not just
that they lack opportunity, attend poor schools, or are
plagued by poverty. They are barred by law from doing
so . . . the major institutions with which they come into con310
tact are designed to prevent mobility . . . .
Alexander argues that our current prison industrial complex is in
fact a new system of social control designed to subjugate marginalized black communities, not merely a manifestation of wayward
urban residents in need of “tough love.” Whether or not Alexan-

308.
See DARITY JR. ET AL., supra note 104, at 29.
309.
Whether mass incarceration is an outgrowth of racially-tainted economic development policies or simply the manifestation of similar personal choices, among a relatively
homogenous demographic, it is undeniable that our prison system impacts an alarmingly
high percentage of black Americans, stripping them of their humanity while incarcerated
and limiting access to many civil rights once they are released. Today, as many as eighty percent of black men have criminal records and are subjected to life outside of prison as second-class citizens due to the stigma of their criminal record. Michelle Alexander, The New
Jim Crow, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Dec. 6, 2010), https://prospect.org/special-report/newjim-crow/. Black Americans are significantly overrepresented in the American prison system,
comprising approximately thirty-eight percent of the federal incarcerated population. See
Inmate Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/
statistics_inmate_race.jsp (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). By imposing harsh drug laws and
tough-on-crime policies on predominantly low-income communities of color, our system of
mass incarceration has perpetuated a system of racial hierarchy in the United States, while
also failing to rehabilitate offenders or prepare them for successful re-entry into our communities. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 8 (2010); Toussaint, supra note 19, at 64 (noting the formerly incarcerated citizens are “shackled with the stigma of their prison record long after serving time behind bars, a stigma that impairs their civil rights and limits their prospects for economic
prosperity in the job market.”) (footnotes omitted).
310.
See Alexander, supra note 309, at 13.
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311

der’s contentions, though brutally convincing, are in fact true,
they suggest that CED programs addressing the issue of prisoner
recidivism, for example, should integrate (or be integrated into) a
broader political strategy for criminal justice reform that engages
issues of race.
Broad-based coalition building as a participatory democratic
strategy to foster political equality preserves the cultural collective
efficacy of black and brown communities by honoring voice. Further, it suggests a reframing of community by seeking to bridge ra312
cial divides. Traditionally, due to the disempowerment of com313
munity action agencies,
the community development
corporation (CDC) has served as an advocate for communities and
their residents. However, CDCs do not always represent the full
spectrum of community perspectives and experiences. Broadbased, multiracial coalitions must include not only CDCs, but also
314
labor unions, faith-based institutions, community-based organizations, educational institutions, and other community stakehold315
ers. A key feature of these coalitions is their multiracial design,

311.
Historically, enslaved Africans were viewed not as humans deserving of equal treatment under the law, but as illiterate, hypersexual animals prone to barbarism and primitive
violence. After the abolition of chattel slavery, the rise of “Black Codes”, and the later development of “Jim Crow” segregation policies, horrific acts of racial terrorism were used to
perpetuate a system of racial hierarchy in America that has, in some ways, persisted to this
day. Even when economically self-reliant black communities arose in places like Atlanta,
Georgia, Chicago, Illinois, Washington, D.C., New York City, St. Louis, Missouri, Rosewood,
Florida, Knoxville, Tennessee, and Tulsa, Oklahoma, they were destroyed by racist white
mobs who detested the notion of economic prosperity for people whom they deemed inferior. As each system of oppression in America has been erected and dismantled, a new system of racial domination has seemingly emerged to take its place. See generally DOUGLAS
BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE REENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM
st
THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (1 ed. 2008).
312.
See Alexander, supra note 3, at 851 (“[R]esidents in low-income, segregated communities can develop positive social assets that provide the basis for positive revitalization.
An unfettered and unrestrained marketplace does not return the economic value of these
assets to the broad communities that produced them. Rather, the marketplace often commodifies and, arguably, exploits these community assets for the benefit of groups and individuals external to the community.”).
313.
See infra section I.A.
314.
See Brian Siebenlist, The Role of Faith-Based Organizations in Smart growth and Regionalism, in SMART GROWTH, BETTER NEIGHBORHOODS: COMMUNITIES LEADING THE WAY 113-14
(2000) (“[F]aith-based organizations have a base of values that gives them moral suasion. As
a result, they enjoy tremendous credibility in public dialogue and are successful at community organizing.”).
315.
Maggie Potapchuk, Multi-Racial Coalitions and Partnerships, in FLIPPING THE SCRIPT:
WHITE PRIVILEGE AND COMMUNITY BUILDING 103 (2005) (discussing how multi-racial coalitions comprised of residents and diverse organizational leaders work together toward common goals). Transactional law clinics at law schools can also serve as “engaged civic institutions” that advocate on behalf of community members and use transactional representation
techniques to advance economic and racial justice. See e.g., Susan R. Jones, Representing Returning Citizen Entrepreneurs in the Nation’s Capital, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY
DEV. L. 45 (2016) (“The George Washington University Law School Small Business and
Community Economic Development Clinic (SBCED Clinic or Clinic) in Washington, D.C.,
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cutting across traditional and illusory neighborhood boundaries
and building communities of interest focused on poverty alleviation and racial justice.
316
Yet, the call for participatory democracy is not new; it simply
has been silenced by America’s history of market-oriented CED
programs. During the civil rights movement in the 1960s, organizations such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and the Congress of
Racial Equality lobbied government leaders to prioritize economic
317
equality for politically disenfranchised groups. Even Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr.’s famous “I Have A Dream” speech delivered on
the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in 1963 began with a metaphor
of a “bad check,” criticizing America for not honoring the debts of
318
injustice to her oppressed populations. Nevertheless, responses
319
to political demands for economic justice have been mixed. The
tragic story of the defunding of community action agencies by local
government leaders, largely due to an unwillingness to confer collective power to poor citizens, reveals a silencing of poor communities and a perpetuation of oppressive social hierarchies. While
local and state governments have initiated important social welfare
320
programs, these programs have frequently failed to integrate
community members into the economic development process or

provides legal representation to the nonprofit organizations that support returning citizens
as well as direct representation to returning citizens.”); Scott L. Cummings et al., supra note
276, at 162 (explaining that “the equitable approach to CED . . . embraces a reconfigured
notion of ‘community’—one defined not by traditional neighborhood boundaries but by a
common interest in redressing poverty and inequality.”).
316.
See Mark Engler, Dr. Martin Luther King’s Economics: Through Jobs, Freedom, THE
NATION (Jan. 15, 2010), https://www.thenation.com/article/dr-martin-luther-kingseconomics-through-jobs-freedom/ (explaining that five years after his “I Have A Dream”
speech, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. began the Poor People’s Campaign, focused on joblessness and economic deprivation).
317.
See Scott L. Cummings et al., supra note 276, at 160.
318.
See Phillip Kennicott, Revisiting King’s Metaphor About a Nation’s Debt, THE WASH.
POST (Aug. 24, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/revisiting-kingsmetaphor-about-a-nations-debt/2011/07/26/gIQArshBaJ_story.html?utm_term=
.2d90f71915f4.
319.
E.g., Scott L. Cummings et al., supra note 276, at 160; Thomas F. Jackson, Martin
Luther King and Economic Justice, DSA: DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS OF AMERICA (Jan. 17, 2014),
http://www.dsausa.org/martin_luther_king_and_economic_justice (“King’s assassination—
and the urban revolts that followed—led to a local Memphis settlement that furthered the
cause of public employee unionism. The Poor People’s March nonviolently won small concessions in the national food stamp program. But reporters covered the bickering and
squalor in the poor people’s tent city, rather than the movement’s detailed demands for
waging a real war on poverty.”).
320.
See infra Section I.A. (discussing various governmental programs throughout America’s history that sought to provide affordable housing and promote economic development
in low-income communities).
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incorporate strategies for linking local coalitions to broader re321
gional reform movements.
The recent rise in local government concern over metropolitan
inequality marks a notable shift from traditional approaches to ur322
ban development. As Paul Peterson described in his 1981 book
City Limits, urban development traditionally comprised only two
central actors—local government and the private sector, with local
government typically occupying a weaker negotiating position in
the relationship. Reflecting a post-New Deal consensus that the
governance of economic development programs belonged at the
local level, most local governments historically focused on avoiding
323
“capital flight,” which in many ways drove local politics. As a result, many local governments avoided redistributive policies to appease a corporate-dominated political economy. Richard Schragger argues that the notion of a “limited city” in urban development
324
“still dominates the literature on urban power.”
In cities across America, local governments are now employing
progressive political strategies that include marginalized communities in the development process and promote justice by fostering
political equality. Clawback provisions in development contracts,
325
326
local living wage laws, community benefit agreements, and col327
lective impact agreements are but a few examples of participatory
democratic strategies that have been used to empower residents
and engender social solidarity across traditional divides. Community-based stakeholders have also expanded their influence in CED
328
initiatives. For example, in Cleveland, Ohio, University Hospital,
a major nonprofit medical center, worked with the Mayor’s Office
to procure 80 percent of a $1.2 billion development project that
329
created more than 5,000 jobs. Alongside tapping into the resources of local educational institutions, CED advocates are lever-

321.
See Scott L. Cummings et al., supra note 276, at 160.
322.
See KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13, at 36.
323.
See Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic
City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 488 (2009) (“Governments in a capitalist system depend on private economic activity to generate prosperity and well- being for their citizens, but they appear to have limited capacity to influence capital flows. In a free market system, capital cannot be commanded by government — it must be cajoled.”).
324.
See id. at 489.
325.
Cf. Brishen Rogers, Justice at Work: Minimum Wage Laws and Social Equality, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 1543 (2014).
326.
See generally Edward W. De Barbieri, Do Community Benefits Agreements Benefit Communities?, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773 (2016).
327.
See generally Patience A. Crowder, Impact Transaction: Lawyering for the Public Good
Through Collective Impact Agreements, IND. L. REV. (2016).
328.
See KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13, at 38.
329.
FARZANA SERANG, ET AL., THE ANCHOR MISSION: LEVERAGING THE POWER OF
ANCHOR INSTITUTIONS TO BUILD COMMUNITY WEALTH 7 (2010).
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aging the thousands of CDCs and the growing number of community development financial institutions that provide financial ser330
vices to marginalized populations.
Even more, new political institutions are being used to promote
political equality. A recent example can be found in the town of
Wisconsin Rapids, Wisconsin, where the Incourage Community
Foundation has taken proactive steps to include community members in decision-making and empower residents to influence local
331
development. These participatory democratic strategies help to
foster political equality by ensuring that the liberty of community
members is not constrained by laws and policies that do not reflect
their values or that embed false narratives about their worth. These
progressive cities recognize that our vanishing social safety nets
and increasingly neoliberal CED solutions are not stemming the
tide of inequality. Professor Susan Bennett argues that decades of
disinvestment in low-income communities, coupled with the “devolution” of public welfare function, has destabilized the lives of very
poor people and, in some cases, “untethered” them from commu332
nity relationships altogether. An untethering of poor residents, at
scale, may complicate the formation of community-based coalitions
necessary for social solidarity to develop. Indeed, the political influence of corporate capitalism reveals that a seat at the table is not
enough. Thus, building upon the call for social solidarity, the next
section discusses the need for a democratization of the economic
factors of production within developing communities or, in short,
a democratization of wealth.
B. Economic Democracy
The second pillar of justice-based CED, economic democracy, calls
for development efforts to promote metropolitan equity by democratizing the ownership of wealth. The ownership of the primary
factors of production within an economy—land, labor, and capital—often dictates who controls wealth. Traditional approaches to
economic development have focused on a combination of supplyside and demand-side economic policies that enable land, labor,
and capital within a geographic location to produce more ‘goods’
for export, generating economic growth. The neoclassical assump330.
See KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13, at 40.
331.
See Drew Lindsay, Rebuilding with a New Blueprint, THE CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY
(Oct.
4,
2016),
https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Putting-Residents-in-Chargeof/237977.
332.
See Susan Bennett, Coming of Age on $2 a Day, Evicted: What CED Has to Say to Today’s
Untethered Poverty, 26 J. Affordable Hous. & Cmty. Dev. L. 57, 58–59 (2017).
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tions of perfect competition and economies of scale popularized
exogenous theories of economic growth that predicted economic
development benefits would trickle down to all members of a
community. Such assumptions converged with neoliberal politics
that suggested the private economic market could correct the
‘market failures’ that lie at the root of poverty. However, the resulting market-oriented CED programs have not only failed to consider who owns the economic factors of production but have also
failed to account for the range of non-market economic factors of
production in marginalized communities, including social capital,
community culture, local decision-making power, neighborhood
amenities, and public goods.
Whether private developers revitalize distressed urban communities or whether low-income families are given the resources to
move to low-poverty neighborhoods, the result is “a system that
produces vast differences in privilege, and then tasks the most priv333
ileged with improving the system.” Conventional approaches to
development perpetuate the belief that individual agency can singlehandedly pull one out of destitute circumstances, while spreading a stereotypical ‘culture of poverty’ based on an ideology of racial hierarchy. Conversely, justice-based CED recognizes that the
solutions to economic inequality must wrestle with our nation’s political history of institutionalized racism that dictated who owns the
primary factors of production that create intergenerational
334
wealth. The justice-based framing reveals the influence of corporate capitalism on public decision-making, a non-market factor of
economic production that should be viewed as a community asset.
Indeed, institutional stakeholders typically gain ownership of productive economic property within low-income communities during
the economic development process. Justice-based CED urges local
governments to shift the ownership of land, labor, and capital to
community-based entities and community residents to more equitably distribute wealth during economic development.
The ownership of land in America has a complex history. The
decline of the traditional urban-suburban divide has shifted the
335
development trajectory of many urban spaces. In cities across

333.
Darren Walker, Why Giving Back Isn’t Enough, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/opinion/why-giving-back-isnt-enough.html.
334.
Cf. McFarlane, supra note 21, at 351 (explaining that economic development programs often ignore “configurations of poverty segregated by race or ethnicity” and “[threaten] to harden these boundaries beyond all hope of remedy because the program ignored
current structural and historical policies that have shaped and configured our racialized
landscape.”).
335.
See Alexander, supra note 3, at 818; BERNADETTE HANLON, ET AL., CITIES AND
SUBURBS: NEW METROPOLITAN REALITIES IN THE US 77 (2010).
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America, new patterns of investment and targeted government action, or inaction, are making low-income neighborhoods increas336
ingly attractive to young professionals and wealthier families.
Aware of these trends, private investors and developers are constantly seeking ways to acquire the land in low-income, disinvested
337
areas before they become gentrified. Much like the Urban Renewal of the mid-twentieth century, these development practices
338
reflect the power dynamics of urban spaces. While CED programs have sought to improve the land, less attention has been paid
to who owns the land. Community residents typically have little influence in the development process, and are rarely positioned to
benefit economically from development programs in their neigh339
borhoods. The treatment of low-income neighborhoods and
their residents as economic markets to be exploited for the financial gain of prudent investors stems not only from the plutocratic
impulse in American life, but also from a racially-driven and stere340
otype-infused cultural framing of poverty. Black inner-city com341
munities, we are told, suffer from a “culture of poverty” and “mutually . . . destructive forces”—unemployment, crime, lack of
education, poor health—that reflect the dangers of concentrated
poverty, the realities of minority behavioral choices, and the dearth
342
of positive social capital.
The narratives of poverty perpetuated by many CED programs
undermine the relationship that low-income individuals have with
their community and the non-market assets in their neighbor343
hood. Scholars have argued that structural disadvantage may be

336.
See Alexander, supra note 3, at 819–20.
337.
See id. at 821; McFarlane, supra note 21, at 6–8.
338.
See Diamond, supra note 33, at 160 (“[T]he poor are the disadvantaged group when
analyzing power through the lens of dependency. The poor typically depend upon the state
for various transfer payments, on the public hospitals and emergency rooms for health care,
on landlords for housing, and on employers for jobs. The only choices available to them
may be ‘take it or leave it’ when leaving it is not realistic.”); Alexander, supra note 3, at 823.
339.
See Diamond, supra note 33, at 162 (“[T]o achieve a set of goals, the poor, those
with a power deficit, must acquire power. This is most readily done through the process of
organizing individuals into groups and institutions in order to increase the leverage that
arises from combining their assets and from the relative reduction in their dependence . . .
[l]egal scholars and others have for some time pointed out the need to organize to achieve
political power . . . [yet], ‘[a] basic tenet of classical political liberalism . . . is that the individual rather than the organized group or community is the fundamental political actor.’”);
Alexander, supra note 3, at 823–24.
340.
See McFarlane, supra note 21, at 339
341.
See Wilson, supra note 132, at 60–62.
342.
Alexander, supra note 3, at 825, n. 144; see also Darity, supra note 104, at 41 (“[T]he
argument that intergroup disparities in wealth are borne out of group based cultural/behavioral deficiencies is misleading and misdirected. Instead, we should focus on the
long exposure of low wealth racial/ethnic groups to theft of wealth and blockades on wealth
accumulation.”).
343.
Cf. Alexander, supra note 3, at 825-29.
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an inadequate proxy for understanding the complex social networks, cultural frames, and historical narratives that impact how
low-income residents respond to their neighborhood’s condi344
tions. Low-income black Americans living in disinvested neighborhoods, for example, may not believe that changing the culture
of their community, or being gifted resources to move to a lowpoverty, predominantly white suburb, is the ‘best’ opportunity for
their family. Notwithstanding narratives to the contrary, lowincome neighborhoods retain an important type of positive social
capital called “cultural collective efficacy” that influences the ability
of neighborhood residents to realize common values and maintain
345
social control through participation in cultural endeavors. Although low-income residents may not own the land in their community, they do collectively own community-based, non-market
goods that bring economic value to the neighborhood, from culture, to social capital, to community relationships. These assets
should not be discarded, manipulated, or destroyed during the development process simply because they do not fit neatly into the
box of our current legal regime. Rather than dismantle urban
spaces deemed unworthy of preservation, a justice-based conception of CED queries how development programs can honor existing non-market factors of economic production and empower residents by increasing the local control of land.
There are several progressive projects in cities across America
that are seeking to democratize the ownership and control of land.
Community land trusts, land banks, and cooperative housing developments are but a few examples. In Boston, the Dudley Street
Neighborhood Initiative has played a vital role in empowering lowincome community members to actively participate in the devel346
opment of their neighborhood. The organization was successful
in creating a community land trust to redevelop housing on thirty
acres of abandoned lots and preserve affordability amidst gentrifi347
cation. Land banks are another progressive vehicle whereby city
governments exercise eminent domain to obtain city-owned land,
tax- delinquent properties, and land owned by absentee landlords,

344.
See id. at 827–28.
345.
Id.
346.
See Jessica Kannam, Community-Based Organizing for Educational Justice: A Case Study of
the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative 10–11 (May 5, 2016) (UNPUBLISHED B.A. THESIS,
CONNECTICUT COLLEGE), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5515d04fe4b0263cc20b
3984/t/57632a10d1758e98278180d3/1466116625824/Kannam_Jessica_2016.pdf.
347.
The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative’s mission is to “empower Dudley residents to organize, plan for, create and control a vibrant, diverse and high-quality neighborhood in collaboration with community partners.” DUDLEY STREET NEIGHBORHOOD
INITIATIVE, https://www.dsni.org (last visited Nov. 6, 2019).
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to be used for community development purposes. After obtaining the land, land banks then transfer the properties to community
land trusts that are democratically governed by neighborhood res349
idents. For example, a coalition of statewide and citywide community groups, faith groups, and labor groups in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, collectively helped to pass a law that will increase
community entities’ control of up to 40,000 vacant properties in
350
low-income neighborhoods. Such efforts empower community
members to preserve affordable housing and resist the threat of
displacement by gentrification. Finally, cooperative housing programs have been leveraged in cities like Washington, D.C. to combat displacement during urbanization. Under D.C.’s Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act, residents of an apartment building are
granted a right to collectively organize and purchase their building
351
when it is marketed for sale by the owner. The progressive law
seeks to stabilize longstanding D.C. neighborhoods by providing
financial counseling, technical assistance, and pro bono organizational/legal assistance in support of tenants becoming homeown352
ers.
Alongside democratizing the ownership of land, economic democracy requires a democratization of the ownership of labor. Collective worker-ownership has long been utilized in low-income
353
communities to address systemic poverty, either by community
members who form cooperatives because of an inability to access
354
living-wage jobs, or by progressive CED advocates seeking to em-

348.

See, e.g., FRANK S. ALEXANDER, LAND BANK AUTHORITIES: A GUIDE FOR THE CREATION
OPERATION OF LOCAL LAND BANKS 2–3 (2005), https://files.hudexchange.info/
resources/documents/LandBankAuthoritiesGuideforCreationandOperation.pdf.
349.
See, e.g., Matthew J. Samsa, Reclaiming Abandoned Properties: Using Public Nuisance Suits
and Land Banks to Pursue Economic Redevelopment, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189 (2008); Diana A.
Silva, Land Banking as a Tool for the Economic Redevelopment of Older Industrial Cities, 3 DREXEL
L. REV. 607 (2001).
350.
Karen Black, Philadelphia Achieves Land Bank Through Compromise, SHELTERFORCE
(Jan. 22, 2014), https://shelterforce.org/2014/01/22/philadelphia_achieves_land_bank_
through_compromise/.
351.
Kathryn Howell, Preservation from the Bottom-Up: Affordable Housing, Redevelopment, and
Negotiation in Washington, DC, 31 HOUSING STUD. 305, 306 (2015).
352.
Law school clinics have played an important role in providing legal support for cooperative housing development in Washington, D.C. See, e.g., Community Development Law
Clinic, U. OF D.C. https://www.law.udc.edu/page/CommunityDevelopment, (last visited
Nov. 6, 2019).
353.
See Peter Pitegoff, Worker Ownership in Enron’s Wake—Revisiting a Community Development Tactic, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 239, 244–45 (2004) (explaining that worker ownership generally refers to enterprises where workers buy in to the business and obtain either
indirect ownership through a beneficial trust (e.g., an ESOP), or direct ownership through
a worker cooperative entity structure).
354.
See Jessica Gordon Nembhard, Principles and Strategies for Reconstruction: Models of African American Community-Based Cooperative Economic Development, 12 HARV. J. AFR. AM. PUB.
POL’Y 39, 46–49 (2006). For a history of the impact of cooperative economic thought in the
AND
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355

power low-income workers. By placing ownership of business activity into the hands of local workers, the worker ownership model
ensures that the benefits of economic development—monetary
profit and job security—remain within the community. The primary vehicle for worker ownership in the U.S. has been the Employee
Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). Developed in the 1970s, the ESOP
allows for the redistribution of capital asset ownership from
wealthy business owners to their employees through the form of
356
company stock. The National Center for Employee Ownership
357
estimates over 6,000 ESOPs in the U.S. as of 2016. Alongside the
ESOP, the worker-owned cooperative is a nontraditional business
ownership structure that challenges the capitalist assumption that
business enterprises must be privately owned and autocratically
managed. In a worker-owned cooperative, governance rights are
based upon the democratic principle of “one-person-one-vote,” rather than a “one-share-one-vote” concept where voting rights are
358
solely tied to a member’s capital investment in the business. For
example, in California, the cities of Richmond and Oakland have
sought to integrate employee ownership into the economic system
through a project led by the nonprofit Project Equity, in collaboration with the Sustainable Economies Law Center and the East Bay
359
Community Law Center. The project was designed to launch and
scale up local cooperative businesses and convert existing busi360
nesses to employee ownership models. Another example exists in
Madison, Wisconsin, where the city has committed to spending $1
million a year, over a five-year period, to establish new worker co361
operatives. In other cities, governments have supported the deBlack community, see generally JESSICA GORDON NEMBHARD, COLLECTIVE COURAGE: A
HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE (2014).
355.
See Pitegoff, supra note 353, at 241 (“Rather than an end in itself or just another way
of doing business, worker ownership can be a vital element of a broader job creation, community organizing, or community revitalization strategy.”).
356.
See Michael Murphy, The ESOP at Thirty: A Democratic Perspective, 41 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 655, 656–57 (2005). The author notes that the ESOP was the result of a collaboration
between economist Louis Kelso and Senator Russell Long. Codified as a retirement benefit
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the ESOP enables
companies to distribute company stock to employees and, in many case, earn a tax incentive.
Id. at 257.
357.
Employee Ownership by the Numbers, NAT’L CTR. EMP. OWNERSHIP (Sep. 2019),
https://www.nceo.org/articles/esops-by-the-numbers.
358.
Carmen Huertas-Noble, Worker-Owned and Unionized Worker-Owned Cooperatives: Two
Tools to Address Income Inequality, 22 CLINICAL L. REV. 325 (2016).
359.
See generally PROJECT EQUITY, A BLUEPRINT FOR CREATING PATHWAYS TO OWNERSHIP
FOR LOW AND MODERATE INCOME WORKERS IN THE SF BAY AREA (2015),
https://www.planbayarea.org/sites/default/files/pdf/prosperity/East_Bay_Community_La
w_Center_Blueprint_for_Creating_Pathways_to_Ownership.pdf.
360.
Id. at 2.
361.
See KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13, at 46; Co-operative Enterprises for Job Creation and
Business Development, CITY OF MADISON (Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.cityofmadison.com/
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velopment of benefit corporations, hybrid entities, and sharing
economy initiatives that may better reflect community needs and
362
capitalize on existing community-based assets. Importantly, however, scholars note that calls for self-determination through social
entrepreneurship and business ownership are unlikely to reach citizens trapped in extreme poverty. Professor Louis Howells has long
called for a nuanced approach, developing individual capacities of
363
the extremely poor to bring greater stability to their lives.
Lastly, alongside democratizing the ownership of land and labor, economic democracy requires a democratization of the ownership of capital circulating within and through a community.
Scholars have argued that city-owned banks and credit unions with
local involvement can empower citizens to dictate how capital is
used within their community, whether to reduce tax burdens or
364
support important public services. In the context of CED, Professor Susan Jones explains that democratizing the ownership of capital calls for “equal access to the social and economic benefits of development” and “empowerment for residents as shareholders of a
365
community’s economic development projects.” This may require
a restructuring of the financial incentives that motivate investors to
participate in market-based CED programs, but it is not an impossible task. Economic inclusion initiatives in places like Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, reveal the viability of equitable development strate366
gies. A former rust belt city, Pittsburgh has recently seen growth
in the healthcare, education, and technology sectors. To help
promote equitable development, William Generett created Urban
Innovation21, a consortium of 20 businesses, nonprofits, and government organizations that use a combination of business incentives, grants, internships, and training programs to promote wealth

dpced/economicdevelopment/co-operative-enterprises-for-job-creation-and-businessdevelopment/1646/.
362.
See, e.g., Deborah Groban Olson, Fair Exchange: Providing Citizens with Equity Managed
by a Community Trust, in Return for Government Subsidies or Tax Breaks to Businesses, 15 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231 (2006); Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain “The Just Rewards of So Much Struggle”: Local-Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37 (2006).
363.
See Louise A. Howells, The Dimensions of Microenterprise: A Critical Look at Microenterprise as a Tool to Alleviate Poverty, 9 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 161 (2000).
364.
See generally Mehrsa Baradaran, Jim Crow Credit, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 887 (2019)
(describing several legislative responses to credit inequality).
365.
Susan R. Jones, Transactional Law, Equitable Development, and Clinical Legal Education,
14 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 213, 213 (2005); see also Scott L. Cummings et al., supra note 276, at 159; DARITY JR., ET AL., supra note 104, at 44 (“[C]ontrary to
conventional wisdom, earnings and other types of income are not key determinants of
wealth. . . . The linchpin for wealth accumulation is the transfer of resources across generations.”).
366.
See KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13, at 22.
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367

generation in disadvantaged communities. Other cities have created opportunities for “micro” impact investments by community368
based entities and even community members themselves. For example, in 2014, the Vermont Department of Financial Regulation
created the Vermont Small Business Offering (VSBO). The VSBO
includes revisions to Vermont securities regulations that enable local businesses to raise equity without having to navigate complex
369
federal securities laws. To meaningfully narrow the wealth gap,
institutional investors must consider equity-oriented development
strategies, including sharing development opportunities with local
community-based investors, funding social welfare programs with
longer maturation periods than typical for impact investments, or
even accepting a lower rate of return to facilitate greater community economic empowerment. Community members should play a
more substantive role in their community’s development process,
370
including both program negotiation and program remuneration.
From land ownership to community-owned labor and capital,
progressive CED projects have leveraged nontraditional entity
structures to shift attention away from the capitalist drive for profit
371
toward a social solidarity focus on economic justice. These progressive CED projects—land trusts, land banks, housing cooperatives, worker-owned companies, community development corpora367.
Id. Scholars have noted the value of entrepreneurship to helping marginalized
communities generate wealth. Cf. Susan R. Jones, Representing Returning Citizen Entrepreneurs
in the Nation’s Capital, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 45, 46–47 (2016)
([T]here are 28.5 million U.S. businesses; 25.1 million, or 88 percent, of these are microbusinesses operating with five or fewer employees . . . The median net worth for a nonbusiness owner is $85,000, and for a business owner, it is $211,000.”). But see DARITY JR., ET AL.,
supra note 104, at 33 (“When we compile the data even those members of marginalized
communities who manage to enter into entrepreneurship largely fail. This is due to a number of factors ranging from under-capitalization, limited market access, or outright theft or
destruction.”).
368.
See KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13, at 58–59; Louisa Schibli & Janice Shade, Investing in the Local Economy: A Win/Win for Business and Community, VERMONTBIZ (June 24,
2016),
http://www.vermontbiz.com/news/investing-local-economy-winwin-business-andcommunity; Vermont Small Business Offering Exemption Helps Small Businesses to Raise Capital,
VERMONTBIZ (June 16, 2016), https://vermontbiz.com/news/june/vermont-small-businessoffering-exemption-helps-small-businesses-raise-capital; VT. DEP’T OF FIN. REGULATION, Exemptions, VERMONT.GOV (2019) https://dfr.vermont.gov/industry/securities/corporatefinance/exemptions.
369.
See, e.g., S.B. 220, 2013–14 Gen. Assemb. (Vt. 2014).
370.
For discussions of policies and initiatives designed to democratize ownership in
marginalized communities, see generally Democratizing Ownership, DEMOCRACY
COLLABORATIVE, https://democracycollaborative.org/democracycollaborative/ownership/
Democratizing%20Ownership, (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).
371.
See generally KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13; HOLDING GROUND: THE REBIRTH OF
DUDLEY STREET DOCUMENTARY (New Day Films 1996); PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR,
STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND RISE OF AN URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD (1994). Both sources
describe how a community-based nonprofit organization used the community land trust
model, the power of eminent domain, and grassroots organizing to create more affordable
housing options for residents.
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tions, social enterprises, credit unions, and others—are being explored across the country. They are helping to democratize the
ownership of the primary factors of production within economic
markets. Still, a critical challenge lies in scaling these initiatives.
While individual progressive projects may collectively chip away at
the flaws in our capitalist system, they may nevertheless struggle to
break down the walls of poverty that encircle America. Moreover,
how do we account for the range of non-market goods produced
within marginalized communities—social capital, culture, community relationships—that do not confer wealth or power in the traditional sense, and are consistently ignored by CED programs? We
not only need system influence; justice demands system change.
Thus, the third pillar of justice-based CED focuses on creating solidarity economy institutions that are community-owned, empowerment-centered, and strategically designed to combat the structural dimensions of oppression.
C. Solidarity Economy
The third pillar of justice-based CED, solidarity economy, calls for
development efforts to create empowerment-centered and community-owned institutions that address the structural dimensions
of poverty. This Article has argued that a justice-based framing of
CED will shift policy beyond localist strategies toward politically
progressive, regional, and equity-oriented solutions that advance
economic justice by democratizing the ownership of wealth. However, unless these progressive projects are replicated at scale, they
will likely fail to produce meaningful change in America’s political
372
economy or address the growing wealth gap. Further, by ignoring
non-market assets that hold value within certain neighborhoods,
but lack value in traditional markets, progressive projects fail to
address aspects of America’s economic system that disempower
black and brown communities. While projects are often temporary
or experimental, institutions are cemented into the local landscape
via legislation that triggers systemic change.
Yet, toxic narratives of poverty have hindered the adoption of
progressive law reform. Too often, we pathologize the poverty of
low-income communities by preaching a doctrine of personal re373
sponsibility. Viewing CED through a justice-based lens urges us to

372.
See Scott L. Cummings et al., supra note 276, at 160.
373.
See, e.g., Brandon M. Terry, Prisons of the Forgotten: Ghettos and Economic Injustice, in
TO SHAPE A NEW WORLD, supra note 53, at 191 (“The white majority doesn’t hold government accountable for changing the conditions in disadvantaged black communities but in-
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embrace a collective democratic responsibility to resolve our country’s legacy of institutional racism and economic segregation
374
through law reform. Scott Cummings, Susan R. Jones, Roger A.
Clay Jr., and Rashmi Dyal-Chand are but a few legal scholars who
have highlighted progressive law reform strategies to overcome the
vestiges of racial and economic segregation in America, including
“establishing community land trusts, authorizing housing trust
funds, expanding inclusionary zoning ordinances, and implement375
ing linkage programs.”
The idea of legislating community-based institutions that reflect
a social solidarity perspective of economic life and facilitate community economic empowerment is not new. Dating back to 1956 in
the town of Mondragón in Spain’s Basque region, the Mondragón
Corporation was formed to facilitate the creation of a solidarity
economy. Over a decade earlier, in 1941, a young Catholic priest,
José María Arizmendiarrieta, had settled in Mondragón as an
evangelist. At the time, the small town was riddled with poverty due
to the recent Spanish Civil War. In line with Catholic social teaching, and in response to growing globalism, Arizmendiarrieta established a technical college in Mondragón to train skilled laborers
for community-based companies. He also educated community
376
members about social solidarity and group participation. The
Mondragón Corporation has since grown into a federation of
worker-owned cooperative businesses, a self-sustaining economic
377
ecosystem of community-owned economic enterprises. As of

stead directs all its resentment and hostility toward black ghetto dwellers.”). But see DARITY
JR. ET AL., supra note 104, at 44 (arguing, “[m]ore personal responsibility or motivation on
the part of blacks is not what is needed. Rather, what is needed is an active program of
wealth redistribution and the removal of structural and discriminatory obstacles that stand
in the way of bridging the wealth divide.”).
374.
See, e.g., MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., THE TRUMPET OF CONSCIENCE 8 (2011) (“The
slums are the handiwork of a vicious system of the white society; Negroes live in them, but
they do not make them, any more than a prisoner makes a prison.”).
375.
See Scott L. Cummings et al., supra note 276, at 162; see generally Roger A. Clay Jr.
and Susan R. Jones, A Brief History of Community Economic Development, 18 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 257 (2009); RASHMI DYAL-CHAND, COLLABORATIVE CAPITALISM IN
AMERICAN CITIES: REFORMING URBAN MARKET REGULATIONS (2018).
376.
Virgil Makilan Lorenzo, Toward Cooperative Ethics: A Ricoeurian Reading of the Educational Aim of Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta, Founder of the Mondragon Cooperatives, (1998) (unpublished dissertation, University of San Diego) (on file with PhilPapers),
https://philpapers.org/rec/LORTCE.
377.
In 1995, the International Cooperative Alliance adopted the revised Statement on
the Cooperative Identity, which contains the seven Rochdale Principles, along with a list of
cooperative values—self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity.
Cooperative Identity, Values & Principles, INT’L COOP. ALL., https://www.ica.coop/en/
cooperatives/cooperative-identity (last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (“A cooperative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and
cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise.”).
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2018, it is regarded as one of the largest companies in Spain, employing over 80,000 employees across four sectors—industry, fi378
nance, retail, and knowledge.
Scholars have mixed opinions on the ability of cooperative economics to overcome the challenges of corporate capitalism and
379
neoliberalism. Nevertheless, the idea of creating solidarity economies that cement cooperative economics and participatory democracy into the local landscape has piqued the interest of communities far beyond the shores of Spain. Although not always
380
broadly publicized, and sometimes met with resistance, solidarity
economies have been implemented in many regions of the United
States for decades. For example, emerging from the American
black liberation struggle, which spanned from Reconstruction to
381
the Black Power Movement following the Civil Rights Movement,
the Jackson-Kush Plan sought to incorporate the principles of the
solidarity economy and participatory democracy into a grassroots
effort to develop the eastern Black Belt portions of Mississippi, in378.
MONDRAGON
CORPORATION,
ANNUAL
REPORT
2012
(2012),
https://www.mondragon-corporation.com/en/about-us/economic-and-financialindicators/annual-report/. The Mondragón business model incorporates seven universal
cooperative principles, known as the Rochdale Principles—(1) voluntary and open membership; (2) democratic member control; (3) member economic participation; (4) autonomy and independence; (5) education, training, and information; (6) cooperating among
cooperatives; and (7) concern for community. See Yair Levi, ‘Internal’ and ‘External’ Principles:
Inward Versus Outward Orientation in Co-operatives, 94 REV. OF INT’L CO-OPERATION 50, 51
(2001).
379.
See Richard Wolff, Yes, There Is an Alternative to Capitalism: Mondragon Shows the Way,
THE GUARDIAN (June 24, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2012/jun/24/alternative-capitalism-mondragon (“MC displays a commitment to job security
I have rarely encountered in capitalist enterprises: it operates across, as well as within, particular cooperative enterprises. MC members created a system to move workers from enterprises needing fewer to those needing more workers—in a remarkably open, transparent,
rule-governed way and with associated travel and other subsidies to minimize hardship. This
security-focused system has transformed the lives of workers, their families, and communities, also in unique ways.”). But see Laura Flanders, Talking with Chomsky,
COUNTERPUNCH.ORG (Apr. 30, 2012), https://www.counterpunch.org/2012/04/30/talkingwith-chomsky/ (“It’s worker owned, it’s not worker managed, although the management
does come from the workforce often, but it’s in a market system and they still exploit workers in South America, and they do things that are harmful to the society as a whole and they
have no choice. If you’re in a system where you must make profit in order to survive. You are
compelled to ignore negative externalities, effects on others.”).
380.
See generally JOHN CURL, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF
COOPERATION, COOPERATIVE MOVEMENTS, AND COMMUNALISM IN AMERICA (2009) (describing the largely unknown history of American cooperative movements for social change,
from farming to labor, that were each met with unique challenges and resistance).
381.
For more information on the black liberation movement, see generally GEORGE M.
FREDRICKSON, BLACK LIBERATION: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF BLACK IDEOLOGIES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA (1995) (providing a sweeping account of the struggle for
racial justice in the United States, from reconstruction to the rise of the black power movement); Adjoa Aiyetoro & Adrienne D. Davis, Historic and Modern Social Movements for Reparations: The National Coalition for Reparations in America (N’COBRA) and Its Antecedents, 16 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 687 (2010) (describing the social movement for reparations in the United
States).

410

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 53:2

382

cluding the city of Jackson. Founded in 2008 by the Malcolm X
Grassroots Movement and its parent organization, the New Afrikan
Peoples Organization, the Jackson-Kush Plan sought to foster selfdetermination, social liberation, and economic justice for histori383
cally marginalized black communities. More than simply a series
of progressive projects, it was designed to build an ecosystem of
cooperatively-owned entities via progressive legislation that generated wealth for local families while honoring non-market community-based assets.
Cooperation Jackson, the present-day outgrowth of the JacksonKush Plan, proclaims as its agenda a mission to “create jobs with
rights, dignity, and justice that generate wealth and distribute it
equitably based on the principles of cooperation, sharing, solidari384
ty, and democracy.” In the past few years, the group has taken
over abandoned buildings and vacant lots, using community land
385
trusts to nurture self-sufficiency and economic democracy. Some
have called Cooperation Jackson a radical strategy for economic

382.
The Jackson-Kush Plan was originally designed to build upon the People’s Assembly
political project that was created in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina to support Chokwe
Lumumba’s successful run for City Council. It also has roots in a number of key historical
moments in the black liberation movement, including: (1) the 1981 campaign of Kwablah
Mthawabu for mayor of Waterproof, Louisiana; (2) the Jackson Human Rights Coalition of
the late 1980s; and (3) the plans of the Provisional Government of the Republic of New Afrika, which sought to establish a community called El Malik as its capital near Bolton, Mississippi in the early 1970s. The Story of Cooperation Jackson, COOPERATION JACKSON,
https://maineworkers.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/jackson-rising-chapter1.pdf (last
visited Nov. 24, 2019).
383.
Brandon King, Building Power in a Frontline Community: The Cooperation Jackson Model,
30 SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 219, 219 (2016).
JACKSON,
384.
The
Story
of
Cooperation
Jackson,
COOPERATION
https://cooperationjackson.org/story (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). Interestingly, an earlier
group called the Provisional Government of the Republic of New Afrika (“PG-RNA”, a predecessor of Cooperation Jackson) had attempted to create a progressive community of cooperative enterprises in the early 1970s, much like that in Mondragón, Spain. Formed during the civil rights movement, the PG-RNA was a group that sought to create a majorityblack nation in the Deep South as a reparations payment for centuries of slavery and Jim
Crow racial oppression. They chose the name “El Malik” after the name that Malcolm X had
taken for himself after his break from the Nation of Islam: El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz. However, the plan was foiled by the Ku Klux Klan. On the day before the PG-RNA planned to move
into the small town of Bolton, Mississippi where they had agreed to purchases twenty acres
of land to start their community, PG-RNA leaders witnessed “a hand-painted sign near the
property that the KKK had posted: NIGGERS, THERE WILL BE NO MEETING HERE
SUNDAY. FREE SIX-FOOT HOLES.” NAPO and MXGM were later formed in the 1980s and
1990s respectively to continue to advocate for social and economic justice for black American communities, and their work continues today. See Katie Gilbert, The Socialist Experiment,
OXFORD AMERICAN (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.oxfordamerican.org/item/1296-thesocialist-experiment.
385.
See, e.g., The Kuwasi Balagoon Center for Economic Democracy and Development,
COOPERATION JACKSON, https://cooperationjackson.org/lumumba-center/ (last visited Nov.
20, 2019).
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development because of its shift away from capitalist norms. Indeed, Mayor Chokwe Antar Lumumba has been deemed “the most
radical mayor in America” for his audacious plan to make Jackson
387
the Mondragón of the South. Mayor Lumumba’s vision centers
on co-governance, including forming “assemblies to elevate ordinary people’s voices, an independent political party accountable to
the assemblies, and publicly financ[ing] economic development
388
through local cooperatives.” Held every quarter, the People’s Assemblies are designed to provide a platform for community members to critique government decision-making and engage in the cocreation of sociopolitical life, evocative of the community action
agencies launched during President Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on
Poverty that were later defunded. While Lumumba’s emphasis on
cooperative economics and participatory democracy may seem radical because of its roots in the black liberation movement, the notion that community economic empowerment is radical merely
underscores the hegemonic nature of neoliberalism. Indeed, Lumumba’s ideas harken back to an oft-forgotten moment of American democracy—Radical Reconstruction—that once held similar
promise for black residents of Jackson, Mississippi.
During America’s Reconstruction period after the Civil War, the
Freedmen’s Bureau laid the foundation for a more equitable ownership of land, labor, and capital by engaging the participation of
black citizens in local government. Mississippi boasted the highest
recruitment of black Americans into government among southern
states with more than 200 black citizens elected to office in an
eleven-year period. Sadly, a strategy of organized terrorism called
the Mississippi Plan trampled upon the progress of formerly enslaved Africans by using violence and state-sponsored racial op389
pression to reclaim power for white conservative Democrats.
Throughout the early to mid-twentieth century, Jim Crow policies,
white flight, and decades of neglect and disinvestment by local
government drove black neighborhoods in Jackson, Mississippi,
deep into the well of poverty, a familiar story to many black urban
390
communities across America. Like many American cities, Jackson, Mississippi—the place where civil rights activist Medgar Evers

386.
Cf. A Socialist Southern Strategy in Jackson, COOPERATION JACKSON (June 13, 2018),
https://cooperationjackson.org/blog/2018/7/13/a-socialist-southern-strategy-in-jackson.
387.
D.D. Guttenplan, Is This the Most Radical Mayor in America?, THE NATION (Nov. 17,
2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/is-this-the-most-radical-mayor-in-america/.
388.
Nathan Schneider, The Revolutionary Life and Strange Death of a Radical Black Mayor,
VICE (Apr. 17, 2016), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/5gj7da/free-the-land-v23n2.
389.
See Gilbert, supra note 384.
390.
See supra, section I.A., describing how racism perpetuated poverty in many communities across America.
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was killed by a member of the White Citizens Council in 1963 for
391
decrying racial oppression—still struggles with racial tension.
Perhaps the only things radical about Mayor Lumumba’s vision are
his willingness to return to the participatory democracy of the Radical Reconstruction era and his commitment to the legacy of coop392
erative economics in black American life.
Other examples of solidarity economies abound but must be
scaled to take root in the American landscape. For example, progressive local governments have passed legislation for impact investors to support minority-owned businesses, helping to connect lo393
cal products and services to local demand. In Jamaica Plain in
Boston, Massachusetts, the Boston Impact Initiative has taken an
economic justice approach to empowering local residents and
business owners to establish a community-controlled economy by
providing a range of integrated capital tools—”loans, credit enhancements, equity investments, royalty finance, direct public offerings, crowdfunding, grants, etc.”—to local community-based
394
businesses. In Cincinnati, the Greater Cincinnati Foundation, in
partnership with city government, created the Minority Business
395
Accelerator, creating nearly 2000 jobs since 2003. Progressive local governments have also launched revolving loan funds managed
by CDFIs or local credit unions to finance economic empowerment
through community-based cooperative start-ups and small to midsized businesses. For example, Minneapolis-St. Paul created the
Ready for Rail program to ensure that their new light rail system
would benefit all community members. The program created a $4
million revolving loan fund that has made over 200 zero-interest
loans to small businesses, many of which are owned by black Amer396
icans. Additionally, in Oakland, California, Impact Hub Oakland
and Self-Help Federal Credit Union created the Runway Project, a
new five-year pilot program that “will explore how to fill in the

391.
See Jesmyn Ward, Racism Is ‘Built into the Very Bones’ of Mississippi, THE ATLANTIC
(Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/02/jesmyn-wardmississippi/552500/.
392.
Indeed, Fannie Lou Hamer, a well-known civil rights activist for voting rights, was
instrumental in the cooperative movement by organizing the Freedom Farm in Sunflower
County, Mississippi in 1969 to secure food sovereignty for marginalized black families. As
political economist Jessica Gordon Nembhard asserts, “there seems to be no period in U.S.
history where African Americans were not involved in economic cooperation of some type.”
JESSICA GORDON NEMBHARD, COLLECTIVE COURAGE: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN
COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 28 (2014).
393.
See KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13, at 56; Toussaint, supra note 19, at 74–75.
394.
See Investing for Justice, BOSTON IMPACT INITIATIVES, http://bostonimpact.org (last
visited Nov. 20, 2019).
395.
See JAMES A. CROWDER JR., ALL-IN CINCINNATI: EQUITY IS THE PATH TO INCLUSIVE
PROSPERITY (1), https://www.gcfdn.org/Portals/0/All-In_Cincinnati_Final%20Report.pdf.
396.
See KELLY & MCKINLEY, supra note 13, at 58.
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‘friends and family’ capital gap for entrepreneurs of color”
through a dedicated pool of capital for business loans and a business accelerator providing technical training and assistance for lo397
cal residents.
Some solidarity economy projects have created new economic
markets altogether, capturing the hidden value in non-market
transactions and stimulating new forms of social capital. For example, Dr. Edgar S. Cahn, creator of Time Dollars and the founder of
TimeBanks USA, popularized timebanking in America as an alternative time-based currency to facilitate the exchange of skills and
experience within communities by individuals with limited access
398
to traditional capital. As Dr. Cahn explains, timebanking can
“enable individuals and communities to become more selfsufficient, to insulate themselves from the vagaries of politics and
to tap the capacity of individuals who were in effect being relegat399
ed to the scrap heap and dismissed as freeloaders.” Another example is the platform cooperative, a democratically-controlled digital platform that is cooperatively-owned and governed by its users,
eliminating the need for traditional venture-capital funding and
promoting the equitable distribution of power among members.
400
Popular examples include Fairbnb, a cooperatively-owned online
hospitality service for people to lease or rent short-term lodging,
401
and Loconomics, a cooperatively-owned, online marketplace that
enables customers to find freelance labor for everyday tasks. These
solidarity economies enable community members and communitybased organizations to build wealth and experience the dignity
that true political equality brings. CED practitioners can identify
such opportunities by conducting inventories of community-based
assets to map community needs and refocus revitalization efforts
from a “deficit-oriented” approach toward a community economic
402
empowerment mindset. Local governments can advance legislation that acknowledges the economic interdependence within and
across regions, and the need for more equitable distribution of
397.
See Oscar Perry Abello, Closing the “Friends and Family” Capital Gap for Entrepreneurs of
Color, NEXTCITY (Oct. 25, 2016), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/runway-project-friendsfamily-capital-gap-entrepreneurs.
398.
See EDGAR S. CAHN, NO MORE THROW-AWAY PEOPLE: THE CO-PRODUCTION
IMPERATIVE 5–6 (2d ed. 2004).
399.
Id. at 6.
400.
FAIRBNB, https://fairbnb.coop/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).
401.
LOCONOMICS COOPERATIVE, https://loconomics.com/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).
402.
There are existing tools that can assist SIB practitioners in mapping the needs of
marginalized communities, crafting state and local public policy strategies to promote equitable development, and identifying the current state of investments and ownership in those
EQUITABLE
DEVELOPMENT
TOOLKIT,
communities.
See
POLICYLINK,
https://www.policylink.org/resources-tools/edtk (last visited Nov. 20, 2019); KELLY &
MCKINLEY, supra note 13, at 51.
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community resources. These progressive mechanisms can help
ensure that CED programs not only improve the lives of people living in low-income communities but also promote long-term economic justice.
CONCLUSION
“It is learning how to take our differences and make them strengths.
For the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. They
may allow us to temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they
will never enable us to bring about genuine change.”—Audre
404
Lorde
A Harris poll administered in the summer of 1967, following the
explosion of race riots in cities like Los Angeles, Detroit, and Newark, revealed that 40% of white Americans at that time believed
that “the way Negroes have been treated in the slums and ghettos
405
of big cities” was a primary contributing factor to social unrest.
Prominent civil rights leaders, such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
were also beginning to connect racial discrimination against black
Americans to a broader critique of America’s political and eco406
nomic system. In a posthumously published essay, titled “A Testament of Hope,” that discussed the black rebellions during the
Civil Rights Movement, Dr. King asserted,
It is forcing America to face all its interrelated flaws—
racism, poverty, militarism, and materialism. It is exposing
the evils that are rooted deeply in the whole structure of
our society. It reveals systemic rather than superficial flaws

403.
See Parlow, supra note 147, at 70 (suggesting region-wide taxation as a strategy “to
distribute resources where they are needed in an attempt to address regional problems such
as poverty and segregation. In doing so, a region could better spread the costs and resources
and avoid the free-rider problem that benefits the affluent localities in the current localist
structure. In these and other regards, equitable regionalism would trigger a ‘regional revenue balance mechanism[]’ that seeks to encourage fiscal transparency, limit inequitable
interlocal subsidization, and diminish the negative externalities that localities impose on
one another.”).
404.
Audre Lorde, The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House, in THIS
BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR 25, 26-27 (Cherríe Moraga & Gloria Anzaldúa eds., 2d ed. 1983).
405.
TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 43.
406.
See Chartier, supra note 20, at 274 (noting that “[d]uring the final period of his life,
Martin Luther King focused his energy with increased intensity on economic issues . . . he
grew more and more attentive to the links between the racial agenda of the civil rights
movement and the question of economic democracy.”).
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and suggests that radical reconstruction of society itself is
407
the real issue to be faced.
Despite a growing sentiment that low-income black communities
408
have become “prisons of forgotten men,” CED in America has
historically failed to address America’s legacy of institutional racism, systemic economic inequality, and sustained racial segregation. Place-based CED programs like Urban Renewal sought to improve blighted urban neighborhoods, yet they have led to
gentrification and increased poverty concentration. More recent
people-based CED strategies, such as HUD’s Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing program, have perpetuated a racialized construction of distressed urban neighborhoods, while undermining
the existence of positive social capital and non-market communitybased assets. These approaches to urban revitalization have been
influenced by a neoliberal political economy that relies upon theories of economic growth that benefit private investors through
marginal improvements in the lives of the poor, and little change
to the status quo of wealth inequality in America. Sadly, although
King delivered his famous “I Have a Dream” speech on the steps of
the Lincoln Memorial over fifty years ago, his words still ring true
today for many low-income black Americans—”The Negro lives on
a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material
409
prosperity.”
Emerging CED innovations, such as the social impact bond, ostensibly overcome the many criticisms of place-based and peoplebased CED models. However, despite its proven ability to stimulate
positive social change, this Article has argued that the emerging
SIB model, much like the place-based and people-based CED strategies of old, will struggle to achieve economic justice because of its
grounding in the hegemony of neoliberalism. Building upon the
work of progressive scholars in local government law, housing law,
and community economic development law, this Article has articulated a new justice-based conceptual framework of CED to guide
the implementation of current and emerging economic development programs. The justice-based approach urges local governments and public policy advocates alike to consider the economic
values and political principles that underlie conventional ap-

407.
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., A Testament of Hope, in THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES, supra note 2, at 313.
408.
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR, All Labor Has Dignity, in THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES, supra note 2, at 105.
409.
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., I Have a Dream, in THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES, supra note 2, at 217.
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proaches to CED, proposing instead the guiding tenets of the solidarity economy where non-market human assets are valued and
community relationships are prioritized.
The three pillars of justice-based CED—social solidarity, economic democracy, and solidarity economy institutions—not only
challenge the dogma of market fundamentalism and neoliberal
politics that have overshadowed much of America’s poverty alleviation efforts since Reconstruction, it also advances a strong democratic vision of economic life. Innovative market-based strategies
may allow us to temporarily beat neoliberalism at its own game, but
they will never enable us to bring about genuine change. As Audre
Lorde once remarked, “[t]he master’s tools will never dismantle
the master’s house.” Perhaps with a focus on justice, America’s
emerging CED programs can finally begin to unravel the web of
social subordination and racial capitalism that has mired so many
families in the trappings of poverty. Perhaps then, our heralded
American Dream can finally become something worth fighting for.

